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Abstract 
The thesis is about immigrants’ cognitive and psychological commitment to the political system 
in Germany. In the light of terrorist actions, migrant political integration has become one of the 
most pressing concerns of European immigration countries over the last years. More precisely, 
my dissertation focusses on the relationship between migrants’ ethnic, religious, and national 
identity (i.e. psychological group memberships) and their attitudinal incorporation into the 
democratic political system of Germany. While national identity is perceived within public 
discourses as a bridge to migrants’ psychological adaption to the mainstream political system, 
ethnic or religious identity are conceived as barriers. Thus, my main interest for the analyses is 
to evaluate how senses of belonging to the ethnic and religious minority group or the national 
majority affects recent and long-term immigrants’ attitudes towards the self in German politics 
(i.e. being a Person who is interested in German politics), as well as attitudes towards the 
democratic regime (i.e. being satisfied with the democratic regime in Germany). Therefore, the 
thesis first assesses the conditions of identification with the national political community in 
Germany of recently arrived immigrants. Second, it examines the impact of national identity as 
well as ethnic identity on the inclination of recent as well as long-term immigrants to become 
interested in national politics in Germany. Thereby, I also discuss the meaning of a so-called 
dual ethno-national identity. Third, I analyse how religious (i.e. Muslim) identity relates to 
migrants’ positive evaluations of the German democratic regime and how the impact is 
moderated by their ethnic, national group membership, as well as generational status. 
Keywords: Political integration, social identification, immigrants, Germany 
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Chapter 1: Migrants’ Group Identities and Attitudinal Integration 
into Politics – Introduction, Overview, and General Framework 
1.1 Introduction, motivation, and research questions of the doctoral thesis 
Recurring events of terrorism since the early 2000s by Muslim extremists, e.g. witnessed in 
Madrid (2004), London (2005), and recently in France (2015) and Belgium (2016), as well as 
recurring occasions of political unrest by immigrant adolescents (e.g. in Paris), have raised 
public debates in Western Europe as well as in Germany on ethnic minorities’ alleged failure to 
psychologically commit to the democratic political systems of European societies. 
Paradoxically, the terrorist attacks as well as most of the political activism currently committed 
in the support of political Islam, i.e. ‘the belief that Islam should guide social and political as 
well as personal life’ (Berman 2003, 257), and political unrest are commonly conducted by 
second- or even third-generation immigrants. These immigrants were born and raised within 
European societies’ educational and social system, and they commonly possess national 
citizenship and know the receiving society’s language. Thus, the search for the condition(s) 
under which ethnic minority group members become psychologically committed to or alienated 
from the political systems of European receiving societies or account for those outcomes has 
been gaining increasing momentum.  
Against this paradoxically empirical background and puzzle, there have been raised 
contentious debates over the last years within the public and the media on the role of migrants’ 
national and ethno-cultural identity that may account for their psychological engagement with 
politics of the receiving country (or the lack thereof)1. It is generally assumed that migrants’ 
ethnic or religious identities are psychological barriers for these individuals to become political 
actors within the realms and rules of the European receiving-country’s political system. It is 
also believed that these identities prevent the development of favourable attitudes towards its 
democratic institutions, personnel, and government, as well as these regimes. Instead, they are 
suggested to foster the emergence of ethnic-group or homeland-based political orientations as 
well as political attitudes that run counter to the political objectives and secular values of current 
                                               
1 The terms “identity” and “identification” are used interchangeably within this dissertation to refer to an 
individual’s self-ascribed psychological memberships in social categories: whereas national identification 
denotes identification with the receiving country, ethno-cultural identification refers to ethnic and religious 
identification. While the former refers to the identification with the ethnic community or the country of origin, 
the latter denotes the identification with the religious denomination or community.  
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European democracies that clearly separate religious from state powers. In consequence, and 
especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in New York, there is, according to Modood 
(2003, 100), an ‘anti-Muslim wind blowing across the European continent’. This is also 
expressed in increasing levels of anti-Islamic attitudes among the native population that can be 
detected across European states, which is also referred to as Islamophobia (Helbling 2013; 
Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Thus, for instance, 61% of German citizens have the opinion that 
Islam does not fit into the Western world, and 57% of non-Muslim German citizens perceive 
Islam as a threat due to different cultural values (Hafez and Schmidt 2015). These anxieties and 
phobias concerning cultural diversity through immigration also found their way into political 
institutions such as political parties in Germany. Thus, the recent draft of the party platform of 
the AFD (Alternative für Deutschland [Alternative for Germany]), clearly proposes that 
political Islam poses a threat to the free and democratic order. Furthermore, the draft states that 
‘Islam does not belong to Germany’ (Alternative für Deutschland 2016, 37). Additionally, more 
moderate voices and established parties within Germany, maintaining a Christian tradition, such 
as the Christian-Social Union (CSU), are becoming increasingly critical towards political Islam 
and migrant integration: ‘Wir müssen uns stärker und kritischer mit dem politischen Islam 
auseinandersetzen, denn er hintertreibt, dass sich Menschen bei uns integrieren [We need more 
and more critical to deal with political Islam, because it thwarts that people integrate with us]’2. 
In contrast to immigrants’ ethno-cultural identities, it is assumed that the national identity of 
the receiving country – mainly defined culturally by its alleged Christian-occidental values and 
traditions (‘Leitkultur’) – provides the remedy and psychological bridge for immigrants to 
become psychologically integrated in the democratic political systems in Europe. This ‘retreat 
of multiculturalism’ (Joppke 2004) is also reflected at the cross-national European level within 
recent discussions on the failure of multicultural policies. Thus, Prime Minister David Cameron 
was claiming at the Munich Security Conference in 2011 that:  
Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different 
cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the 
mainstream. […] We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities 
behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values. […] This hands-
off tolerance has only served to reinforce the sense that not enough is shared. 
And this all leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And the search for 
something to belong to and something to believe in can lead […] [to] a 
process of radicalisation. […] instead of encouraging people to live apart, 
                                               
2 Secretary General of the CSU (Christian-Social Union) Anread Scheuer in an interview with the newspaper 
‚Die Welt‘ from April 22, 2016 (Vitzthum 2016). 
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we need a clear sense of shared national identity that is open to everyone 
(Cameron 2011) 
The meaning of national identity for understanding multiculturalism is also emphasised by 
scholars. Hence, Modood (2007, 2) suggests that multiculturalism should be understood as 
combining ‘the recognition of group differences within the public sphere of laws, policies, 
democratic discourses […] [with] a shared citizenship and national identity’.  
Yet, despite the alleged culturally-based negative relationships between ethnic or 
religious identity and immigrants’ psychological accommodation in democratic political 
systems, and respective positive relationship between national identity and migrants’ 
democratic adaption as currently discussed in the wider public of European receiving societies, 
the precise meanings of those identities as well as the mechanisms that link them with migrants’ 
alienation or attachment to politics are often less unequivocal, and this is also true with respect 
to empirical evidence.  
Current scholarly work on this topic is still far from conclusive and is lacking systematic 
research analysing migrants’ ethnic, religious, and national identity and migrants’ psychological 
integration into receiving-society politics. Indeed, existing research is characterised by 
considerations of varying strands of disciplines as well as various results that often contradict 
the simple equations drawn by the public concerning the impact of migrants’ religious or ethnic 
identity: Thus, there is an accumulation of grievance-based social movement research as well 
as group consciousness literature within Europe and the US, which supports that socially 
deprived and stigmatised ethnic and religious identities, as well as so-called dual identities, 
involving a combination of migrants’ ethnic or religious minority identity together with national 
identity, may have unique effects on immigrants’ cognitive intentions towards normative 
political action within host societies but also conventional policy-related participation such as 
voting (e.g. Fleischmann, Phalet, and Klein 2011; Simon and Klandermans 2001; ; Simon and 
Grabow 2010; Simon and Ruhs 2008; e.g. US research on group consciousness: Shingles 1981; 
Verba et al. 1993). Moreover, cross-country research in Europe on religion and democracy 
satisfaction or trust in political institutions shows that Muslims evince nearly the same levels 
of trust in the government or even report higher levels of satisfaction with democracy than non-
Muslims in the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France (cf. Jackson and 
Doerschler 2012, 93). Also, research among Muslim and Christian adolescents in the 
Netherlands by Grundel and Maliepaard (2012) does not indicate differences in democratic 
skills between both faith communities. Furthermore, European micro-level research on political 
attitudes such as political interest and political trust, which also accounts for identification with 
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the receiving society in their statistical analysis, has found independent positive effects of 
attachment to the native majority in addition to other integration factors such as majority 
language proficiency or social involvement with natives (e.g. Caballero 2009; Diehl and Urbahn 
1998; Eggert and Giugni 2010; Fleischmann, Phalet, and Swyngedouw 2013; Maxwell 2010b). 
At the same time, the identification with the ethno-religious group is shown to have either no 
independent effects or additional negative effects on political trust-related measures (Caballero 
2009; Fleischmann, Phalet, and Swyngedouw 2013). However, there is also German-based 
research pointing to the opposite effects on political interest among Turks, indicating a negative 
effect of national identity and a positive effect of ethnic identity (Simon, Reichert, and Grabow 
2013).   
The current problems associated with previous research that prevent confident 
conclusions about the relationship between migrants’ group identities and their psychological 
adaption to politics are threefold: First, most of the previous research (e.g. Diehl and Urbahn 
1998; Eggert and Giugni 2010) does not theoretically address the precise mechanisms of how 
religious, ethnic, and national identity relate to migrants’ political attitudes towards the host 
society. Second, previous studies are inconclusive as they address different forms of political 
attitudes (e.g. political interest, or political trust). Third, most of the former European research 
that endeavours to explore the impact of migrants’ group identities on their attitudinal 
incorporation into mainstream politics does not address group differences between immigrants 
of various origins (e.g. European Union versus non-European Union (i.e. third) countries). By 
studying different immigrant groups together, the studies implicitly assume that the effects are 
the same across immigrant groups (e.g. Turks and Italians). Finally but importantly, previous 
research mainly employs cross-sectional data and methods, which prohibit drawing causal 
inferences about the impact of migrants’ social identities. In sum, the existing research literature 
is characterised by a current inability to provide consistent contributions to the empirical and 
societal puzzle concerning the relationships between migrants’ social identities and attitudinal 
integration into host-society politics. 
Against the background of existing lacunae in research as well as public debates, the 
present doctoral thesis seeks to provide a systematic research contribution to the European study 
of whether ethnic minorities’ religious, ethnic, and national identities provide psychological 
barriers or bridges to immigrants’3 attitudinal integration into politics in Western Europe.  
                                               
3 Here, I will use the term “immigrants” to refer to people who themselves (first generation) or at least one of 
their parents have migrated to Western countries (second generation). 
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Therefore, I will focus on immigrants in Germany, which provides an especially relevant 
and interesting European country to study the relationship between migrants’ social identities 
and political attitudes for at least two reasons: On the one hand, Germany provides one of the 
main immigration countries in Europe since the period of labour recruitment in the 1950s and 
1960s, which has attracted and still attracts considerable numbers of immigrants of various 
origins from EU (European Union) and non-EU countries, as well as immigrants of Muslim 
faith, e.g. from Turkey (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2009). On the other hand, Germany still 
formally excludes considerable parts of its immigrant population from formal and objective 
group membership (national citizenship), and thus from the formal pathway into its politics by 
its restrictive citizenship law: Statistics show that 44% of residents in Germany with a migration 
background do not hold German citizenship (cf. Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 
2016, 142). 
The thesis focusses on the attitudinal bases of political behaviour to open up the black 
box behind migrants’ political activity. It thereby addresses the political attitudes of political 
interest and democracy satisfaction and asks for their conditions as well as specifically for the 
impact of migrants’ social identities. There are good reasons for choosing those attitudes for 
analysing migrants’ attitudinal integration into the political system: First, they capture two main 
premises of democratic systems that involve participatory and representative elements: to have 
citizens who participate as well as to have citizens who perceive the political system to be 
sensitive and responsive to their demands. Moreover, both attitudes are conceptually 
comprehensive for capturing migrants’ attitudinal integration in politics because political 
interest is a sample of “internal” and democracy satisfaction of “external” political attitudes, 
referring either to individuals’ attitudes towards the self in politics (e.g. political interest, 
political self-efficacy) or individuals’ attitudes towards external objects of the political system 
(e.g. authorities, the regime) (for the difference between internal and external political efficacy, 
see Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Craig and Maggiotto 1982). According to Maxwell 
(2013, 285) both kinds are particularly informative about migrant political integration as they 
reveal immigrants’ thoughts and beliefs about the political system as well as how immigrants 
feel about their political role within the destination country. Further, political interest and 
democracy satisfaction are valuable indicators as they are samples of cognitive and affective 
political attitudes that are both suggested to predict by psychological and political science 
literature conative (political) orientations and (political) behaviour (e.g. Rosenberg and 
Hovland 1960; Niedermeyer 2005). Thus, van Deth and Elff describe interest in politics as the 
line ‘between democratic and non-democratic citizenship’ (2004, 478). Also democracy 
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satisfaction can be expected to increase the likelihood of political participation because it 
implies that the regime is perceived to be responsive to the wishes and needs of its citizens and 
thus to be influenceable. At the same time, people who perceive the political system as 
legitimate are suggested to be more likely to comply with the rules (cf. Kelleher and Wolak 
2007, 707). Thus, a lack of external positive political attitudes and thus lack of responsiveness 
and legitimacy of the political system may call the democratic system into question and 
encourages immigrants to seek political change, protest, or engage in antisystem behaviour 
(Farah, Barnes, and Heunks 1979; Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982). Accordingly, Tillie, 
Slootman, and Fennema (2007) show in their study among Muslims in Amsterdam that a lack 
of political trust relates to alienation and radicalisation. Similarly, Maxwell (2010b) summarises 
Muslims’ trust in the government: ‘Trust in government (or the lack thereof) is not the only 
measure of alienation but it is an important indicator of Muslim attachment to mainstream 
politics because it measures the degree to which individuals feel government authority is 
legitimate and responsive to their needs’ (90). Last but not least, those two specific examples 
of external vs. internal, respectively cognitive vs. affective political attitudes are chosen as 
dependent variables of investigation due a lack of other measures available in the empirical data 
used within the present thesis.  
Concerning these two important indicators of migrants’ attitudinal integration into 
politics (i.e. political interest and regime satisfaction), the core of the thesis (i.e. four empirical 
chapters that are based on single research articles) will elucidate specific questions concerning 
the explanatory role of ethnic, religious, and national identity among various immigrant groups 
in Germany. Concerning the public debates within Western Europe as well as in Germany that 
are currently predominant around the topic of European receiving-societies’ national identities 
that immigrants need to adopt in order to become attitudinally integrated into European 
democracies, the empirical chapter will allow the illumination of the conditions that facilitate 
the national identity of immigrants as well as the effect that national identity may have on 
migrants’ self-image as political actors (i.e. being a person who is interested in national politics) 
or positive attitude towards the political democratic regime (i.e. being satisfied with the regime). 
Phrased differently, this dissertation highlights and treats national identity as the outcome of 
interest as well as an explanatory factor. Accordingly, empirical Chapter 2 will first empirically 
and theoretically elaborate on the conditions of immigrants’ national identity in Germany, 
before empirical Chapter 3 assesses its impact on migrants’ interest in national (i.e. German) 
politics. Within a third step, in empirical Chapter 4, the impact of national identity on migrants’ 
interest in politics in Germany will be gauged in combination with a deprived ethnic identity, 
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which has been found in literature to have in terms of a dual identity an independent effect on 
migrants’ cognitive mobilisation and motivation to partake politically (e.g. Klandermans, van 
der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008; Simon and Klandermans 2001). Last but not least, 
empirical Chapter 5 will examine the moderating role of migrants’ national identity on their 
religious identity (in terms of religious belonging and behaviour) and satisfaction with 
democratic governance in Germany.  
Table 1.1 provides a first overview of my thesis that can be divided into three parts with 
respect to the outcome that is studied within each of the empirical chapters. The respective 
subsidiary questions of the chapters are: (1) What are the conditions for migrants’ national (i.e. 
German) identity (Chapter 2)? (2) What is the impact of German identity on immigrant 
members’ interest in receiving-country (i.e. German) politics (Chapter 3)? (3) What is the effect 
of dual ethno-national identity on migrants’ general interest in politics within Germany (Chapter 
4)? (4) What is the influence of religious identity (in terms of religious belonging and 
behaviour) and, in particular, of Muslim identity on migrants’ positive affect towards (i.e. 
satisfaction with) democratic governance in Germany in dependency on migrants’ national 
identity, generational status, and ethnic group membership (Chapter 5)?  
In order to explore the research questions within Chapters 2 to 5 theoretically, these 
empirical chapters involve general theoretical insights from the social psychological and 
sociology literature (e.g. Gordon 1964; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
1995) as well as cross-country empirical evidence to delineate the conditions that foster 
immigrants’ national identity in Germany as well as to define the theoretical mechanisms that 
link migrants’ group identities4 to their internal and external political attitudes towards the 
German political system.  
 
  
                                               
4 In the following, I treat the terms “social idenity,” “group identity”, and “collective identity” interchangeably, 
which refer to the phenomena of psychological membership in a social group or category. 
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Table 1.1. Outline of the thesis 
Chapter Topic Data Co-
authors 
Article History (to 05/2016) 
1 General 
framework 
   
 Part 1    
2 National identity SCIP Claudia 
Diehl & 
Peter 
Mühlau 
First submission to Ethnicities in 01/2015: 
Published in 02/2016:  
“Between ethnic options and ethnic boundaries – Recent 
Polish and Turkish migrants' identification with 
Germany.” Ethnicities 16 (2): 236–60. 
 Part 2    
3 Political interest  SCIP Diana D. 
Schacht 
First submission to International Migration Review 
in 01/2015: 
Revise and Resubmit in 05/2015 but rejection in 
12/2015 
Second submission planned to Ethnic and Racial 
Studies in 05/2016 
4 Political interest GSEOP Non First submission to Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies in 05/2013: 
Published (online first) in 11/2013: 
“Immigrants' Ethnic Identification and Political 
Involvement in the Face of Discrimination: A Longitudinal 
Study of the German Case.” Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 40 (3): 339–62. 
 
Published in Ethnicities in 2015 
Published in Ethnicities in 2015 
 
 Part 3    
5 Regime 
satisfaction 
GSEOP Non First submission to Social Science Research in 
03/2016: 
Under review since 04/2016 
 6 Summary, 
Discussion and 
Outlook 
   
 
Empirically, Chapters 2 – 5 employ, in contrast to previous research, longitudinal data 
collected from recently immigrated or long-term immigrants from either traditional (i.e. guest 
worker) or new sending countries in Germany. While traditional immigrant groups involve 
migrants from nations of the former labour recruitment period in the 1950s and 1960s (i.e. 
Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and Southern Europe (i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain)), 
new immigrant groups refer to immigrants from the former Soviet Union as well as Poland in 
the aftermath of the fall of the Iron Curtain. More specifically, the empirical Chapters 2 and 3 
use data from recently immigrated respondents of Turkish and Polish origin, who are within 
their first three years in Germany, from the international project ‘Socio-Cultural Integration 
Processes of New Immigrants in Europe’ (SCIP) (Diehl et al. 2015a). The present thesis thereby 
advances previous studies in literature that have commonly not studied political or 
identificational assimilation at the of the assimilation process of immigrants. In contrast, 
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Chapters 4 and 5 employ data that have been collected within different waves of the German 
Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) from immigrants of various ethnic origins who are usually 
already for some years/decades in Germany or are immigrant descendants (Wagner, Frick, and 
Schupp 2007) (for a detailed description of the data, refer to the methods section, Section 1.4).  
The present first chapter serves to provide a broader theoretical and empirical 
introduction, overview, and synthesis of the empirical chapters that build the main part of this 
doctoral thesis. It therefore delineates and presents a general conceptual as well as theoretical 
underpinning of the research questions that frame the empirical chapters. In Section 1.2, I 
therefore first discuss the key concepts of political attitudes and integration under study in my 
doctoral work and develop a conceptual model of immigrants’ political attitudes. Before the 
delineation of the explanatory and theoretical approach of my thesis to account for the impact 
of migrants’ social identities, Section 1.3 will outline the current empirical situation in Germany 
regarding political interest and satisfaction with democracy, as well as national identity. Section 
1.4. in the following discusses the theoretical approach and derives hypotheses concerning the 
conditions and the effects of migrants’ national identity as well as of other identities (i.e. ethnic 
and religious identity) on their internal as well as external political attitudes in Germany – here, 
political interest and regime satisfaction. Section 1.5 next gives a specific and conceptual 
outline of the empirical chapters of the thesis, summarising the theoretical arguments developed 
within Section 1.4. Section 1.6 elucidates the methodological and analytical approach as well 
as the data used, before the main results of the empirical chapters are presented in line with the 
hypothesis previously presented (Section 1.7). Finally but importantly, I close with an epilogue 
(Section 1.8.).  
1.2 Conceptualising migrants’ attitudinal integration into politics 
Without a clear conceptual framework, it would not be possible to describe and explain 
immigrant minorities’ attitudinal integration into European host societies such as Germany. 
Moreover, it would be difficult to understand the main attitudinal concepts behind migrants’ 
attitudinal integration. Even though this seems self-evident, the current research literature on 
this topic is often characterised by a lack of conceptual definitions as well as terminological 
consensus because it is perceived through the lenses of different scholarly disciplines. Thus, 
research uses different terms for describing migrant inclusion in the host society (assimilation, 
acculturation, incorporation, and so forth), which leads to serious confusion and decreases the 
theoretical utility of the terms. Even though my thesis is not able to solve the missing conceptual 
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consensus across disciplines as well as to tackle all conceptual difficulties involved, I will at 
least increase conceptual consciousness and clarity for the purposes of the present scholarly 
work. For doing so, I will first clarify within this section the three main outcome concepts of 
interest within this doctoral work, namely national identity, political interest, and regime 
satisfaction (Section 1.2.2). For this purpose, I will refer to the political culture and supporting 
literature (e.g. Almond and Verba 1972; Easton 1965; Norris 1999a) (Section 1.2.1). Both 
approaches are valuable for this thesis’s purposes to assess national identity as the outcome of 
interest as well as an explanatory factor because they suggest national identification as a 
political (support) attitude that warrants besides individuals’ positive attitudes towards the 
regime and/or the political system the stability and legitimacy of political systems. Moreover, I 
will draw on the classic attitude–behaviour link model, namely the psychological theory of 
planned behaviour (TPB; Ajzen 1988; 1991) to provide further insights on the general relevance 
of the political attitude concepts of national identity, political interest, and regime satisfaction 
for immigrants’ behavioural integration into host-society politics (Section 1.2.3). Besides the 
conceptualisation of the attitudinal component of integration, I will further clarify within this 
section the concepts around migrants’ inclusion in host societies and why the usage of the term 
of “integration” instead of “assimilation” in politics may be preferred (Section 1.2.4). Because 
the empirical research of the present dissertation project lies within the realms of sociological 
and social psychological scholarship, I will focus within this section on conceptual traditions 
of sociology as well as psychology.     
1.2.1 Conceptual bases of political culture and support  
To conceptualise the attitudinal component of migrant political integration into host-society 
politics, the present thesis integrates political science literature on political orientations (e.g. 
Almond and Verba 1972; Easton 1965) and psychological literature on attitudes (e.g. Ajzen 
1991; Rosenberg and Hovland 1960). The insight that a stable democracy with a participatory 
citizenship has cultural and attitudinal prerequisites was suggested by the political culture 
approach, which has crucially changed the perspective of political research towards explicit 
subjective and psychological aspects of politics (cf. Verba 1965, 516). According to this 
approach, political culture refers to ‘attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, 
and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system’ (Almond and Verba 1972, 13). Further, 
it is stated: ‘When we speak of the political culture of a society, we refer to the political system 
as internalized in the cognitions, feelings and evaluations of its population’ (ibid.). Similar, but 
with a stronger focus on political culture’s function, is the definition by Lucina Pye (1972, 218): 
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Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give 
order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying 
assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system. It 
encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. 
Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the 
psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. 
Following the previous definitions, four main notions generally refer to migrants’ political 
attitudes that are under study within the present thesis: First, they may provide as political 
culture a characteristic of a collective (e.g., nation, immigrant political community) through a 
particular distribution of attitudes among its members, yet at the same time they also provide 
characteristics of the individual migrant at the micro-level. Second, immigrant political 
attitudes may serve important functions for the preservation and maintaining of political 
systems as they involve the norms, rules, and ideals guiding them. Third, migrants’ individual 
attitudes are directed towards different political objects involving, besides the political system, 
its institutions and actors as well as its performance outcomes, in addition to migrants’ attitudes 
towards the self as political actor within the system (cf. Almond and Verba 1972, 17). For the 
purposes of clearer distinctions, “external” and “internal” political attitudes can be 
distinguished. Whereas the former is referring to attitudes towards the political system and its 
objects, the latter is referring to attitudes towards migrants’ self-image as political actors within 
the political system, for instance, of Germany (cf. also literature on political efficacy for the 
difference between internal and external, e.g.  Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Craig and 
Maggiotto 1982). Close to the political culture approach, the political support paradigms of 
David Easton (1975; 1965) and Pippa Norris (1999a) suggest the concept of covered support, 
which is referred to as “political support” in this doctoral thesis, which addresses supportive 
attitudes and sentiments towards primarily four main objects of the political system, namely the 
political community, political regime, political institutions, and political actors.  
Last but not least, migrants’ internal or external political attitudes towards the self as 
political actor or the political system can be distinguished by the political culture approach 
along different types involving cognitive, affective, or evaluative aspects. Cognitive 
orientations address structures of beliefs and perceptions or knowledge of the political system. 
These orientations involve “internal” attitudes such as political interest or knowledge. In 
contrast, affective orientations as well as evaluative orientations can be conceptually subsumed 
as both are addressing feelings about the political system, its personnel and institutions, as well 
as the subjective judgements based on feelings or on other evaluation criteria such as 
performance (cf. Almond and Verba 1972, 15). These orientations involve “external” attitudes 
such as political trust or satisfaction, as well as national identification. 
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The psychological literature allows, in addition to cognitive, evaluative, and affect 
aspects, a conative (behavioural) component of political attitudes that has been neglected by 
the classical political culture and support literature. According to a classic tripartite view by the 
psychologists Rosenberg and Hovland (1960, 1), an attitude involves cognitive (opinion and 
beliefs) and affective (evaluative feelings and preferences), as well as behavioural/conative 
components (overt actions or statements of intent): ‘Attitudes are typically defined as 
predispositions to respond in a particular way toward a specified class of objects. [...] The types 
of response [...] fall in three major categories: cognitive, affective, and behavioural’. Thus, there 
are supposed to be behavioural intentions (e.g. to participate in national or local elections) 
involved in migrants’ political attitudes. Intention is conceived by psychologists as person’s 
psychological readiness or motivation to perform a given behaviour (Ajzen 1991), which 
coincides with Easton, who proposes that political attitudes involve ‘predispositions or a 
readiness to act on behalf of someone or something else’ (Easton 1965, 160). 
Combining the insights of the previously outlined political culture literature as well as 
psychological literature on the three components of attitudes, Figure 1.1 depicts a possible 
classification and examples of individual migrants’ political orientations according to their type 
as well as object-relation (adapted from the conceptual overview by Niedermayer 2005, 17). It 
also involves the main indicators of migrant attitudinal integration of this doctoral thesis, 
“internal” political interest, “external” regime satisfaction, and “external” national 
identification (*).  
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Figure 1-1. Dimensions of political orientations 
Types of orientations 
Objects of 
orientations     
Cognitive 
orientations: 
(perceptions and 
beliefs) 
Affective/evaluative 
orientations: (feelings 
and judgments) 
Conative orientations: 
(intentions) 
 Internal: 
 
Increasing behavioural tendency 
 
Own political role   
Increasing 
degree of 
generali-
sation 
political interest*, 
political knowledge  
internal political 
efficacy 
intention to 
conventional (e.g., 
voting; party 
membership) and 
unconventional (e.g. 
lawful demonstration; 
signing a petition) 
political participation 
External:     
Political actors    
external efficacy, 
political trust, 
political satisfaction* 
  
Political 
institutions   
   
Political regime       
Political 
community     
national 
identification*    
 
1.2.2 Meaning of national identification, interest in national politics, and regime 
satisfaction 
What is the meaning as well as the relevance of migrants’ political interest, regime satisfaction, 
as well as national identification with respect to migrant political integration? Following the 
political support approach, national identification refers to the object “political community” of 
a political system and refers to the mental and affective attitude of citizens towards it. According 
to Easton (1965, 177), it involves the we-feeling or sense of community ‘with a group of persons 
bound together by a political division of labor’. Accordingly, national identification may also 
imply the emotional commitment to the production of shared national and public goods such as 
such as education, public infrastructure, and governmental policies that are produced within 
politics (van Deth 2000). Empirical studies within the political culture paradigm measure the 
support of the political community usually by national pride or perceived and subjective sense 
of belonging to the political community (cf. Norris 1999b, 10–11). Individuals may have 
multiple affective attachments to different political communities, which may affect each other 
in terms of weakening and strengthening (cf. Westle 1999, 166). With respect to migrants, those 
are multiple attachments towards the political community of their country of origin as well as 
the polity of their receiving country.  
Source: Own illustration adapted from Niedermeyer (2005: 17); *main attitudes of this doctoral thesis 
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Within (social) psychological literature, these multiple attachments are acknowledged 
in the form of ethnic and national identity as a special form of social identity that is defined by 
Tajfel (1981) as ‘that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from [his] knowledge 
of [his] membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership’ (255). Following both the social identity theory (SIT 
hereafter; Tajfel and Turner 1986; see also Hogg and Abrams 1988) and its extension, self-
categorisation theory (SCT hereafter; Turner et al. 1987), social identification refers to 
individuals’ self-ascribed psychological membership in social categories and groups (e.g., 
gender, ethnicity, class, or religion) that build individuals’ self-concept besides his/her personal 
identity as unique persons. Social identity is a multidimensional concept that includes a number 
of dimensions, such as self-categorisation, belonging, regard, importance, or practice (e.g. 
Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004; Phinney and Ong 2007). By the reference to 
subjective feelings of belonging to a group, social identity can be distinguished from mere 
objective group membership such as that determined by passport or birth (Ashmore et al. 2004). 
Accordingly, migrants’ ethnic group membership is also defined in the literature as ‘a subjective 
belief in [..] common descent because of similarities of physical type or of custom or both, or 
because of memories of colonization and migration’ (Weber 1968, 389). Within this subjective 
perspective of ethnic group membership, some of the putative shared properties (e.g. shared 
kinship) may represent actual but also imagined internal and external ascriptions. Indeed, Nagel 
(1995, 21) refers to ethnic identity as ‘a dialectic between internal identification and external 
ascription’. While previous literature has conceived migrants’ national and ethnic or religious 
identity as mutually exclusive, i.e. a stronger attachment to the host country (i.e. national 
identification) must mean a weaker connection to the country of origin (i.e. ethnic 
identification) and vice versa, more recent literature in line with the bi-dimensional model of 
acculturation (Berry 1997) acknowledges four more complex identity combinations (see also 
Hutnik 1991): integrated identity (high national, high ethnic identification) - which is also 
referred to as dual or hybrid identity (cf. Verkuyten 2005, 149 ff.), assimilated identity (high, 
low), separated identity (low- high), and marginalised identity (low-low). 
As migrants’ identification with the political community of European receiving 
countries constitutes one main indicator of migrants’ attitudinal integration into politics in this 
doctoral thesis, the theoretical Section 1.4 will address which factors may account for migrants’ 
psychological orientation towards the German host society. The reader should bear in mind that 
this dissertation also studies the question on the effect of migrants’ identification with the 
receiving community on migrants’ self-image as political actors (i.e. interest in national politics) 
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as well as affect towards the political system (i.e. regime satisfaction) (see the explanatory 
considerations in Section 1.4.2).  
Interest in politics addresses within Figure 1.1 the internal cognitive component of 
migrants’ self-image as political actors within the new home country. Even though widely 
applied, the concept and the meanings involved with political interest are barely addressed in 
research. Thus, by relying on interdisciplinary literature, the doctoral work differentiates three 
conceptions/dimensions that imply political interest and thus guide subsequent theoretical 
reasoning: political attentivness, political importance, and political motivation. Before going 
into those conceptions, there is the question what “political” and “interest” may refer to in 
“political interest”. Given that the main interest lies in the psychological inclusion in the host 
society political system, the term “political” may refer to the fundamental trichotomy of polity, 
policy and politics (e.g., Treib et al. 2007). Hence, migrants’ political interest can be suggested 
to refer either to the interest in the institutional structures (e.g. the constitution, institutions, 
authorities, parties) of the host society political system (polity), its political procedures (e.g. 
elections, votes, lobbying) or processes (e.g. political clashes, debates, acts of war) by which 
decisions are made (politics), or its political programmes and outputs (e.g. laws etc.) its (policy). 
Interest in the sense of psychological literature is a motivational variable (Hidi and 
Renninger 2006). Yet, in comparison to other motivational variables, it is content specific and 
exists in a particular relation/interaction with a person. Moreover, it is characterised by a 
cognitive and affective component, respectively value and feeling valances (i.e. the object or 
activity of interest is perceived as important and positive). According to the psychological 
literature, interest can imply both the underlying process of re-engagement with a particular 
content/object as well as the resulting motivational state the term. Consistent with this 
perspective, interest is suggested to be closely linked to self-determined forms of motivation, 
thus intrinsic motivation or identified/integrated regulation within extrinsic motivation, where 
goals and needs are fully integrated with the self (Ryan and Deci 2000). Thus, individual’s 
interest in a specific object/content (e.g. politics) may be used to predict individual’ intrinsic 
motivation for activities concerning the specific object/content. 
According to the previous delineations, three specific conceptions of political interest 
may be applied: political attentiveness, importance, and motivation. Political attentiveness 
describes that political issues (politics, polity, policy) within the receiving society “arouses a 
citizen’s curiosity’ (van Deth 1990, 278) or cognitive attention (Zaller 1992, 18). Secondly, 
political interest may imply that political issues of the receiving country are perceived as 
personally important as well as positive (i.e. political importance) (cf. van Deth 2000). Last but 
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not least, as political processes specifically relate in terms of content to the production of 
collective and public goods, political interest may imply the intrinsic motivation to contribute 
to the shared collective goods of the German host society and thus to solve free-riding dilemmas 
(i.e. political mitivation). Thus, in sum, migrants that are interested in politics in the conceptual 
terms of the thesis pay attention to politics, perceive politics as personally important as well as 
are intrinsically motivated to politically participate in receiving country political system. That 
the concepts of political interest are closely interrelated has been shown by van Deth (2000), 
who shows that subjective political interest (i.e. political attentiveness) and political importance 
in absolute terms (the absolute importance assigned to politics for one’s own life) are highly 
correlated as well as are predicted by the same set of factors such as income or social capital.  
Different from the previous internal cognitive type of migrant political attitudes, 
considering the self as political actor, are the external evaluative or affective orientations 
towards the political system. This kind of orientations encompasses concepts within the 
literature such as (external) political efficacy, political (dis)trust, or political (dis)satisfaction 
(Craig and Maggiotto 1982; Farah, Barnes, and Heunks 1979; Newton 2008). They all have 
two things in common: First, they address individuals’ positive feelings and evaluations of 
political responsiveness, which promote feelings of legitimacy and commitment towards the 
political system. Responsiveness is central to democracy. Thus, representation theory identifies 
responsiveness as the main mechanism for citizens’ control over governments between 
elections (Pitkin 1967). This implies a bottom-up understanding of responsiveness, respectively 
‘what occurs when the democratic process induces the government to form and implement 
policies that the citizens want’ (Powell 2004, 91). Phrased differently, regime stability is also 
dependent on ‘inducing [migrant-origin] citizens to believe that the government is responsive 
to their own needs and wishes’ (Ginsberg 1982, 182). Thus, a lack of attitudes strongly relating 
to feelings of system responsiveness such as external political efficacy, political trust, or 
satisfaction has been discussed within the literature as an indicator of a ‘legitimacy crisis’ (cf. 
Arzheimer 2002, 42ff.) or related phenomena within the German context such as 
‘Politikverdrossenheit’ (cf. Caballero 2009, 68ff.; and see also Arzheimer 2002). Second, they 
have in common that they rather address what Easton (1965, 1975) calls specific (dis)support 
of the political regime, system, and institutions, rather than a general withdrawal of diffuse 
support. Specific support refers to ‘the satisfaction that members of a system feel they obtain 
from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities [those governing]’ 
(Easton 1975: 437). Subsequently, specific support is object-specific as well as dynamic and 
can thus be related to what Fritz Scharpf (1999) has called ‘output legitimacy’, which is 
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associated with the perceptions about and evaluations of effective governance and 
responsiveness, as well as the specific results of governance. In contrast, diffuse support refers 
to the more basic and stable support of the system taken as a whole. In the words of Easton 
(1975: 444), ‘… it refers to evaluations of what an object is or represents, not of what it does. 
[…] Outputs and beneficial performance may rise and fall while diffuse support, in the form of 
a generalized attachment, continues’. Thus, Arthur H. Miller also proposes that declining levels 
of individuals’ (specific) trust in governments do not imply a general legitimacy crisis of 
governments within societies:  
Less than 1 per cent of the respondents proposed a change toward a 
socialistic government. What was expressed by the open-ended statements 
was a discontent and dissatisfaction with the performance of the system and 
the need for reform to make it more responsive. [...] To summarize, political 
cynicism is related to feelings of political inefficacy, to the belief that 
government is unresponsive, and to an apparent desire for structural and 
institutional reform (Miller 1974b, 992). 
In summary, migrants’ satisfaction with the host-society’s democratic government and regime 
can be understood as an important evaluative expression of migrants’ perceived responsiveness 
of the democratic government to their needs, and respective wishes and demands.  
Following the intergenerational theory of integration by Esser (2004) and the concept 
of social production functions (e.g. Lindenberg 1989), there are two main demands of migrants 
that address two commonly shared needs of individuals in general: to maximise their physical 
well-being, as well as their social approval (see also Kalter and Granato 2002). These basic 
needs and thus goals are typically provided through the production of some culturally-
acknowledged and -specific goals and means, respectively, that are known within the society to 
produce them (e.g. economic access and educational credentials) (cf. Kalter and Granato 2002, 
201 f.). Thus, Esser (2004, 1135) concludes that immigrants can be expected to ‘have an 
objective have (or should have) an objective interest in assimilative actions and investments in 
receiving country capital, like formal education or the acquisition of the host society's 
language’. Accordingly, research has repeadely attested that immigrants are a positive selective 
group with respect to achievement motivation within host societies (Kao and Tienda 1995; 
Kristen and Dollmann 2010; for an overview on mechanisms, see Salikutluk 2016). Yet, within 
a chain of production of social approval, immigrants are in general disadvantaged in the 
production of economic success as they lack specific capital needed within the reception context 
to produce this goal (e.g., educational credentials, language skills, native contacts) (Kalter and 
Granato 2002). This lack of necessary resources to produce better socio-economic positions is 
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found to be still relevant for the second generation of immigrants in Europe (Heath, Rothon, 
and Kilpi 2008).  
Another main demand of immigrant minorities can be suggested to be cultural 
recognition, which is predicted to increasingly become an issue of ‘identity politics’ or ‘politics 
of difference’ (Verkuyten 2005, 58). These political demands aim at the recognition of migrants’ 
cultural and religious background. Especially because Europe and Germany officially follows 
the recognition of cultural pluralism, religious freedom, minority rights, and equality (EUR-
LEX 2008), migrants may evaluate host-society governments according to these demands. In 
sum, the democratic political system may be affectively charged by first- as well as second-
generation immigrants according to their social and cultural demands, which results in certain 
feelings of responsiveness by the individual migrant and thus, satisfaction with it.  
Even though regime satisfaction suggests specific and time-dependent evaluations, I 
follow Muller and Williams (1980, 34) in their assumption along a support-alienation 
continuum that ‘the more negative reinforcement received by an individual, i.e., the more the 
experience of dissatisfaction with political outputs, the more will generalized affect for the 
political system incline toward [..] alienation […]’. Thus, specific negative attitudes may 
change to diffuse and more stable negative attitudes towards the political system. Therefore, 
external evaluative or affective orientations such as regime satisfaction may measure their 
political alienation (Miller 1974), which involves ‘unfavorable affect for the political system or 
structure of political authority’ (Muller and Williams 1980, 343). From the previous outline, it 
follows that Section 1.4 requires the elaboration on the factors that may influence migrants’ 
perceived regime responsiveness as well as feelings and senses of legitimacy towards the 
political system (i.e. regime satisfaction). 
In sum, the previous overview has highlighted the single relevance of each attitude for 
migrant attitudinal integration within European democracies such as in Germany in terms of 
forming, first, a politically informed and conscious migrant-origin citizenry (by political 
interest); second, a morally committed and lawful migrant-origin citizenry (by democracy 
satisfaction); and third, an emotionally committed migrant citizenry (by national identification). 
1.2.3 The joint relevance of political interest, regime satisfaction, and national 
identification for migrant political integration 
Previous research directly studying individuals’ or migrants’ political attitudes as dependent 
variable or treating them as the cause of individuals’ or migrants’ political participation, 
commonly neglects to elaborate on the link between political attitudes and political participation 
 Introduction, Overview, and General Framework 
19 
and behaviour, or to consider interrelations between the different internal and external political 
attitudes (e.g. de Rooij 2012; Eggert and Giugni 2010). Rather, for most of the previous 
literature, a very straightforward and self-evident link follows from being politically interested 
or having positive attitudes towards the political institutions, personnel, or democratic regime 
over a positive attitude to participate politically and in the end to do so according to the attitude. 
Yet, historical psychological views as well as longstanding psychological works on the attitude–
behaviour relation crucially challenge the assumption that attitudes automatically indicate how 
people will behave (see e.g. Festinger 1964; LaPiere 1934; Wicker 1969). Based on the 
observed attitude–behaviour inconsistencies, the main psychological models on the attitude–
behaviour link were developed that help to understand how attitudes predict deliberate 
behaviour, namely the psychological theory of planned behaviour (TPB; Ajzen 1988; Ajzen 
1991) and its forerunner, the theory of reasoned action (TRA; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). 
Reviews and meta-analyses have provided support for the efficacy of these models across a 
variety of behavioural domains such as health behaviours or exercising behaviour (for an meta-
analysis, see Armitage and Conner 2001), but also voting behaviour (Netemeyer and Burton 
1990; Ajzen, Timko, and White 1982). I argue that the link between the three main internal and 
external attitudes, involving political interest, regime satisfaction, and national identification, 
and migrants’ political behaviour in the host society, can be understood through addressing the 
main components of TBP that predict intention and behaviour in consequence. 
According to the TPB (Ajzen 1988, 1991), the most proximal determinant of people’s 
behaviour is their intentions to engage in the behaviour (e.g. the intention to participate in 
elections). This intention is determined by three main psychological components and related 
beliefs: (1) Attitude towards performing the specific behaviour; (2) subjective norms about 
social normative pressures to perform the behaviour; and (3) perceived behavioural control to 
be able to perform the behaviour. Attitudes refer to the overall positive or negative evaluation 
of performing the behaviour (e.g. whether to vote in the election is… good-bad, foolish-wise, 
favourable-unfavourable, desirable-undesirable)5, which is formed by behavioural beliefs about 
the consequences of the behaviour in question (e.g. value and expectancy of success, costs or 
benefits). Subjective norms, in turn, are based on individuals’ perception and belief regarding 
whether important other people in their life would want them to perform the behaviour in 
question (e.g. to vote in the national elections). In contrast, perceived behavioural control 
reflects the extent to which individuals perceive that they are able to perform the behaviour in 
                                               
5 See also measurement examples by Ajzen et al. (1982). 
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question. Thus, following basic TPB, individuals and migrants who have positive attitudes 
towards the political behaviour (e.g. participating in a party or voting is wise, beneficial, or 
useful), think that there is normative social support or pressure for performing the political 
behaviour by others important to them (e.g. native contacts), perceive that they can perform the 
behaviour, and have strong intentions to perform the political behaviour.  
I suggest that the political orientations of political interest, democracy satisfaction, and 
national identification can be included in the TPB model as antecedents of attitude, social 
norms, and perceived control, and thus of intention and individual political behaviour, because 
they modify the structure of the three main beliefs relating to the three components (see Figure 
1.2).  
 
 
Thus, external affective political orientations such as regime satisfaction involving positive 
evaluations of the responsiveness of the democratic government can be expected to shape the 
overall positive evaluations of the political behaviour in question (e.g. whether is it wise, 
beneficial, or useful to participate in elections or parties). Furthermore, internal cognitive 
orientations such as political interest that indicate individuals’ political attentiveness as well as 
relevance of national politics can be assumed to affect the personal belief about the cost and 
benefits of the political behaviour and thus the overall positive evaluation of the behaviour. In 
addition, political interest can be supposed to shape the belief and feeling to be politically 
efficacious, and thus the perceived behavioural control over performing a political behaviour. 
Finally, ‘we’-feelings and senses of community with the national political community (i.e. 
national identification) should affect the perception of whether fellow citizens want them to 
perform the political behaviour, and thus the subjective norm to do so. Also, literature on the 
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Figure 1-2. Conceptual scheme of political orientations within the model of planned political behaviour 
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social identity perspective suggests that social identities affect behaviour through the mediating 
role of group norms (Hogg and Smith 2007; Terry, Hogg, and White 2000).  
In summary, the model of planned political behaviour in Figure 1.2 allows the derivation 
of a more complete conceptual model of migrants’ political attitudes because it deepens 
understanding on how attitudinal dynamics may shape paths to migrants’ behavioural activity 
over intention and preceding attitudinal, normative, and control beliefs. Thus, in sum, I suggest 
that the political interest, regime satisfaction, and national identity that are studied within my 
doctoral thesis provide indicators of migrant attitudinal political integration that are relevant to 
explain.  
1.2.4 Attitudinal assimilation versus integration into politics 
According to Classical Assimilation Theory (CAT) (e.g. Park and Burgess 1921), the term 
assimilation implies a one-sided process in which a minority group adapt behaviourally and 
culturally to the mainstream of the receiving society. Even though the doctoral thesis focusses 
on the changes of political attitudes that are involved with the individual immigrant, it is not 
referring to the classical conception of assimilation. Rather it refers to an understanding that 
can be derived from the New Assimilation Theory (NAT; Alba and Nee 2003) and the model of 
integration by Esser (2006) and thereby justifies the use of the terms of attitudinal integration 
or incorporation instead of assimilation. NAT and the approach by Esser challenge the classical 
understanding of assimilation as both suggest that assimilation addresses a decline in the 
salience of group differences not only depends on (e.g. attitudinal) changes by the migrant 
group as well as by the majority group. Moreover, assimilation is supposed to be depending on 
conditions within the receiving country of little or no ethnic discrimination or social distance. 
Further, Esser (2006, 9) specifically proposes that assimilation is only one out of four specific 
types of social integration of immigrants that emerge from individual migrants’ inclusion along 
two contexts – ethnic group versus host society: assimilation, whereby inclusion is in the host 
society with exclusion from the ethnic group; marginality, whereby there is no inclusion in 
either the ethnic group or the host society; ethnic segmentation which involves inclusion in the 
ethnic group and exclusion from the host society; and multiple inclusion which involves 
inclusion in both social systems. In sum, both approaches suggest that assimilation is a more 
demanding process and integration outcome than suggested by CAT. Thus, the thesis applies 
the terms of integration or incorporation instead of assimilation because assimilation would 
additionally require to theoretically as well as statistically address exclusion processes with 
respect to political attitudes relating to the ethnic group/origin as well as changes in political 
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attitudes and conditions involved with the national majority group. Through a lack of 
operationalisation possibilities of the social integration types (in SOEP) or due to missing 
information of the majority (in SCIP), assimilation can’t be appropriately addressed by the 
thesis ssimilation.   
1.3 The current empirical situation in Germany on immigrant attitudinal integration 
into politics  
Because this doctoral thesis empirically studies immigrant attitudinal integration into European 
politics in the case of Germany, the present section will describe the current empirical evidence 
and situation of immigrant political interest, regime satisfaction, and national identification in 
Germany. 
Germany has become one of the main European immigration countries since the period 
of labour recruitment in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, there is still an empirical and theoretical 
deficit concerning the political integration of its current approximately 16.4 million residents 
with direct or indirect migration backgrounds (cf. Statistisches Bundesamt 2015, 7). One of the 
reasons for this existing lack is the long-time general resistance of policy makers to 
acknowledge Germany as an immigration country. Thus, Joppke proposes 1999: ‘While 
Germany is not alone in Europe in not defining itself as a nation of immigrants, it is the only 
country that has not become tired of repeating it, elevating the no-immigration maxim to a first 
principle of public policy and national self-definition’ (62). As a consequence, until the very 
early 2000s and liberalisations of the citizenship law in terms of dual citizenship or granting jus 
soli citizenship (based on territorial birth) for second-generation (i.e. German-born) immigrants 
at least under certain conditions, policy makers in Germany have been hesitant to acknowledge 
them as political actors as well as to consider their political incorporation into the German 
society. At present, as a considerable number of first- and second-generation immigrants in 
Germany do not hold German citizenship, a significant fraction of the immigrant population in 
Germany is still formally excluded from the main political right of participating in national 
elections. Yet, there are other political rights and non-electoral participation possibilities also 
open for foreign immigrant residents, such as taking part in demonstrations or joining political 
parties. Moreover, immigrants from European countries (such as Italy or Spain), i.e. EU 
citizens, hold voting rights at the city district level. Yet, immigrants from non-EU countries 
such as Turkey, which still currently constitute the largest immigrant group in Germany 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2015) are excluded from local voting rights. As the political attitudes 
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under study within this doctoral thesis (i.e. political interest, regime satisfaction, national 
identification) are only partly but not fully determined by immigrants’ (missing) formal political 
participation rights, they can be perceived as appropriate means to political integration of 
formally less or more excluded immigrants and non-Turkish as well as Turkish immigrants, 
respectively.  
Within European and German scholarship, the long-time sidelining of migrants’ political 
incorporation relates to two previous neglects (see Morales and Giugni 2011): First, there has 
been a general lack of adequate individual-level data with indicators of migrants’ socio-political 
participation as well as attitudes. Second, even seminal scholarly works on migrant integration 
have neglected the political dimension almost completely (Gordon 1964; Portes and Zhou 1993; 
for Germany, cf. specifically Esser 2008). 
As a joint consequence of the policy and research situation in Germany until very 
recently, empirical evidence related to immigrants’ political interest, national identification, and 
regime satisfaction is quite limited. The existing scarce German research on political attitudes 
generally finds that immigrants show considerably lower levels of interest in politics than their 
native counterparts (cf. Diehl and Blohm 2001, 411; Diehl and Urbahn 1998, 34; Doerschler 
2004, 469). On the basis of data from the Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP), Diehl and Blohm 
(2001) reveal that only about one-sixth of all immigrant groups have a high or a very high 
interest in German politics, as opposed to approximately one-third of all Germans (cf. ibid., 
411). Moreover, immigrants are less likely to identify with a German politics (cf. Diehl and 
Blohm 2001, 411; Diehl and Urbahn 1998, 38), though their party identification increases with 
the length of residence in Germany (cf. Kroh 2009, 822). Besides the variation of political 
involvement between immigrants and natives, German studies also show variations in the 
political attitudes of political trust, interest, or party identification between different immigrant 
groups similarly to studies in the Netherlands (Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004; 
Caballero 2009; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Kroh and Tucci 2009; Togeby 2004; Wüst 2002). 
For Germany, studies often reveal a difference between foreign Turkish and non-Turkish 
immigrants (e.g. Italians). While Diehl and Blohm (2001) find that Turkish nationals have 
higher political interest than other nationalities, Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans (2004) reveal 
lower interest in German politics for foreign Turkish than non-Turkish immigrants (e.g. 
Italians). With respect to satisfaction with democracy, Caballero (2009) shows that Turkish 
nationals among immigrants are the least satisfied (cf. ibid., 127). Also with respect to national 
identification, research indicates that immigrants from Turkey identify less with Germany than 
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immigrants from other former guest worker nations such as Italy, Greece, or Ex-Yugoslavia 
(Diehl and Schnell 2006).  
The next theory section serves to delineate the factors that can account for variation in 
immigrants’ political interest, regime satisfaction, and national identification as well as their 
different ethnic origins. 
1.4 Predicting migrants’ political attitudes 
After having established the conceptual underpinning (Section 1.2) and empirical background 
in Germany (Section 1.3), the present section serves to identify and delineate the explanatory 
factors and the explanatory model that accounts for the attitudinal components of migrant 
political incorporation of interest (i.e. political interest, regime satisfaction, and identification 
with the political community). Phrased differently, the section serves a theoretical synthesis of 
the empirical chapters of the doctoral thesis (Chapters 2 to 5) and broader literature review (for 
a specific overview of the chapters, see Section 1.5.).  Therefore, the section will draw on 
existing theoretical approaches of sociology and social psychology as well as empirical studies 
within the existing literature.  
When it comes to explaining migrants’ attitudinal integration into host-society politics 
in terms of the political interest, regime satisfaction, or identification with the political 
community, explanatory factors must be distinguished on two grounds: First, they can address 
different explanatory levels such as the individual- (micro-), group- (meso-), and societal- 
(macro-) level. Phrased differently, factors may involve either individual characteristics of 
migrants, characteristics of social organisational networks (e.g. social capital), or characteristics 
of the political structure and context of the country of residence (cf. Morales and Giugni 2011, 
5ff.). Reviewing different literature suggests that political participation and attitudes depend on 
a variety of macro- and meso-level factors. First and foremost, migrants’ political participation 
and attitudes depend on institutional settings, citizenship regimes, and political rights that open 
or close the access to the political community and system (Koopmans et al. 2005). Thus, open 
citizenship regimes give migrants much higher probabilities of being politically active than 
more closed regimes (González-Ferrer 2011; Morales and Morariu 2011; Morales and Pilati 
2011).  Moreover, at the meso-level, social capital at the group level plays a role. This kind of 
capital is perceived as a ‘function of (1) the number of organisations, (2) the variety in the 
activities of the organisations and (3) the density of the organisational network’ (Tillie 2004, 
531).  
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Meso- and macro-factors are not at the centre of the explanatory approach of the present 
thesis, however. Rather, I seek a microfoundation of migrants’ attitudinal integration into 
politics. In doing so, it opens up the black box of mechanisms that are directly implied with the 
individual migrant. Moreover, the data sets of thesis do not contain appropriate measures to 
grasp additionally macro or meso information.  
For defining the conditions of migrants’ attitudinal integration into politics, the thesis 
refers to the individual inclusion processes as well as implied individual characteristics and 
resources of migrants that have been suggested by Esser (2006, 8). Accordingly, migrants 
individual’ inclusion in the host society is a matter of interrelation of four different dimensions 
of integration (in terms of content): the structural, cultural, emotional and social integration. 
While the cultural dimension addresses the acquisition of knowledge and skills, the structural 
dimension addresses the placement in positions, for example in the educational system or on 
the labour market. The social dimension refers to the development of social contacts and 
relations and the emotional dimension implies social identification. 
I will argue that these integration processes serve as host country-specific culturally, 
socially, and emotional capital that explain how migrants become successfully involved 
psychologically in the political life. This argument draws on the general ‘productivity’ as well 
as ‘context-specificity’ aspect of capital of individuals, as it is noted in a large body of literature. 
Concerning the former aspect, classical proponents of the concept of (social) capital such as 
Coleman (1988), Bourdieu (1983), Lin (1999), and Putnam (1993; 2000) suggest that capital is 
productive, ‘making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be 
possible’ (Coleman 1988, 98). While capital or resources such as language skills and knowledge 
generally imply an investment of personal resources, social or emotional integration implies 
specific resources or aspects embedded in a social structure that may facilitate particular forms 
of action and cooperation (cf. Lin 1999, 35). 
1.4.1 Predicting migrants’ political interest  
The knowledge of the language spoken in the receiving country can be suggested to be a highly 
relevant (cultural) capital for migrants’ political interest: It not only induces the cognitive links 
and bases that allow to pay attention to political information (i.e. political attentiveness) but 
also facilitates that information on receiving-country politics become emotionally linked within 
the individual migrant and thus may gain some personal importance (i.e. political importance). 
Moreover, having a command of the host society language allows to access social capital in the 
form of native social contacts who enhance migrants’ political interest, as well (see below). 
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Even though proficiency in the origin language allows for similar processes, they are less 
effective in fostering political interest as this proficiency limits they ways in which migrants 
are able to draw attention to political information within the host society, to perceive and 
memorise information on receiving country political issues, as well as to accesses social 
networks of natives. 
There are trust, norms of reciprocity, information, and cooperation associated with social 
networks (Putnam 2000, Coleman 1988) that may link migrants’ social membership in native 
networks to political interest: First, native networks circulate information about specific 
processes, expectations and rules of the political system and thus ease migrants’ attention 
processes as well as may increase their curiosity about political affairs of the network members 
(i.e. political attentiveness). Moreover, the inclusion in native networks involves opportunities 
for cooperation that foster learning about national group specific interests and thus facilitates 
intrinsic motivation to contribute to those group interests (i.e. political motivation). Last but not 
least, norms of reciprocity and social trust are produced by the participation in native networks 
that enforce migrants’ intrinsic motivation for the participation in the collective good production 
of this group. According to literature, voluntary but not necessarily political associations in 
particular provide this kinds of social environment (Putnam 2000). Thus, the thesis expects that 
social contact with natives (and especially in voluntary associations) fosters immigrant 
members’ interest in the political issues of the receiving country political system.  
According to Social Identity Theory (SIT, Tajfel and Turner 1986), social identity, i.e. 
perceived psychological membership in social groups or categories, is part of individual 
(migrant)’s self-concept. It has a main emotional and motivationaö meaning as it provides the 
individual with self-esteem and a positive self-concept. To maintain a positive self-concept 
through group membership, social identification invokes mechanisms that biases and affects 
interests, cognitions, emotions as well as behaviour in favour of the ingroup to increase 
ingroups’ distinctiveness to other groups (see e.g. Brewer 1979; Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 
2007; Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2009; Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002). As politics 
involve the means and processes to protect and preserve a positive social identity by influencing 
the political representation and thus the distribution of the collective goods and privileges of 
groups, social identification may predict individuals’ attentiveness, importance and (intrinsic) 
motivation towards political matters. Thus, through the meaning of political matters for the 
value of migrants’ social identities and self-esteem, identification with the national majority 
(i.e. national identification) can be expected to increase the importance of host society political 
matters (e.g. polity, politics, policy) for the individual migrant. In the same line, national 
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identification facilitatea/biases according to the social psychological perspective the cognitive 
attention to political structures (polity), processes (politics) and content (policy) of the national 
ingroup. Further, national identification affects migrants’ (intrinsic) motivation to influence the 
collective good distribution of the national ingroup because it specifically structures migrants’ 
interests in favour of the ingroup (i.e. collective interests). 
The individual migrant holds multiple psychological memberships that relate besides 
the national majority to their ethnic origin or religious group (see e.g. Roccas and Brewer 2002; 
Tajfel 1978; Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012b). According to Tajfel and Turner (1986), self-
identified members of a devalued (i.e. low-status) group are motivated to opt for a political 
behaviour-related strategy that tries to re-establish a positive ethnic identity and thus self-
concept (i.e. social competition). This strategy is likely when boundaries between groups are 
not perceived to be permeable and the existing status differentials are conceived as illegitimate 
and unstable. Thus, ethnic or religious identification of ethnic minorities in Germany may evoke 
specific collective interests and thus intrinsic political motivation (i.e. political interest). Those 
are however rather specific to the religious or ethnic group. Nonetheless, ethnic identification 
may increase political attentiveness and importance specifically of the structure and processes 
(i.e. polity and politics) of the receiving society, as the host society context builds the 
opportunity structure in which migrants can achieve a change the social status hierarchy in 
favour of the ethnic group and theerby experience self-enhancing.  Hence, it can be expected 
that ethnic or religious identity may be also linked to interest in the political matters of the 
receiving country, specifically if the identities are perceived to be devalued. Yet, national 
identity may interact with ethnic identity in predicting migrants’ political interest because 
national identity in contrast to ethnic identity enhances more efficiently political attentivness as 
well as importance processes, partly through enhancing cultural and social capital (i.e. majority 
language proficiency and embeddedness in native networks) (cf. previous arguments above). 
Thus, the thesis expects that under perceived discrimination that reflect impermeable group 
boundaries, simultaneous identification with the ethnic minority group and the host society, a 
dual identity, may predict political interest to a higher extent than ethnic or national 
identification alone. 
With respect to the impact of structural integration, the thesis expects that the placement 
in the host society labour market and related resources such as status and money may rather 
indirectly than directly impose an impact on migrants’ political attentiveness, importance and 
motivation through migrants’ majority language proficiency, national identification or the 
access to native contacts. Thus, in sum, migrants’ structural integration is supposed to play a 
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minor role in predicting migrant’s political interest than their social, cultural and national 
emotional integration. 
In sum, Figure 1.3 highlights the theoretical considerations within a micro model on the 
role of migrants’ ethnic/religious and national identity on interest in receiving country politics. 
While the upper part represents theoretical paths that are addressed within the empirical Chapter 
4 of the thesis, the lower part represents explanatory considerations within the empirical 
Chapter 3. 
 
Figure 1.3. Conceptual diagram on the main micro-mechanisms of migrants’ integration processes/capital 
and their political interest in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
1.4.2 Predincting migrants’ democracy satisfaction  
Besides political interest, the thesis further proposes that the four integration dimensions 
(cultural, emotional, structural and social integration) are main conditions for migrants’ 
perceived regime responsiveness and legitimacy and thus democracy satisfaction in the 
receiving country. People with a higher social status (i.e. structural integration), for instance, 
are more likely to perceive their needs and wishes for social approval satisfied by the political 
system, and thus to perceive the political regime as responsive and legitimate. Relatedly, 
researches have documented that judgments of the personal state of the economy or health as 
well as job satisfaction or life satisfaction are closely related to democracy satisfaction (e.g. 
Schäfer 2013; Zmerli, Newton, and Montero 2007). 
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The command of the majority language and social contacts with natives in turn may 
affect democracy satisfaction through producing social trust, which spill over to political trust 
(Jacobs and Tillie 2004, 421). Yet, I argue that there is also another mechanism that links host 
country-specific cultural and social capital (i.e. majority language proficiency and interethnic 
contacts) to regime satisfaction due to reducing cultural distances on behalf of the native policy 
makers and authorities, which may otherwise foster disadvantages in terms of political 
representation of migrant interests. Thus, Ulbig (2005, 2) assumes that policy makers who share 
characteristics with citizens ‘by appearance, statements, or symbolic gestures send cues to their 
constituents that they will be more responsive to their needs’. 
Further, emotional inclusion in the form of national identification can be expected to 
increase democracy satisfaction as it biases positive attitudes towards the national group (and 
related objects that help to preserve a positive identity). In similar veins, national identification 
bias migrants’ perceptions of regime responsiveness i.e. making the ‘the polity democratically 
more legitimate in one’s eyes’ (Mansbridge 1999, 651). Last but not least, national 
identification can be expected to enhance satisfaction with the democratic regime of the 
receiving society, because it drives migrants to assimilate the self to the content of the national 
group prototype. According to Kunovich (2009), besides ‘ethnic’ characteristics such as 
language, this also involves ‘civic’ and ‘political’ aspects such as legal rights and duties of a 
democratic national political community. 
Apart from the structural, social, cultural and emotional inclusion processes, an 
increasing body of literature as well as theories from social psychology point towards religion 
as factor within the immigrant’s context of settlement that bear a main influence on migrants’ 
political support attitudes. There has been a traditional strand of political science literature that 
connects religion with attitudes towards democracy by cultural arguments (see, among others: 
Huntington 1996a; Huntington 1996b; Modood 2003; Pauly 2013). Yet, empirical studies do 
not consistently document the alleged negative association between a Muslim affiliation and 
democratic attitudes or democratic skills as well as differences to a Christian affiliation in 
western host societies (e.g. Jackson and Doerschler 2012; Maxwell 2010).  
Relying on social psychological literature, the doctoral thesis argues for two distinct 
micro-mechanisms through which religion becomes relevant to migrants’ regime evaluation. 
According to SIT, social identities are a main source of shaping and determining individual’s 
well-being and expectations. Thereby, religious identity can be suggested to particularly 
enhance individuals’ subjective life-satisfaction because it offers a comforting and compelling 
worldview, a social support system, and a unique form of psychological enrichment (i.e. 
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personal well-being and self-esteem) (Ysseldyk et al. 2010). Yet, there are good reasons to 
assume that main dimensions of migrants’ religious identity, their religious self-categorisation 
and attendance may have different (positive and negative) effects on democracy satisfaction.  
Through the church-based social system, members can not only actively re-affirm a 
positive identity but may also experience support in terms of advice or assistance when 
attending religious services. Thereby individuals’ general well-being is enhanced. Moreover, 
political participation in organised communities such religious organisations may satisfy 
migrants’ needs and expectations towards democracies of free expression and practice of 
religion. In addition, religious participation provides social interaction opportunities to develop 
civic skills, norms, trust and the political knowledge necessary to practise democratic 
citizenship (Putnam 2000). Thereby, it may also enhance migrants’ satisfaction with decision-
making structures of a democratic regime.   
In contrast, the self-categorisation dimension of religious identity as a member of a 
particular religious community may under circumstances of a socially disadvantaged and 
stigmatised religious identity lead to perceptions of a lack of responsiveness legitimacy of the 
political regime of the receiving country. Thus, as a Muslim affiliation is associated with 
disadvantages in the main positioning system of the host society, the labour market (e.g. 
Constant et al.  2006: 25), and the majority population shares negative attitudes as well as 
discriminate against Muslim believers (e.g. Helbling 2013), it can be expected to decrease 
migrants’ well-being as well as perceived regime responsiveness. 
Because religious attendance and affiliation are closely related, interaction effects can 
be suggested: Because Muslim believers experience contrary to their expectations and wishes 
for free expression and practice of religion a contested and disadvantaged identity within the 
German receiving society, the positive effect of church attendance can be expected to be less 
pronounced for them compared to Protestant or Catholic immigrant believers. Similarly, it can 
be suggested that because Muslim believers are less likely to meet native Germans by their 
church attendance than Protestant and Catholic believers do, respectively remain among their 
religious community of shared grievances, the negative effect of Muslim affiliation may be 
more pronounced among Muslims that frequently attend religious services and events.  
Yet, an alternative assumption is that religious attendance may enhance the 
psychological resources that help to cope with a negative and contested Muslim identity through 
the mechanisms of a social support system. Thus, church attendance may buffer the negative 
well-being effect of Muslim affiliation on democracy satisfaction.  
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Figure 1.4 depicts the influence associations between migrants’ emotional, cultural, 
social, and strucutural integration and democracy satisfaction that are topic of empirical Chapter 
5 of the present doctoral work. 
 
Figure 1.4. Conceptual diagram on the main micro-mechanisms of migrants’ integration processes/capital 
and their political interest in Chapter 5 
1.4.3 Predicting migrants’ national identification  
Besides migrants’ political interest and democracy satisfaction, the thesis also studies migrants’ 
national identification as political attitude. Again, the question is how the other main integration 
dimenions of migrants by Esser (2001) relate to it. Following the classical assimilation theory 
by Gordon (1964), acquiring the language of the receiving country as well as entering social 
relations with the host society in clubs and institutions (i.e. ‘structural assimilation’ in Gordon’s 
terms) can also be conceived as measures of migrants’ social and cultural assimilation that 
precede their identificational assimilation in terms of developing a sense of peoplehood 
exclusively towards the (political community of host) society (for a similar argument, see also 
Esser 2001, 12–14): First, by learning and speaking the language of the host society, migrants 
become familiar with the host-society culture and become similar to the native group members, 
which increases levels of identification with this group (de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 
2014; Hochman and Davidov 2014; Turner et al. 1987.  Second, interethnic social ties can 
provide an explanation for immigrants’ identification with the receiving country because 
individuals tend to adapt to the values, beliefs, and norms of a social group they interact with 
(cf. de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014, 8). Moreover, having interactions with natives 
Religious 
attendance  
Religious 
affiliations (Muslim 
vs. Christian)  
Democracy 
satisfaction 
National identity 
Majority language 
Income, social status, 
employed within the 
receiving country labour 
market 
Emotional 
capital  
Cultural, social and 
structural capital  
Political 
attitude 
Independent variables Outcome 
Native contacts 
Chapter 1 
32 
is a signal for migrants that they are socially accepted and that social boundaries are permeable, 
which eases identification with this group (de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014; 
Leszczensky 2013). Last but not least, migrants’ structural in terms of economic integration can 
be suggested to increase national identification die to two reasons: First, to be economically 
successful in the host society provides opportunities for a positive social reference, which 
makes identification with the national group more attractive. Second, economic integration is 
an importance source for national identification through providing contact opportunities to 
natives as well as financial resources for participating in other social netoworks of natives, such 
as clubs and culuntary associations (cf de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014, 6.f). 
 Figure 1.5 shows the paths between migrants’ cultural, social, and structural integration 
and their emotional integration (national identification) as suggested in the empirical Chapter 2 
of the thesis. 
 
Figure 1.5. Conceptual diagram on the main micro-mechanisms of migrants’ integration processes/capital 
and national identiification in Chapter 2 
1.4.4 Differences between immigrant groups in Germany 
Next to considering the migrant-specific characteristics at the individual level that can account 
for migrants’ attitudes towards the self in national politics (i.e. political interest) as well as 
attitudes towards the host-society political regime and political community (i.e. regime 
satisfaction and national identification), I also hypothesise on the role of group differences. 
Previous literature often implicitly assumes that the command and knowledge of the host-
society language, as well as social contacts with natives, matter in the same way for the interest 
in national politics, regime satisfaction, and national identification in different immigrant 
groups (e.g. Hochman and Davidov 2014; Esser 2009; Maxwell 2010a; Morales and Pilati 
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2011). In contrast, I argue that the extent to which host-country language skills, as well as 
having social contacts with natives in networks (of voluntary associations), affects migrants’ 
interest in national politics, regime satisfaction, or national identification depends on 
immigrant-group specific characteristics as well as on characteristics of the host-society context 
(see for national identity effects Schulz and Leszczensky 2016). More specifically, following 
classical assumptions on the nature of ethnic boundaries (Alba 2005; Wimmer 2008) or the 
permeability of inter-group boundaries (Tajfel and Turner 1986), I propose in line with Schulz 
and Leszczensky (2016, 186) that while being proficient in the native language as well as having 
social ties with natives may increase interest in national politics, regime satisfaction or ‘national 
identification if boundaries between immigrants and natives are blurred, it may fall short thereof 
or do so only marginally in a context of bright boundaries between immigrants and natives’. 
The nature of ethnic boundaries (i.e. bright vs blurred) relates to social and cultural distinctions 
or in terms of Alba (2005:22) whether external (social) as well as internal interpretations of 
immigrants belonging are unambiguous or ambiguous. Two main factors that indicate the nature 
of ethnic boundaries are perceived discrimination by the majority population as well as 
incompatibility of cultures, respectively the distance between migrants’ origin culture and the 
dominant culture of the country of settlement (see also Schulz and Leszczensky 2016, 170). 
Both factors vary between various immigrant groups in Germany and thus may moderate the 
impact of national language proficiency and having contacts with natives on national political 
interest, regime satisfaction, or identification with the political community. In comparison to 
traditional labour immigrant groups from Southern Europe (i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain) and former Yugoslavia, but also new immigrant groups in Germany from Eastern 
Europe, specifically Poland, immigrants from Turkey are exceptional with respect to social and 
cultural distances in many respects: First, Turkish immigrants from the first as well as second 
generation perceive higher discrimination than the other immigrant groups (Verkuyten and 
Martinovic 2012a; Steinbach 2004, 146ff.; Ganter 2003, 133ff.). Second, Germans report higher 
social distance towards them than towards Italians or Greeks (Steinbach 2004, 120ff.; Ganter 
2003, 133ff.). Third, Turks are also faced with strong norms of ingroup loyalty by their co-
ethnics (Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012a). Fourth, Turkish immigrants are culturally more 
distant from Germans than, for instance, Poles due to a more dissimilar origin language 
(Kristen, Mühlau, and Schacht 2016, 184). Moreover, due to Turks’ mainly Muslim 
background, their religious differences with respect to a traditionally Christian majority in 
Germany are more pronounced than for immigrants from Southern Europe or Poland (Diehl 
and Koenig 2013). In sum, Turkish immigrants can be perceived to be faced to higher extents 
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with bright and salient ethnic boundaries than other immigrants from former Yugoslavia and 
Southern Europe, or more recently from Poland. In sum, it can therefore be expected that 
cultural, social, structural and emotional inclusion processes in the German host society 
increase interest in politics and democracy satisfaction less strongly for Turkish than for non-
Turkish-immigrants. Similarly, migrants’ cultural, social, and structural integration shpuld 
foster their national identification less strong if they are of Turkish in comparison to a non-
Turkish background. 
1.4.5 Previous empirical evidence and open questions 
Even though there is a growing body of European empirical studies on migrants’ political 
attitudes towards the mainstream society in the course of the attacks in New York, Madrid, and 
London in the early to mid-2000s, there is still a considerable gap of empirical research, 
especially concerning immigrants’ external political attitudes such as political trust or regime 
satisfaction. While American research has examined the attitudes of political trust of African 
Americans and of Latinos for decades (see, for instance Abramson 1972; Abney and Hutcheson 
1981; Michelson 2001; Long 1978; Rodgers 1974; Howell and Fagan 1988; Wenzel 2006), 
there is only a recent research field in Europe such as that indicated by studies conducted by 
Fennema and Tillie (1999), Janmaat (2008), Maxwell (2010a), Anduiza and San Martín (2011), 
Sanders et al. (2014), and Fleischmann et al. (2013). Thus, there is still comparatively less 
published in international peer-reviewed journals on ethnic minorities’ external evaluative and 
affective political orientations within European host societies than on other dimensions of 
migrants’ structural (i.e. economic), cultural, or social integration (cf. van Craen 2012, 114). 
Concerning national identification and its conditions, empirical research is also increasingly 
growing in Europe as well as in Germany (e.g. de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014; 
Hochman and Davidov 2014; Schulz and Leszczensky 2016). Reviewing the existing European 
research literature, a diverse and complex picture emerges on the impact of majority language 
proficiency (i.e. host country-specific cultural capital) and interethnic contacts (i.e. host 
country-specific social capital) on migrants’ interest in national politics, regime satisfaction, 
and national identification.  
 Previous quantitative research indicates that abilities to use the host-country language 
matter for immigrants’ general political interest (Diehl and Urbahn 1998). Also, with respect to 
political interest measures that specifically relate to politics of the receiving country, Berger et 
al. (2004, 501) and Jacobs et al. (2004, 552) find for different immigrant groups in Berlin or 
Brussels that national language proficiency facilitates interest in national politics or local 
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politics. In contrast, the study by Zurich, Eggert, and Giugni (2010, 194) among different 
immigrant groups only provides evidence that language proficiency matters for political interest 
among Italian immigrants, but not for Kosovars or Turks. Building on the large Putnamien 
literature and social capital arguments on political trust provided by Fennema and Tillie (1999), 
Eggert and Giugni (2010, 192) find positive effects for Italian immigrants of both cross-ethnic 
membership as well as ethnic membership on interest in local politics, as well as positive effects 
for Kosovars of ethnic group membership. Moreover, Jacobs et al. (2004, 552) show that ethnic 
membership matters for Moroccans but not Turks indirectly through union membembership. In 
contrast, Berger et al. (2004) as well as the European cross-national study by Moral and Palati 
(2011) in ten European cities reveal a more complex picture, in which not all types of 
organisational memberships show the same impact. More specifically, Morales and Pilati 
(2011) show that ethnic social capital in terms of formal involvement in ethnic associations and 
informal embeddedness in ethnically homogenous networks impinge on migrants’ interest in 
hostland politics as well as active engagement in politics. Additionally, Berger and her 
colleagues (2004, 501) find that ethnic associational membership is negatively associated with 
Turkish migrants’ interest in German politics when interest in homeland politics is accounted 
for. Morales and Pilati (2011) refer to the specific political context and existing political 
opportunity structures that may account for varying effects of ethnic social capital across 
countries. They conclude that ‘Ethnic social capital has different meanings and mobilization 
value in different political and institutional contexts. In contexts where individual rights are 
easy accessible to immigrants and their children and group rights are underdeveloped, ethnic 
social capital is primarily a segregating force’ (ibid., 110f.).  
Besides interest in national politics, language proficiency has also been found to relate 
to regime responsiveness measures such as regime satisfaction. Thus, an effective command of 
the host-society language has been found to relate to ethnic minorities’ positive affect towards 
government in terms of institutional trust or satisfaction (Janmaat 2008; Maxwell 2010a). Also, 
within a combined acculturation measure, familiarity with the English language fosters a 
measure of democratic engagement, which also involves besides behavioural indicators 
psychological indicators such as political interest, knowledge, or satisfaction with democracy 
(Sanders et al. 2014). In contrast to previous positive findings in literature, van Craen (2012) 
finds that both native language use as well as native group friends negatively relate to 
governmental trust among Turkish descendants in Belgium. Moreover, perceived 
discrimination has been found within various European studies to be a significant factor that 
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depresses the levels of governmental trust and satisfaction of minority members (Maxwell 
2010a; Maxwell 2010b; van Craen 2012; Sanders et al. 2014). 
With respect to the identification with the political community of the host society (i.e. 
national identification) and its conditions, previous research based on cross-sectional data finds 
evidence that social and cultural assimilation (i.e. native contacts and majority language 
knowledge) are positively related to higher levels of national identification among immigrants 
(Esser 2009; de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014; Hochman and Davidov 2014; Schulz 
and Leszczensky 2016). Yet, a recent longitudinal study on the relationship between social and 
national identification could not find a significant relationship, as soon as unobserved 
heterogeneity through time-invariant factors is accounted for (Leszczensky 2013). Moreover, 
Schulz and Leszczensky (2016) show that in contrast to immigrant adolescents of former 
Yugoslavian and Southern European origin, there is no association between having native 
friends and national identification for immigrants from Poland and Turkey. Research on the 
effect of perceived rejection by the native group finds cross-sectional as well as longitudinal 
evidence that perceived discrimination negatively relates to national identification (de Vroome, 
Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014; Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, and Solheim 2009; Morales and 
Pilati 2011; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007).  
In sum, arguments and previous empirical findings presented so far indicate that 
migrant-specific characteristics and capital at the individual level related to majority language 
proficiency and social contacts with natives matter for migrants’ attitudinal integration into 
politics in Germany in terms of interest in national politics, national regime satisfaction, or 
national identification. Moreover, even though some studies have implicitly assumed the same 
effects for different immigrant groups (e.g. Hochman and Davidov 2014; Esser 2009; Maxwell 
2010a; Morales and Pilati 2011), there is also research that shows that the effects of social 
involvement in interethnic networks as well as the knowledge of the majority language on 
political interest or national identification differ mainly between Turkish and non-Turkish 
immigrants (e.g. Eggert and Giugni 2010; Schulz and Leszczensky 2016; Berger, Galonska, 
and Koopmans 2004). Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that most of the empirical 
research presented previously is cross-sectional. As a consequence, the studies are limited to 
draw any causal inference. Moreover, there are in general minimal studies on migrants’ 
satisfaction with democracy. 
Although minimal reliable empirical evidence is available on the impact of migrants’ 
identification with the receiving society on their internal and external political attitudes, the 
scare evidence in Europe that is available mostly supports that migrants’ national identity 
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contributes to the explaining of migrants’ trust- or political support-related attitudes towards the 
government, institutions, and so forth (cf. Fleischmann, Phalet, and Swyngedouw 2013, 217; 
see also Caballero 2009; Maxwell 2010b) as well as political interest (cf. Eggert and Giugni 
2010, 193; see also Diehl and Urbahn 1998). Yet, on the contrary, Reichert (2013, 168) finds a 
direct as well as negative indirect impact of national identification on Turkish immigrants’ 
interest in politics in Germany through decreasing perceptions of ethnic disadvantages.  
In support of the idea by SIT on the effect of devalued social identities to achieve 
positive social identity by social competition in the case of impermeable boundaries, research 
on ethnic minorities reveals a positive impact of ethnic or religious identification on political 
mobilisation intentions (e.g. Fleischmann, Phalet, and Klein 2011; Klandermans, van der Toorn, 
and van Stekelenburg 2008). Concerning more directly the political attitudes under study within 
this doctoral thesis, Reichert (2013, 168) does find a positive effect of ethnic identification for 
Turks’ interest in politics in Germany, while Fleischmann and her colleagues (2013, 219) do 
not find a significant impact of an ethnic-religious identification measure on second-generation 
Turks’ and Moroccans’ political trust in Belgium.  
Evidence for the unique mobilising power of such dual identities under perceptions of 
discrimination has been found in cross-sectional and small longitudinal studies among Turkish 
and other migrants in Germany (Simon and Grabow 2010; Simon and Ruhs 2008) and in the 
Netherlands (Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008). Those studies reported 
that dual identities among immigrants do not to foster radicalisation or political violence, but 
rather involvement in normative political actions (Simon and Ruhs 2008). Concerning migrants’ 
political attitudes, Reichert (2013, 163) only found a relevant effect of dual identity on Turks’ 
subjective political competence, though not political interest. Furthermore, Fleischmann et al. 
(2013, 219) could not identify a significant impact of interaction between civic (i.e. national) 
and ethno-religious identification on political trust among Turks and Moroccans in Belgium.  
In sum, the existing evidence on the relationship between migrants’ group identities and 
their attitudinal integration into politics in European societies is still scarce and limited with 
respect to important methodological aspects, such as being concentrated on single migrant 
groups (e.g. Turks), or applying cross-sectional data analysis. 
1.5 The methodological approach of the doctoral thesis 
Unlike many other researchers working on the political trust and political interest of ethnic 
minorities (e.g. Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Janmaat, 2008; Maxwell 2010; Wenzel 2006), the 
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main advantage and unique contribution of my doctoral research lies in the usage of longitudinal 
instead of cross-sectional data and statistical regression methods. The advantage of longitudinal 
data is that it helps to tackle the question of causality more convincingly than cross-sectional 
designs, because they enable the application of econometric estimation strategies that allows an 
estimation of 'within individual' changes and the elimination of time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity, selection bias, and estimate changes in migrants’ cognitive and evaluative 
outcomes. The present section thus serves to outline and highlight the specificities of the data 
(Section 1.6.1), the causal and analytical approach (Sections 1.6.2 and 1.6.3), as well as 
measurement strategies of migrants’ identities (Section 1.6.4) used within the core chapters (2-
5) of the doctoral thesis. 
1.5.1 Data 
Chapters 4 and 5 use longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) 
to examine migrants’ general political interest and satisfaction with the democratic regime in 
Germany. More specifically, Chapter 4 employs data from 1993-2006 and Chapter 5 draws on 
the years 2005 and 2010. The German Socio-Economic Panel Study is a nationally 
representative and household-based individual-level panel survey collected annually by the 
German Institute of Economic Research (Deutsches Institut for Wirtschaft= DIW) since 1984. 
There are nearly every year 11,000 households and approximately 30,000 individuals sampled. 
Each individual in a respective household over the age of 16 is interviewed. GSOEP includes a 
broad spectrum of topics like demography, economic situation, education, health, value 
orientation, and satisfaction, as well as integration (Wagner et al. 2007). The richness of the 
data for studying migrant integration emanates from two features of the GSOEP: First, GSOEP 
involves various subsamples of immigrant minorities from different world regions that provide 
a sufficient number of immigrant respondents for statistical analysis. A first sample (sample B) 
that was drawn in 1984 oversampled the labour migrant population in Germany, who had 
migrated to Germany during the period of labour recruitment from the late 1950s to the early 
1970s. More specifically, 1,393 households were drawn that were composed of individuals 
living in households in which the household head belonged to the main immigrant groups 
residing in West Germany, namely the Turkish, Italian, Greece, ex-Yugoslavian, and Spanish 
minorities. Another second immigrant sample drawn between 1994 and 1995 (sample D) 
includes individuals from households with at least one household member who immigrated to 
Germany after 1984. Two additional samples were drawn in 1998 and 2000 (samples E and F). 
Both samples also include immigrants in their population schemes, however only in the latter 
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(sample F) were households that included foreign individuals sampled separately. Second, 
besides the high number of respondents of immigrant background, GSOEP involves a sufficient 
composition of relevant migrant-specific indicators measuring immigrant integration, ranging 
from language skills, identification with the residence country as well as origin country, the 
ethnic composition of friendship networks, and experiences of discrimination. In summary, the 
data is quite unique because it provides repeated information on first- and second-generation 
immigrants in Germany over a long period of time, thus allowing statements about integration 
dynamics over time. Yet, because the majority of its immigrant respondents were sampled in 
1984, GSOEP represents primarily long-term immigrants of Germany and not newly arrived 
immigrants. 
Due to that disadvantage of GSOEP to provide information of recently immigrated 
immigrants in Germany, the thesis also employs data from an international Norface-funded 
project on ‘Socio-Cultural Integration Processes of New Immigrants in Europe’ (SCIP; Diehl 
et al., 2015), which constitutes a two-wave panel study of new immigrants in Europe. It was 
initiated in 2009 and entails approximately 7,000 migrants aged between 18 and 60 years. These 
were recent immigrants from four European destinations, namely England, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, and Germany. Immigrants have been interviewed at the latest 18 months after 
immigration and a second time approximately fifteen months later. Unlike most panel surveys 
in Germany, the dataset is one of the first to address a very crucial and dynamic phase and initial 
period after immigration that may lay the groundwork for subsequent acculturation and 
integration processes such as political or emotional integration. As previously outlined in 
Section 1.4.2, the literature on the dynamic nature of social and ethnic belonging emphasises 
that changes in social self-conception are crucially initiated by changes of social and reference 
contexts through immigration (Howard 2000). In sum, Diehl et al. (2015b, 5) thus conclude: 
‘Studying new migrants, therefore, has the potential both to provide important descriptive 
information on recent immigrant flows to Europe and to help settle [..] unresolved questions of 
current integration research’. Another advantage of the SCIP project provides that it has 
collected data on various socio-cultural dimensions such as migrants’ social networks, religion, 
cultural consumption, as well as identification. Moreover, it also involves pre-migration 
characteristics of migrants, e.g. pre-migration worship attendance. The empirical studies of the 
thesis in Chapters 3 and 4 employ the SCIP data from Germany, which involve new immigrants 
from Poland and Turkey. A random sample was drawn from population registers in five cities 
(Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Munich, and Bremen). The target population was comprised of 
recent immigrants between the ages of 18 and 60 years who, at most, stayed for 18 months in 
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Germany at the time of the first interview that took place in 2010 or 2011. In total, 2,644 face-
to-face interviews (1,482 among Poles; 1,162 among Turks) were conducted in the first wave. 
Around 1.5 years later, approximately 45% could be re-interviewed (for a detailed description 
of the methodological setup of the project, see Gresser and Schacht 2015). 
In sum, GSOEP as well as SCIP provide through their unique panel structure as well as 
different focus on either log-term or new immigrants a valuable empirical ground for this 
thesis’s analysis of migrants’ attitudinal integration into German politics.  
1.5.2 Analytical strategy 
In line with the thinking on causal inference by Smith (2014) or Holland (1986), the present 
doctoral thesis seeks to identify the ‘the effects of causes’ (EoC) instead of the ‘causes of 
effects’ (CoE). CoE has been traditionally applied within social sciences, leading to an infinite 
list of causes, and researchers needed to realise, according to Sobel (2000), ‘that they are merely 
adding more and more variables to a predictive conditioning set, [that] one wonders what will 
take the place of the thousands of purported (causal) effects that currently fill the journals’ 
(Sobel 2000, 650). Instead, the causal approach of EoC implies that it is not the main statistical 
aim to decompose the variance of an outcome variable as far as possible, respectively to identify 
as many causes of the outcome as possible, but rather the attempt to identify the causal effect 
of a specific variable such as national identification on an outcome variable such as political 
attitudes. According to the counterfactual approach on causality (Rubin’s model) (Rubin 1974), 
the causal effect of a treatment (T) is defined as the difference between the outcome for an 
individual in case of no treatment as well as in the case of treatment. Yet, an individual can 
never be observed simultaneously in both states, which is known as the fundamental problem 
of causal inference (Holland 1986). Within cross-sectional designs, the difference between 
different individuals is thus measured. Yet, the causal effect would only hold if the assumption 
of unit homogeneity (no unobserved heterogeneity) holds. Within non-experimental survey data 
(without randomisation), this is not the case, and this method consequently suffers from the 
problems of self-selection based on unobserved heterogeneity (also called: omitted variables 
bias). Longitudinal data (i.e. repeated observations on individuals over time) and respective 
regression models allow researchers to deal with the problem of selection on observable and 
unobservable variables (for panel regression models, see Wooldridge 2010; Allison 2009; 
Mundlak 1978; see also Schunck 2013; Brüderl 2010). Panel data and respective regression 
methods address variations in characteristics between persons as well as within persons over 
time. The general formulation of the error-component model looks like the following: 
 Introduction, Overview, and General Framework 
41 
𝑦it = 𝛽1𝑥it + 𝛼i +  𝜀it 
In this model, the error term is divided into two components. While 𝛼i donates to a 
person-specific time-constant error term, thus involving the unobserved characteristics that do 
not change over time, 𝜀it represents the idiosyncratic error term that involves all unobserved 
characteristics of a person that vary over time. This error component model is the base of 
random effects (RE) as well as fixed effects (RE) regression models. Depending on the precise 
RE and FE model, assumptions on strict exogeneity hold, implying that the x-variables are 
uncorrelated with the error terms 𝜀it or 𝛼i. Within the FE model, the unobserved 𝛼i is removed 
prior to estimation through a transformation of time-deaming the data. Hence, fixed-effects are 
even unbiased (consistent) if  𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑥it , 𝛼i) ≠ 0. Phrased differently, FE controls for all time-
invariant variables of individuals, even though they have not been observed or measured such 
as sex, country of birth, or personality traits that are rather stable (e.g. intelligence). Moreover, 
at the same time it applies that FE controls for one part of attrition bias in longitudinal data due 
to time-constant variables. The estimator based on the time-demeaned variables is called the 
fixed effects estimator or the within estimator and is entirely based on within-person changes 
over time. It only rests on the further assumption of strict exogeniety between the independent 
variables and the idiosyncratic error (unobserved time-variant variables) 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥it , 𝜀it) = 0.  In 
contrast, the random effects model assumes that the person-specific error term 𝛼i is not 
correlated with the predictors, which allows for time-invariant variables to play a role as 
explanatory variables in the regression models 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥it , 𝛼i) = 0. Yet, the assumption can easily 
be violated in non-experimental research due to unobserved heterogeneity, which leads to 
biased and inconsistent estimates in the case of RE, while FE still provides consistent estimates. 
Yet, if the assumption 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥it , 𝛼i) = 0 holds, RE is more efficient (due to smaller standard 
errors) than FE, because it draws on within- as well as between-person information to estimate 
the effect. Thus, there is a trade-off between efficiency and bias within panel regression 
modelling. Yet, in terms of identifying EoC, the latter “bias” is more important. 
The empirical studies within Chapters 2-5 draw on these advantages of panel regression 
analysis. While Chapter 2 on the conditions of national identification applies random effects 
models, all other chapters (3, 4, and 5) use panel regression models that estimate within-effects 
in random-effects models, thus allowing us to address both advantages of FE and RE regression 
simultaneously (Allison 2009; Wooldridge 2010; Mundlak 1978; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 
2008; for an overview, see also Schunck 2013). These are called hybrid (Allison 2009) or 
correlated-random effects models (Mundlak 1978). They rest on the idea of decomposing 
between and within variation and to estimate the effects within only one model. Even though 
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the models are not new, they have received increasing attention within studies on panel data. 
Hence, the hybrid model according to Allison (2009) used within Chapters 2 and 3 on migrants’ 
political interest decomposes the time-varying variables into a within and between cluster 
component by 
𝑦it = (𝑥it − 𝑥i)′𝛽1 + 𝑥i𝛾 + 𝑧i′𝛿 +  𝛼i +  𝜀it 
Thus, 𝛽1 gives the within or fixed-effect estimate that is unbiased by the level 2 error 𝛼i. As in 
fixed-effects models, 𝛽1 is not biased through time-constant unobserved variables. 𝛿 provides 
the coefficient for the time-invariant variables, for which 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛼i|𝑥it, 𝑧i)=0 still needs to hold. 
Yet, by inclusion of the cluster means 𝑥i of the level 1 variables, the model ensures that effect 
estimates of the level 2 variables are corrected for between-cluster differences in 𝑥it. In sum, 
this hybrid model provides the most efficient and unbiased estimates for time-variant as well as 
time-invariant indicators of national identification, political interest, as well as ethnicity (i.e. 
country of origin). 
Similar to the hybrid model is the correlated random effects model (CRE) (Mundlak 
1978) applied within Chapter 5 on migrants’ satisfaction with democracy. In contrast to the 
hybrid model, it includes the cluster means of level 1 variables as an alternative to cluster mean 
centring (Halaby 2003, 519). 
𝑦it = (𝑥it)′𝛽1 + 𝑥i𝛾 + 𝑧i′𝛿 +  𝛼i +  𝜀it 
The cluster mean picks up any correlation between the person-specific error and the 
level 2 variable. While 𝛽1 still provides the same fixed-effects estimate as in the hybrid model, 
𝑥i will differ, as it provides within the hybrid model the between effect, while it is within CRE 
the difference of the within and between effects. 
In addition to the main strategy to account for selection of time-constant unobservables 
via panel regression models, the empirical regression models in Chapters 2-5 of my thesis also 
account for the selection of time-varying observables to assess the causal effect of social 
identification; as for fixed effects, the assumption of 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥it , 𝜀it) = 0 stills needs to hold. I build 
on Morgan and Whinship (2007) as well as Pearl’s (2010) framework of directed acyclic graphs 
(DAGs). Pearl elaborates three different approaches to identifying causal effects, of which one 
is the conditioning on variables that block all back-door paths from the causal variable to the 
outcome variable. This means, in more traditional terms, to identify observed variables that 
simultaneously affect X and Y. This variable is supposed to confound the relationship between 
X and Y and needs to be conditioned to assess the causal effect of X. Figure 1.4 C provides a 
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confounder of the relationship between D and Y, as in terms of Pearl’s language, a back-door 
path. The Path X←C→Y is a back-door path because it includes a directed edge pointing to X. 
In terms of my relationships of interests within Chapters 3, 4, and 5 between migrants’ time-
varying social identification and political attitudes, the approach suggests that other time-
dependent integration processes such as social and cultural adaption must be conditioned on to 
identify the causal effect of changes in psychological group memberships. Hence, in summary, 
my empirical analyses in the form of panel regression models of political attitudes on ethnic 
neglect, rather than seek, to primarily account for all causes of political interest, but focus on 
common causes that affect ethnic identities and political attitudes simultaneously. To find the 
respective variables is, with a first step, a theoretical task. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1-6. A causal diagram in which the effect of X on Y is confounded by C  
 
1.5.3 Moderation and mediation: Highlighting mechanisms 
Besides the analytical strategies chosen above to approach the causal effects of social 
identification on political attitudes with longitudinal data, I also apply moderation and 
mediation analysis, which allow the definition of the conditions and mechanisms of how social 
identification exerts its effect on migrants’ cognitive and evaluative political attitudes towards 
the German host society. Phrased differently, these types of analyses allow us to analyse in 
addition to the question of “whether” a variable has an effect, also “when” (moderation) and 
“how” (mediation) the variable has an effect on the outcome. Basic graphical models of 
mediation and moderation are depicted in Figure 1.5.   
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1-7. Simple diagrams on moderation and mediation of the effect of X on Y by M  
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Moderation implies a conditional effect of X, respectively that the effect of X is dependent on 
the values of another variable M. In contrast, mediation implies an indirect effect of X on Y, 
respectively that the effect of X on Y runs fully or partly over two paths (a and b) through 
another variable M. The empirical chapters of the present thesis have different hypotheses on 
moderation and mediation. For instance, in Chapter 4, the effect of a dual identity on political 
interest is suggested to depend on perceived discrimination (moderation). Further, Chapter 2 
supposes, for instance, that the effects of cultural and social assimilation on developing a 
national identity differ for recently immigrated Turks and Poles. Chapter 2 also proposes that 
the effect of time in the receiving country on national identification is mediated by increasing 
social and cultural assimilation processes.  
Moderation hypotheses are tested analytically by separate group analysis or including 
an interaction term within the regression equation, which is constructed as the product of X and 
M (Hayes 2013, 214). Analytically applying mediation analysis, Chapter 4 uses the product-of-
coefficients approach (Preacher and Hayes 2004) to examine how the effect of time in Germany 
is mediated by social and cultural assimilation on national identification. This implies the 
product of the coefficients of both paths (a) and (b) between X and Y in Figure 1.5, which 
resolves in its own coefficient, which is referred to as the indirect effect of X in the literature.  
Another traditional strategy to test mediation hypotheses is applied within Chapter 3 that 
analyses how the effect of national identification may be exerted through host country-specific 
social and cultural capital (i.e. majority language skills and interethnic associational 
involvement) on interest in national politics. It is the Baron-Kenny method (Baron and Kenny 
1986), also called the causal steps strategy, which identifies mediation through three premises: 
1) one must first establish that there is an effect to be mediated, meaning evidence that X and 
Y are associated, 2) X must affect M significantly, and 3) the effect of X on Y is reduced by a 
condition on M.  
1.5.4 Measurement of migrants’ social identities 
As noted by the literature and Section 1.2.1, social identity is a multidimensional construct. 
Social identity involves conceptually different aspects such as self-categorisation, importance, 
emotional attachment, or meaning, which are measured differently (see Ashmore, Deaux, and 
McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). Hence, referring to oneself as a member of a social category (self-
categorisation) can be measured by close-end or open-end questions such as ‘Which of the 
following religious communities do you consider yourself to belong to? -Islam; -Christianity; 
 Introduction, Overview, and General Framework 
45 
and so forth’, or ‘In terms of my religious denomination, I consider myself to be…’. To self-
categorise as member of a certain ethnic or religious group can be differentiated from the 
strength or importance of the respective group identification. Both are commonly 
operationalised with Likert items, referring to the strength of attachment or perceived pride 
associated with the group membership (e.g., from SCIP: ‘How important is the following to 
your sense of who you are: your current country of residence?’ and ‘Do you feel proud of your 
current country of residence?’).  
Ethnic belonging is applied within the empirical chapters of this dissertation with 
measures of own country of birth or of the parents (e.g. Chapter 5) as well as with ordinal 
measures of strength of ethnic belonging (e.g. Chapter 3). For operationalising national 
belonging in Chapters 2-5, there are only Likert items in GSOEP and SCIP available. Moreover, 
a behavioural measure for religious identity in Chapter 5 is used, which entails the information 
on respondents’ frequency of religious attendance. 
 Besides the different aspects of social identity, individuals also have multiple identities 
within their social self-concept, involving different group memberships. These overlapping 
national and ethnic identities are specifically referred to in the literature as dual (ethno-national) 
identity (Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012a; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014), which is also of 
interest within this thesis’s empirical Chapters 4 and 5. Even though it is empirically 
demonstrated that individuals identify with several groups simultaneously, the measurement of 
this experience is far from self-evident in current empirical research as well as yielding different 
results (for an overview, see Fleischmann and Verkuyten 2015).  
To measure the impact of a dual ethno-national identity in the thesis different strategies 
are applied: As the direct measure of dual identity (e.g., “I feel I belong to both the Turks and 
the Germans”) is not available in the data sets, bidimensional scale measures are applied, which 
consist of some kind of combination of the two separate national and ethnic identity scales 
(Nguyen et al. 2007). Either both single scales are split at some point of the scale (midpoint, 
mean, or median) to create categories of the inclusion strategies by Esser (2006) (dual, 
assimilated, separated, or marginalized) or the two emotional orientations are combined into an 
interaction term. In general, either measurement strategy has its statistical and conceptual 
disadvantages. Actually, the product term strategy is preferable for many statistical reasons, 
because dichotomisation of rather continuous variables results in loss of variability and 
statistical power (Demes and Geeraert 2014). Moreover, dichotomization at an arbitrary point 
of the sample (median or mean) limits cross-sample comparisons and may provide a distorted 
view of respondent identification. Nonetheless, if research interest specifically lies in testing of 
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the typological model by Esser (2006), such as in Chapter 4, the interaction strategy is less 
efficient/valid as the interaction term does not allow to differentiate between individuals who 
have medium scores on both scales and those who score very high on one scale and low on the 
other (Nguyen et al. 2007). Chapter 4 on general political interest finally uses the median 
instead of mean-split approach because the distributions of the single identification measures 
are skewed. Moreover, the median-split instead of the midpoint-split method is applied because 
even though the latter method might be more conceptually defensible as well as allows for 
cross-sample comparison, median-split allows for a more even distribution of participants 
across the four identity strategies (Arends-Tóth and van de Vijver 2006). Last but not least, the 
median-split method is chosen for reasons of inter-study comparability as it is the most applied 
method in previous literature (e.g. Berry and Sabatier 2010; Giang and Witting 2006). Because 
Chapter 5 on democracy satisfaction has no specific theoretical reason for differentiating 
bicultural migrants from other inclusion types (assimilated, separated, or marginalized), the 
product term strategy is used within the statistical analysis. 
Other important intendent variables (e.g. language proficiency or native contacts) are 
operationalised and used differently within the thesis, depending on their inclusion within the 
specific waves of SOEP or SCIP. Thus, for instance, as SEOP 2005 and 2010 lack the measures 
on migrants’ language skills, it is not included in the analysis of Chapter 5. 
1.6 Main findings of the empirical chapters with respect to the theoretical 
framework  
The main objective of the doctoral thesis is to discuss the integration conditions of migrants’ 
attitudinal integration into the German host society political system in internal/cognitive as well 
as external/evaluative terms (i.e. to gain a self-concept as political actor, to be satisfied with the 
regime and to identify with the national political comunity).  
Referring to the hybrid panel regression results in Chapter 3 and 4, it seems reasonable 
to conclude line with theoretical expectations in Chapter 2 that migrants’ cultural, social, 
structural, as well as emotional inclusion relate to the German host society (i.e. national 
identification) are main driving forces for their political interest. Due to different immigrant 
populations involved in Germany, also separate group analyses are calculated in Chapter 3 and 
4. These subgroup analyses indeed show some ethnic group-related results with respect to the 
effects of social and cultural capital indicators of the thesis. Thus, contrary to expectations in 
Section 1.4.1 the effect of majority language on interest in receiving country politics is stronger 
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for recently-arrived Turks. Moreover, there is statistical indication that there is only a negative 
effect of ethnic bonding within associational involvement for new immigrants from Poland but 
not from Turkey. Relatedly, political interest is for Turks significantly increased by informal 
social capital in the form of contacts with natives. Due to the positive effects that native contacts 
and language proficiency also exert in Chapter 4 on general political interest, the thesis 
concludes that cultural and social capital in form of majority language proficiency and 
interethnic contacts significantly matter for migrant’s political interest in the receiving country. 
This findings are consistent with previous (mainly cross-sectional) research (e.g. Eggert and 
Giugni 2010, Janmaat 2008). 
The thesis primarily contributes to existing literature in outlining the impact of 
emotional capital and its interrelation with cultural and social capital. For migrants’ receiving 
country-specific political interest, empirical analyses in Chapter 3 prove that national 
identification has an independent positive effect on political interest for recently immigrated 
Poles as well as for Turks. However, stepwise regression analyses also evince in line with 
expectations in Section 1.4.1 indirect effects of national identification. Thus, majority language 
proficiency interethnic contacts party mediate the national identity effect for Turks. That is 
because the national identity effect is reduced conditioning on these variables, as well as both 
indicators significantly predict the outcome. Moreover, separate regression analyses on 
interethnic contacts as well as language proficiency show a significant independent effect of 
national identification. Apart from indirect effects, the analyses also document as expected 
moderator effects, i.e. that impact of national identity (it’s partial slope) is depending on levels 
of majority language and associational involvement. Thus, with increasing language skills, the 
effect if national identification increases for Turks. In contrast, when gaining associational 
membership, national identification positively predicts political interest among Poles but 
negatively among Turkish immigrants. The negative effect might be due to experiences of social 
distance and stigmatisation that Turks may encounter in voluntary associations of the host 
society. This evokes national identity conflicts and thus social participation may mitigate the 
effect of national identification.  
Besides national identity, Chapter 4 on “general political interest” also empirically 
highlights in line with considerations in Section 1.4.1 that under the condition of perceived 
discrimination a combined dual ethno-national identity may function as emotional capital that 
enhances interest in politics in contrast to an assimilated or segregated identity. With respect to 
group specific effects between Turkish, Ex-Yugoslavian and Southern European immigrant 
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groups, subgroup as well as interaction analyses find that the dual identity effect conditional on 
discrimination only significantly applies to the Turkish migrant group. 
In sum, the thesis concludes that emotional inclusion processes independently as well 
as in combination and relation with social and cultural inclusion processes predict migrants’ 
inclination to develop an internal political self-conception in terms of becoming interested in 
its political issues (e.g. policy, politics, polity). Nonetheless, it also documents that not only 
host country-related psychological inclusion provides emotional capital for migrants’ 
inclination to become interested in and possibly active in the political system of Germany, but 
also in combination with psychological inclusion in ethnic group. Dual identity is not only the 
most common form of self-identification of migrants (e.g. Verkuyten 2005, 158). Moreover, 
because its infuelnce is conditional on perceived discrimination, which is often met by recent 
as well as long-term immigrants, it may be a main pathway for migrants’ political integration 
in Europeans receiving society.  
 With respect to migrants’ external attitudinal inclusion, their satisfaction with the 
democratic regime in Germany, the empirical study in Chapter 5 confirms in line with 
considerations in Section 1.4.2 that social, structural and emotional inclusion processes of 
migrants with reference to host society are also main predictors (majority language proficiency 
as cultural capital could not be tested due to gaps in SOEP data in 2010 and 2005). Thus, it 
shows in line with theory that migrants’ national identification, job status, as well as contacts 
with natives have independent effects on immigrants’ democracy satisfaction. Moreover, 
perceived discrimination as important underlying mechanism decreases migrants’ democracy 
satisfaction in line with assumptions. With respect to the religion as main condition, the analysis 
also documents the suggested independent positive effect of religious attendance on regime 
evaluations. In contrast to this dimension of religion, self-considered religious (i.e. Muslim) 
affiliation rather exerts conditional effects depending on the ethnic group membership of the 
individual migrant. Thus, the test of interactions terms as well as subgroup analyses reveal that 
it negatively predicts democracy satisfaction for immigrants from Turkey, while it positively 
predicts democracy satisfaction of for the other non-Turkish immigrants (from Eastern and 
Western EU states as well as other non-EU countries). Besides the negative effect of Muslim 
affiliation for second-generation Turks subgroup analyses also corroborate a negative 
interaction between frequent religious attendance and Muslim affiliation. Thus, the positive 
effect of frequent religious attendance on Turkish immigrants’ democracy satisfaction is getting 
smaller in the case of self-identifying as Muslim in comparison to a Christian self-identification. 
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At the same time, it applies that a Muslim self-identification leads to lesser democracy 
satisfaction among Turks, when they frequently visit the mosque. 
 Concerning the development of a sense of national group membership, Chapter 2 
evinces no large differences between newcomers from Poland or Turkey concerning the general 
conducive impact of their cultural and social assimilation as well as the hampering effect of 
perceiving discrimination for their emotional assimilation. Only the negative effect of perceived 
discrimination is stronger for Turks than for Poles. No effect of economic integration as 
suggested in Section 1.4.3 can be found. Yet, the analyses find considerable differences between 
Turkish and Polish immigrants in their social assimilation and their perceptions of 
discrimination and value compatibilities over time that determin a general decline if Turks’ and 
Poles’ increase in national identification over the length of stay in Germany. Thus, for instance, 
while the social assimilation increases for Poles, it stagnates for Turks. Moreover, the 
perception of discrimination increases considerably for recent immigrants from Poland. Those 
initial conditions partly account for the different identity trajectories of newly arrived Turks and 
Poles over time. 
1.7 Epilogue 
The previous Chapter 1 has served to provide a broad conceptual, theoretical, empirical 
background and synthesis of the core empirical chapters (2-5) of this doctoral work. The 
dependent variables of the empirical chapters were therefore set in a conceptual framework of 
political support literature/culture as well as within the framwork of migrant integration by 
Esser (2006). Further, the methodological strategy of the thesis has been delianted and the main 
results of the chapters with respect to the dicussed theory has been outlined.   
The following main chapters of this doctoral thesis (Chapters 2 to 5) are research papers 
written for international peer-reviewed journals. Every article independently elaborates on 
theories and empirical methods. Thus, to some extent, each of the articles stands alone. 
Nonetheless, all of the research articles do fit the aim and framwork that has been described in 
Chapter 1. Thus, within a more extensive conclusion in Chapter 6, each article will be discussed 
another time with respect to the broader whole of this doctoral thesis.  
The present last section of Chapter 1 thus serves to provide a specific outline and 
introduction of the subsequent empirical chapters. The single empirical chapters revolve around 
single subsidiary questions on the impact of national, ethnic, and religious identity of migrants 
and their adaptation to the political systems of European democracies in terms of becoming 
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personally self-conscious as political actors in politics (i.e. political interest) as well as having 
a favourable affect towards the political system (i.e. regime satisfaction) (see Section 1.1). 
Moreover, there is a specific focus on the role of national identity in constituting a determinant 
of internal and external political attitudes and that at the same time provides an explanandum 
that seeks its own explanation.  
The potential conditions of migrants’ identification with the national political 
community in Germany are studied in Chapter 2. Thereby, the study builds on assumptions of 
the classical assimilation theory by Gordon (1964) that migrants’ identificational assimilation 
(i.e. national identification) happens over time in Germany through migrants’ cultural and social 
accommodation within the receiving society over time (i.e. familiarity with and knowledge of 
the host-society language as well as social contact with natives). In contrast, salient ethnic 
boundaries in the form of perceived discrimination and cultural incompatibilities prevent new 
immigrants from their identification integration (Alba 2005) Moreover, this research endeavour 
places special emphasis on group differences in developing national identification for recent 
immigrants in Germany from Turkey and Poland. It is assumed that that Poles and Turks differ 
in their starting conditions to culturally and socially assimilate as well as to perceive 
discrimination and cultural incompatibilities within Germany, which in consequence leads to 
lower national identification among Turks, while it fosters higher national attachment among 
Poles. Yet, aside from the initial differences, the paper supposes that the effects of cultural and 
social assimilation as well as perceived discrimination on national identification should be quite 
similar for newly-arrived Poles and Turks.  
In contrast to Chapter 2, Chapter 3 deals with the explanation and testing of the effect 
of national identity on recent Polish and Turkish immigrants’ tendency to become interested in 
the political affairs of Germany, i.e. to become interested in national politics. Therefore, the 
empirical study draws on arguments of SIT (Tajfel and Turner 1986) as well as CVM (Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Thereby it suggests, on the one hand, a direct effect of migrants’ 
national identification on interest in national politics through affecting political attentiveness, 
importance, and motivation. On the other hand, indirect effects of national identity (i.e. 
moderation and mediation) by migrants’ German language skills as well as formal (i.e. 
associational) and informal embeddedness in social networks with Germans are proposed. The 
research article also discusses ethnic group differences with respect to the effect of national 
identity due to differences in ethnic boundaries with the German population in the form of social 
and cultural distances.  
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Building on Chapter 3 but with a different explanatory focus, Chapter 4 examines the 
role of national as well as ethnic minority identity for labour migrants’ political interest in 
Germany. More specifically, the empirical study starts from classical theoretical arguments of 
the conditional mobilising effect of a discriminated against and socially deprived ethnic identity 
(Miller et al. 1981; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), which is also suggested by SIT (Tajfel 
and Turner 1986). It then further adds arguments of the PCI model (Simon and Klandermans 
2001) to propose that a dual identity that combines the deprived ethnic minority identity with a 
sense of belonging to the national political community has a stronger effect on migrants’ 
cognitive mobilisation to act politically than a single ethnic or national identity. Moreover, due 
to different perceptions of discrimination among labour immigrant groups in Germany, the 
study also suggests that the dual identity is stronger for labour immigrants with backgrounds in 
Turkey versus South Europe or former Yugoslavia.  
Chapter 5 finally devotes attention to migrants’ regime satisfaction. Other than in the 
previous empirical Chapters 2 to 4, changes in satisfaction with democracy are primarily studied 
in relation to migrants’ religious identity, which is perceived in public and previous scholarly 
debate to negatively relate to migrants’ affect towards the government and institutions of 
democracies due to incompatible values between religion and democracy, with a particularly 
negative focus on Islam (Hofmann 2004; Huntington 1996a) (see also Section 1.1). Given that 
perceived responsiveness of political institutions, the government, regime, and so forth, is a 
matter of an individual’s life-satisfaction, the study assumes that psychological memberships 
in social groups (e.g. religious, ethnic, and national groups) affect the satisfaction with 
democracy of immigrants due to shaping individuals’ personal experiences and well-being. 
Because religious identity is a multidimensional concept according to social identity literature 
(Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004; Phinney and Ong 2007), the empirical study 
discusses the social identity experiences provided by religious identity behaviour such as 
attendance of religious events or services alongside the effect of migrants’ self-categorisation 
as members of Christian faith or Muslim faith. While a positive effect of religious attendance 
is suggested due to the positive and supportive experiences that are provided by religious 
attendance among cultural ingroup members, a negative effect of self-defining as Muslim is 
expected due to the negative experiences of stigmatisation that are encountered in the 
conflictive intergroup context of a historically Christian German host society. As individuals 
hold multiple group memberships, the article discusses how social identity experiences 
provided by national identity, ethnic identity by the country of origin (i.e. Turkish versus non-
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Turkish ancestry), and immigrant generation (i.e. first versus second generation) shape the 
effect of religious self-identification.   
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Chapter 2: Between ethnic options and ethnic boundaries –Recent 
Polish and Turkish migrants’ identification with Germany* 
 
Abstract 
We describe migrants’ early patterns of identification with the receiving society and explain 
why these differ by migrants’ origins. Using longitudinal data from a novel survey among recent 
immigrants from Poland and Turkey in Germany enables us to analyse the nexus between social 
assimilation, ethnic boundaries and identification more directly than previous studies. 
Theoretically, we start out from assimilation theory and its assumption that migrants’ 
identification with the receiving country is a consequence of their preceding social and 
cognitive assimilation and from the literature on ethnic boundaries. Results suggest that Turkish 
new migrants start out with higher levels of identification with Germany than Poles. Over time, 
however, their national identification decreases while it increases for Poles. This is partly 
explained by the fact that Turkish migrants’ social assimilation stagnates; more importantly, 
only Turks perceive more rather than less discrimination and value incompatibility over time. 
While both groups’ identificational integration with the receiving country thus starts out from 
different conditions, they do not show a fundamentally dissimilar pattern with respect to the 
consequences of assimilation and discrimination for their national identification. Yet, the 
negative impact of the latter is stronger for Turks than for Poles, reflecting the greater salience 
of ethnic boundaries for this group. 
 
  
                                               
*This chapter has been published as research article in the Journal Ethnicities 2016, Vol. 16(2): 236–260. DOI: 
10.1177/1468796815616156. Co-authors are Claudia Diehl and Peter Mühlau. 
Chapter 2 
66 
2.1 Introduction 
There is a renewed interest in migrants’ ‘emotional’ or ‘identiﬁcational’ integration in the 
receiving societies (Joppke, 2007). This is not only reﬂected in the public debate on some, 
mostly Muslim migrant groups’ alleged unwillingness to become full and loyal members of 
their receiving societies. There is also a substantial body of research in sociology, psychology 
and social psychology on migrants’ identity patterns, on the factors inﬂuencing them and on 
their consequences, e.g. on psychological well-being, outgroup attitudes or political 
engagement (Fischer-Neumann, 2014; Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012). Some studies are 
based on experimental research (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000: 103ﬀ.), others rely on survey 
data, for example from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). These studies mostly 
analyse the correlates of identity types or proﬁles using cross-sectional data (Schwartz, 2005: 
299). They evince considerable inter-individual variation in ethnic and national identities. 
Correlates on the individual level include education (Zimmermann et al., 2007), proﬁciency in 
both the receiving and sending countries’ languages (Esser, 2009), contact to majority and 
minority members (De Vroome et al., 2014; Leszczensky, 2013), citizenship status (Ersanilli 
and Koopmans, 2010) and experiences of discrimination (Verkuyten and Yildiz, 2007). 
Intergroup variation seems to be substantial as well, with some groups identifying more strongly 
with the receiving or sending country than others (Diehl and Schnell, 2006; Zimmermann et al., 
2007). On the group level, ethnic group size, the degree of ethnic replenishment, residential 
segregation (Esser, 2004; Jiménez, 2008), as well as the salience and the nature of ethnic group 
boundaries play an important role (Verkuyten, 2005: 159). 
In this paper, we will describe and explain early changes in recently arrived migrants’ 
identiﬁcation with the receiving country. Doing so will provide insight into a very dynamic 
phase in migrants’ identities that has so far remained a black box in integration research. 
Migrating to a new country is a typical change in social context that social identity theorists 
have described as a trigger for changes in identity and their meanings (Howard, 2000: 379; 
Owens et al., 2010: 488):   New– alternative or overarching – ‘ethnic options’ (Waters, 1990) 
are opening up as assimilated (e.g. ‘German’ or ‘American’), hyphenated (e.g. ‘Turkish- 
German’) or pan ethnic (e.g. ‘European’) identities. Depending on their experiences in the host 
society, e.g. discrimination due to their ethnic background, migrants may decide to distance 
themselves from or to embrace these new – or their old – identities. 
We will focus on migrants’ identiﬁcation with the receiving country – i.e. their ‘national’ 
identiﬁcation (see Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012) or their ‘identiﬁca- tional assimilation’ 
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(Gordon, 1964: 71) – rather than with their country of origin for theoretical, empirical and 
policy reasons. Theoretically, it can be assumed that being exposed to a new context aﬀects 
migrants’ identiﬁcation with the receiving country more than their identiﬁcation with the 
country of origin. After all, it seems unlikely that migrants abandon their homeland identity 
right away, even though this may happen in the long run. In turn, empirical evidence for reactive 
ethnic identities, although a prominent concept, is yet very scarce (Diehl and Schnell, 2006), 
and if it happens at all, it will probably not happen right after migrating to a new context but 
over time or in the next generation (Hansen, 1962; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001). Moreover, from 
a policy perspective, it seems important that new members of a society develop some sense of 
belonging to their new homeland and to understand which factors can hamper this process. 
Compared with this, the question of whether they maintain their ethnic identiﬁcations and thus 
develop some sort of ‘dual’ identity or abandon their old ties and identiﬁcations and become 
‘assimilated’ seems less important. However, we will take into account ﬁndings from previous 
studies showing that there is an empirical correlation between these two – analytically separate 
– dimensions of identiﬁcation (Skrobanek, 2009; Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012; Verkuyten 
and Yildiz, 2007) by brieﬂy presenting some preliminary ﬁndings on this issue in our 
conclusion. 
Our analyses are based on novel data from a two-wave survey among recently arrived 
immigrants in Germany. We will assess how and why these patterns diﬀer inter-individually 
and between migrants from various origins. In particular, we will analyse to which extent 
diﬀerences in migrants’ identity trajectories reﬂect their ongoing cognitive (referring mostly to 
language acquisition) and social (referring mostly to making friends with majority members) 
assimilation processes as well as their group-speciﬁc reception contexts. Notably, diﬀerences 
in the nature of ethnic boundaries will be more salient for some immigrant groups than for 
others. By analysing longitudinal data collected among newly arrived migrants, our study 
moves beyond existing research in several respects. To our knowledge, no study on ethnic 
identity has so far focused on migrants who have moved to Europe only recently. 
In the following, we will describe in further detail the theoretical arguments that guide 
our research and present existing empirical ﬁndings. These relate to changes in migrants’ 
identiﬁcation with the receiving country in general and to the role of their assimilation in other 
spheres and their experiences and perceptions of discrimination in particular. This section will 
be followed by a description of the ethnic groups under consideration here and the 
corresponding reception contexts and climates they face in Germany. Along with this, we will 
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present our theory-driven expectations about both groups’ early identity trajectories. Based on 
this we will present our data, empirical ﬁndings, and ﬁnally sum up and discuss our results. 
2.2 Theoretical background and existing findings 
Theoretically, migrants’ ethnic identities are examples of ‘collective’ or ‘social identities’, two 
terms that are often used interchangeably (Owens et al., 2010: 490). According to Social 
Identity Theory (SIT), social identity is ‘that part of a person’s self-concept which derives from 
his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional signiﬁcance attached to that membership’ (Tajfel, 1981: 255). There are many ways 
to measure immigrants’ identities, most importantly, ethnic labelling and self-categorisation, 
the sense of belonging to a group, ethnic behaviour and in-group attitudes (Phinney and Ong, 
2007). Many empirical studies on immigrant identities focus on their ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’ 
identiﬁcations, the former referring to migrants’ identity as a member of the country of origin 
and the latter referring to their identiﬁcation with the country of destination (Verkuyten and 
Martinovic, 2012). 
2.2.1 Migrants’ identification with the reception context: theoretical arguments... 
When it comes to explaining if and why migrants identify with their new receiving country a 
canonical and simple answer is that this ‘just happens’ over time. Inter-individual and 
intergroup variations in the pace of this process are due to migrants’ diﬀerential exposure to 
contexts and contacts that promote or hamper their identiﬁcation with both contexts. This was 
the idea behind Milton M. Gordon’s famous dictum that migrants’ identiﬁcation with the 
receiving country is the last and ﬁnal stage of their integration process that follows more or less 
‘naturally’ ‘[.. .] once structural integration has occurred [.. .]’ (1964: 81). Migrants who have 
acquired the necessary language skills and left the ethnic niches of the receiving country’s 
labour market meet majority members and enter the majority society’s primary groups 
(‘structural assimilation’ in Gordon’s terms). Once this step has been completed, their 
identiﬁcation with the receiving country will automatically increase. 
Gordon argues that this process might take several immigrant generations to be completed, 
implying that he had a rather long-time span in mind. But the idea that acculturation and social 
ties with majority members promote migrants’ identiﬁcation with the majority country can also 
be applied to ﬁrst-generation migrants’ national identiﬁcation.1 In order to come to testable 
conclusions about diﬀerent groups’ identity trajectories it is necessary, although, to identify the 
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general mechanisms that are at work behind Gordon’s assumption (see also De Vroome et al., 
2014). 
Migrants’ acculturation can be considered to be the ﬁrst step in their assimilation 
process. It has been argued that skills in the majority language inﬂuence migrants’ identiﬁcation 
with the receiving context (Walters et al., 2007) because they are a precondition for contacts 
with natives. Another important mechanism is that speaking the receiving country’s language 
comes along with a greater exposure to its values, norms and practices. Furthermore, language 
is an important means to indicate belonging and solidarity and to demarcate identities (Miller, 
2000). It has also been argued that speaking the language of the receiving country increases 
minority members’ similarity with majority members and that this enhances their identiﬁcation 
with the latter (Hochman and Davidov, 2014: 346). 
The relationship between social assimilation and national identiﬁcation has also 
received some attention. One mechanism described in the sociological literature is based on the 
assumption that contacts with natives signal to minority members that ethnic boundaries are 
permeable and that belonging to the majority is a feasible strategy (Leszczensky, 2013, for a 
similar argument on the role of majority contacts in the naturalisation decision see Diehl and 
Blohm, 2003). According to SIT, permeability of intergroup boundaries is the main 
precondition for low status group members to abandon devalued group memberships/identities 
and to become members of higher status groups, which, in turn may foster positive social 
identities and psychological well-being (Tajfel, 1978). Verkuyten and Martinovic thus argue 
that in an ‘[.. .] intergroup group structure with permeable group boundaries, ethnic minority 
group members tend not to use strategies of ethnic identiﬁcation and social competition, but 
rather national identiﬁcation and individual mobility’ (2012: 93). 
Signalling permeability of ethnic boundaries is, however, not the only mechanism that 
links social and identiﬁcational assimilation. Interaction with majority members may again 
come along with increasing exposure to receiving society’s norms, values and social practices 
and – for some groups more than for others – with the pressure to adopt these, including a 
national identiﬁcation (Lubbers et al., 2007; Schulz and Leszczensky, 2015). Furthermore, 
contacts with natives oﬀer opportunities to obtain social approval for declaring or showing 
loyalty to the receiving country (Esser, 2009: 360). 
More recent theoretical approaches to migrants’ adaptation emphasise the role of salient 
ethnic boundaries – i.e. socially relevant ethnic distinctions that matter in a given reception 
context (Wimmer, 2008: 975) – in migrants’ assimilation process. Salient boundaries come 
along with some degree of social closure so that minority members’ access to resources is 
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limited, in other words: they are discriminated against by majority members (Wimmer, 2008: 
980). In line with this argument, proponents of classical and neo assimilation theory have 
conceded that discrimination can slow down the integration process (Alba, 2005; Gordon, 1964: 
78). It can aﬀect both migrants’ motivation to identify with the receiving country and their 
opportunities for doing so (Esser, 2009: 360). Feeling as an integral part of the receiving country 
may not only become less attractive if it is perceived as being exclusionary and discriminatory 
but will also reduce perceived opportunities to receive social approval for visible signs of 
loyalty. As a consequence, ‘assimilation [.. .] as a strateg[y] for individuals to ‘shift sides’ and 
escape a minority stigma [.. .]’ (Wimmer, 2008: 19) may be perceived as not being an option by 
individuals who feel discriminated against. This could negatively aﬀect their readiness to 
identify with the majority. 
2.2.2 …empirical evidence and open questions 
Several studies have analysed the relationship between migrants’ cognitive and social 
assimilation, discrimination and perceived incompatibilities between majority and minority 
culture on the one hand and their identiﬁcation with the latter on the other hand. Previous studies 
based on cross-sectional data show that migrants’ cognitive and social assimilation is associated 
with higher national identiﬁcation especially for ﬁrst generation migrants (De Vroome et al., 
2014: 21). Hochman and Davidov (2014) show that migrants’ cognitive assimilation, i.e. their 
proﬁciency in German, has a positive eﬀect on their identiﬁcation with Germany. 
A recent longitudinal examination of the relationship between migrants’ social 
assimilation and their identiﬁcation with the receiving society among German born adolescents 
with Turkish background revealed that social assimilation and identiﬁcation are unrelated once 
unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality are taken into account (Leszczensky, 2013). 
The author concedes, however, that causal eﬀects might occur at earlier stages in life. Esser 
(2009) did not ﬁnd an unambiguous relationship between contacts with natives and migrants’ 
identiﬁcation with Germany in his longitudinal study based on data from the German Socio- 
Economic Panel (GSOEP) either. 
Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. (2009: 121) show in their longitudinal study that there is in fact a 
negative relationship between experiences of discrimination and national identiﬁcation among 
FSU migrants in Finland but not between discrimination and ethnic identiﬁcation. De Vroome 
et al. (2014: 21) come to a similar conclusion and argue that perceived acceptance or rejection 
by the majority strongly inﬂuences immigrants’ sense of national belonging. Schulz and 
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Leszczensky (2015) show that salient ethnic boundaries counteract the positive eﬀect of native 
friends on migrants’ identiﬁcation with the majority. 
The studies reviewed so far have in common that they study the relationship between 
migrants’ cognitive and social assimilation, discrimination and national identiﬁcation not at the 
beginning of the assimilation process but give a snapshot of this relationship at a later – and 
necessarily rather arbitrary – stage of their stay in the receiving country. Others look at this 
relationship among second-generation migrants which makes a lot of sense because they were 
born in the receiving coun- try and an ‘identiﬁcation gap’ between this group and majority 
members is more puzzling than between immigrants in a narrower sense of the word (i.e. those 
who immigrated themselves) and the latter. However, these studies cannot answer the question 
of whether some migrants’ lower (or higher) levels of identiﬁcation with the receiving country 
existed already right after or even before immigration or evolved during their course of their 
stay. 
Furthermore, with a few exceptions (Esser, 2009; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009; 
Leszczensky, 2013), the studies mentioned so far have looked into the relationship between 
assimilation, discrimination and identiﬁcation based on cross-sectional data. Even though they 
shed much light on the phenomenon under consideration here, they cannot test any assumptions 
about causal relationships between diﬀerent dimensions of the assimilation process. 
And ﬁnally, the arguments and ﬁndings presented so far refer to the general mechanisms 
triggering or hampering migrants’ identiﬁcation with the receiving country and focus on 
migrants in general or on speciﬁc groups but they do not study group diﬀerences systematically 
(for a recent study on these diﬀerences see Schulz and Leszczensky, 2015). We argue, however, 
that it needs to be taken into account that new immigrants’ adaptation process starts out from 
group-speciﬁc circumstances. In this respect, an ethnic group’s degree of residential and labour 
market segregation, linguistic and cultural distance, overall educational level as well as the 
nature and strength of ethnic group boundaries appear to matter most. In order to come to 
testable conclusions about the identity trajectories for the groups under consideration here, we 
will now turn to describing the migration history, immigrant population and the reception 
context for recent migrants from Turkey and Poland to Germany.2 Based on this, we can 
formulate speciﬁc expectations that guide our empirical analysis of both groups’ early 
integration trajectories. 
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2.3 Poles and Turks in Germany: expected results 
Contemporary newcomers from Turkey or Poland enter into rather distinctive trajectories of 
Germany’s post-war history of immigration. There are now about 2.8 million German 
inhabitants with Turkish migration background, thus constituting the second largest single 
immigrant group in Germany (Ethnic Germans being the largest). The pioneer migrants were 
predominantly male low skill labour migrants who came to ﬁll the German economy’s labour 
demand in the 1950s and 1960s. After a recruitment stop in 1973, family members joined them 
and settled permanently in the Federal Republic. Family reunion is still the most important 
migration motive among Turks (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2010: 206). There 
are also a considerable number of Turkish migrants coming to Germany to pursue post-
secondary education, and a few Turkish skilled migrants have arrived under the new 
governmental policy of attracting high-skilled immigrants. In contrast, while it is true that large 
numbers of Polish speakers had migrated from the former Eastern Prussian provinces to the 
industrial centres in the West Germany before the ﬁrst World War, today’s 640,000 or so persons 
with Polish migration background have mainly arrived in the post-communist period – either 
as ‘Ethnic Germans’ (Aussiedler) or as workers or students (Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge, 2010: 37ﬀ.). Since Poland’s accession to the European Union in 2004, Poles have 
received new rights to freedom of movement within the wider European Union, though 
Germany restricted labour migration from Poland until May 2011. 
Poles and Turks diﬀer with regard to their ethnic group’s size and ethnic institutional 
completeness. Given their numbers, especially in some larger German cities such as Berlin or 
Cologne, new coming Muslim Turks enter institutionally more complete ethnic communities 
than Poles. Germany’s Turks also have been found to have comparatively few interethnic 
friendships, even in the second generation and even compared with Turks in other European 
cities (Crul and Schneider, 2012: 389). In a similar vein, both groups diﬀer with respect to the 
nature and strength of ethnic boundaries they face upon arrival. Social distances on behalf of 
natives are particularly strong for Turks (Blohm and Wasmer, 2008) who also more often 
experience discrimination than non-Muslim immigrants (Hans, 2010) such as Poles. After all, 
ethnic boundaries tend to be deﬁned religiously in Europe (Foner and Alba, 2008; Zolberg and 
Woon, 1999) and stereotypes about groups’ alleged unwillingness to adapt and contribute to 
German society and culture are quite widespread (for an example see Sarrazin, 2010). New 
arrivals with a Muslim background such as Turks will thus soon be confronted with the vivid 
debate about the incompatibility between Islam and Western culture that has clearly gained 
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aAssimilation refers to cognitive and social assimilation. b Boundaries refer to perceived discrimination 
and value incompatibilities between majority and minority. 
momentum during the last decade. This is not the case for Poles in Germany. The critical public 
discourse on immigration from Eastern Europe to Germany focuses mostly on Romanians and 
much less so on Poles. 
In sum, Poles join a rather well-integrated group of co-ethnics in Germany whereas 
Turkish migrants’ assimilation proceeds slower than for other groups. Furthermore, salient 
ethnic boundaries exist mostly between Turkish migrants and the majority population in 
Germany but not between Polish migrants and Germans. Starting out from the theoretical 
arguments outlined above and our description of group speciﬁc reception contexts we can now 
formulate speciﬁc expectations about both groups’ patterns of early changes in ethnic and 
national identities (for a summary of our expected results see Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2-1. Relationship between time in and identification with Germany for Polish and Turkish new 
immigrants: expected results 
Given the diﬀerent natures of ethnic boundaries that Turkish and Polish migrants face in 
Germany, we assume that Poles show a rather ‘classical’ pattern of social and cognitive 
assimilation and low perceptions of discrimination and group diﬀerences. We expect Turks, 
in turn, to assimilate socially and cognitively slower than Poles and to perceive more 
discrimination and group diﬀerences as a consequence of more salient ethnic boundaries 
than Poles. 
Notwithstanding these initial diﬀerences, we further expect to ﬁnd support for the 
assumption from assimilation theory that identiﬁcation with the receiving context is 
generally stronger among those individuals who speak the language and interact with 
natives. Based on the boundary approach, we also expect that experiences of discrimination 
and perceptions of strong cultural diﬀerences between majority and minority are associated 
with lower levels of identiﬁcation with the residence country – for both Poles and for Turks. 
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2.4 Data and analytical strategy 
In our empirical analyses, we draw on data from a unique dataset produced in the international 
survey project on Socio-cultural Integration Processes among New Immigrants in Europe 
(SCIP) that was funded by the NORFACE Research Programme on Migration (Diehl et al., 
2015). The SCIP project is a two-wave-panel study of selected migrant groups in which about 
7000 recent migrants aged between 18 and 60 were surveyed in four European destination 
countries – Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom and Ireland. Migrants with a maximum 
stay of 1.5 years were interviewed soon after their arrival and as many as possible were re-
interviewed again another 1.5 years later.3 To analyse group diﬀerences, Poles as a rather recent 
immigrant group to these destinations, and Turks/ Pakistanis/Moroccans   as   groups   
representing   the   classical labour/colonial migration to Western Europe, were included in the 
SCIP survey. These groups contribute greatly to the share of migrant population in the four 
countries (for a detailed description of the methodological setup of the project see Gresser and 
Schacht, 2015). In Germany, immigrants from Turkey and Poland having stayed in Germany 
up to 1.5 years were interviewed in Turkish and Polish CAPI-interviews. Initially, a random 
sample was drawn from population registers in ﬁve large cities 
Migrants’ identiﬁcational integration is measured using the ISSP identity questions (full 
questionnaire available at: http://www.scip-info.org): How important is the following to your 
sense of who you are/ how proud are you of [.. .]? Answer options included, among others [.. 
.] the country where you were born?, [.. .]  your  current country of residence? These items are 
measured using a 4-point scale that were combined into an additive index ranging from 2 to 8 
(very proud/important- not proud/important at all).4 As mentioned in the introduction, we will 
concentrate on migrants’ identiﬁcation with their receiving country. 
The independent variables are measured as follows: How well would you say you 
understand/speak/read /write German when someone is speaking to you? (1= not at all, 4= very 
well) (cognitive assimilation); Let us talk a little more about the people who are important to 
you personally and who you feel close to that live in Germany. Please do NOT include your 
parents, your husband/wife or your children, but you CAN include other relatives. For up to 
four persons mentioned it was asked (among others): Is the background of this person 
Polish/Turkish, German, or some other group? As a second indicator migrants were asked: How 
often do you spend time with Germans? (1= never, 6= daily) (social assimilation). 
Levels of discrimination are operationalised by perceived group discrimination rather 
than by individual experiences of discrimination since it can be assumed that discrimination 
 Between ethnic options and ethnic boundaries 
75 
can hamper migrants’ identiﬁcation if they think that members of their group are discriminated 
against – even if they personally haven’t experienced any discrimination: Some say that people 
from Poland/Turkey are being discriminated against in Germany. How often do you think 
Polish/Turkish people are discriminated against in Germany? (1= never, 5= very often). In the 
SCIP survey, migrants’ subjective perceptions of salient group diﬀerences were asked directly. 
Their approval of the item: The values of Poles/Turks and Germans are irreconcilable/ totally 
diﬀerent (1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree) thus serves as a second indicator for salient 
ethnic boundaries. 
Time spent in Germany is measured in months. Every migrant was interviewed twice 
but for reasons related to the practicalities of sampling and ﬁeldwork the time migrants’ had 
already spent in the country at the time of their ﬁrst interview ranged from 1 to 15 months.5 
This enables us to analyse the relationship between migrants’ assimilation, experiences of 
discrimination and identiﬁcation in more detail than by just comparing wave 1 and wave 2 
interviews. Independent of that, the time span between the ﬁrst and the second interview was a 
minimum of 15 months and varies little between respondents. 
We start out by examining if changes in migrants’ identiﬁcation with Germany diﬀer 
between Poles and Turks over time. Based on this, we estimate a set of random eﬀect 
regressions to utilise the between and within variation of time spent in Germany.6 Doing so, we 
analyse if group-speciﬁc trajectories reﬂect early experiences in those factors theoretically 
expected to trigger migrants’ identiﬁcation with the receiving context, namely their social and 
cognitive assimilation and their early perceptions of exclusion. These regressions are conducted 
separately for the two groups to allow that both groups react diﬀerently to assimilation and 
exclusion. By running both, regressions of assimilation and exclusion on time, in a ﬁrst step, 
and of identiﬁcation on time, assimilation and exclusion in a second step we can ‘decompose’ 
the total time eﬀect into a direct (time→identiﬁcation) and an indirect 
(time→assimilation/exclusion and assimilation/exclusion! identiﬁcation) eﬀect. Finally, we 
illustrate our ﬁndings by simulating how identity trajectories of Turks would look like if they 
experienced Poles’ levels of assimilation and exclusion or reacted to these experiences as Poles 
do. 
2.5 Findings 
In order to get a grasp of the general patterns of identiﬁcational integration for Poles and Turks, 
we display Polish and Turkish migrants’ identiﬁcation with the receiving country in Figure 2.1 
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as a function of the time spent in Germany.7 As expected, both groups show diﬀerent patterns 
of adaptation during their ﬁrst 3 years in Germany (Figure 2.2). 
In the beginning of their stay, Turkish migrants identify more with Germany than Poles’ 
but this changes over time: Turkish migrants’ identiﬁcation with the reception country stagnates 
later on and eventually decreases and after about 24 months, they show slightly lower levels of 
identiﬁcation with Germany than Poles. The latter group’s identiﬁcation with the reception 
context continuously increases over time8. 
 
Figure 2-2. Identification with Germany for Poles and Turks by time in Germany in months (means) 
While this basic pattern does indeed provide at least some support for the expectation that Turks’ 
identity trajectories deviate from the pattern predicted by assimilation theory, it is yet unclear 
which processes underlie the declining identiﬁcation of Turks with Germany. A closer look at 
the group averages of the model variables (see Table 2.1) yields several salient diﬀerences: only 
Poles show rising levels of identiﬁcation with Germany between the two waves. To provide a 
full picture of both groups’ identity patterns, we also display mean values for identiﬁcation with 
Poland/Turkey. These reveal that while Turks identify some-what stronger with Turkey than 
Poles with Poland, both groups show a slight though non-signiﬁcant increase in their 
identiﬁcation with the country of origin over time. This may point to a heightened salience of 
the homeland identity after migration. Fewer Turks than Poles are working, a ﬁnding that is 
likely to reﬂect the diﬀerent migration histories of Poles and Turks to Germany: Poles come 
mostly to Germany to work and study whereas Turks come mainly to join their families already 
living in Germany. Accordingly, many immigrated as spouse. 
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With respect to the indicators for migrants’ early social and cognitive assimilation, results show 
that Poles and Turks have similar German skills in wave 1 but that Turks improve their 
proﬁciency in German more between waves 1 and 2, possibly related to the fact that they know 
more German speaking co-ethnics when they arrive. The picture is mixed with respect to both 
groups’ social assimilation: Poles spend more time with Germans than Turks and this gap 
widens over time. However, more Turks than Poles have Germans among their best friends.  
The indicators for the ethnic boundaries suggest a group speciﬁc pattern: Turks and 
Poles perceive similar degrees of group discrimination at the beginning of their stay but these 
perceptions increase signiﬁcantly over time only for Turks, whereas they remain stable for 
Poles.9 Perceived value incompatibility is substantially higher for Turks than for Poles in wave 
1 and tends to increase over time for Turks but remains stable – at comparatively low levels – 
for Poles. 
We will now turn to our multivariate analyses in order to study the relationship between 
migrants’ early cognitive and social assimilation, their experiences of dis- crimination and their 
identity trajectories. We ran separate random eﬀects regressions on both, the indicators of 
assimilation and discrimination and on migrants’ identiﬁcation using multiply imputed 
datasets.10 Results including calculated indirect and total eﬀects11 are summarised in Table 2.2 
(for full models see Appendix A2.1, M1–5 and Appendix A2.2). 
Overall, the total eﬀect of Time in Germany conﬁrms that over time, Turkish migrants’ 
identiﬁcation with Germany decreases signiﬁcantly, while it increases substantially for Poles 
(see last row in columns 10 and 12 in Table 2.2). These eﬀects are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent 
between both groups. Furthermore, Table 2.2 reveals that over time, Turks and Poles cognitive 
assimilation increases, for Turks even stronger than for Poles. However, social assimilation 
increases only for Poles but not for Turks. Multivariate results conﬁrm that both groups also 
show a diﬀerent pattern in terms of their experiences of discrimination: over time, Turks 
perceive more group discrimination whereas this is not the case for Poles (see columns 2 and 4 
in Table 2.2). 
With respect to the impact of migrants’ early assimilation and their experiences of 
discrimination on their identiﬁcation, the patterns look again similar for both groups (see 
columns 6–9 in Table 2.2): Migrants’ early cognitive assimilation is unrelated (Poles) or weakly 
related (Turks) to their identiﬁcation with Germany, whereas social assimilation enhances both 
groups’ identiﬁcation with the receiving context. Discrimination diminishes their identiﬁcation 
with Germany but this eﬀect is substantially larger for Turks than for Poles. This ﬁnding could 
be related to the greater salience of ethno-religious boundaries for Turks than for other migrants 
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that turn perceptions of discrimination into something more threatening for Turks than for Poles 
– possibly because they point to a larger societal problem and more severe social exclusion. 
The ﬁnding that the perception of value incompatibilities diminishes only Turks’ identiﬁcation 
with Germany but not Poles’ sense of national belonging points in the same direction. 
Obviously, these incompatibilities are more fundamental in nature for Turks than for Poles.  
The direct eﬀects of time in Germany on identiﬁcation are somewhat attenuated when 
taking the indicators of cognitive and social assimilation as well as ethnic boundaries into 
account (see second last row in columns 10 and 12 in Table 2.2). However, the relative size of 
the direct eﬀect of time in Germany on identiﬁcation with Germany remains quite large, 
especially for Turks (see columns 10 and 12 in Table 2.2). This is partly related to the fact that 
the indirect eﬀects of cognitive assimilation and discrimination point in opposite directions and 
counterbalance each other. Obviously, the variables under consideration here (and the 
measurements used!) can only account for a small proportion of the overall trend in Turkish 
and Polish migrants’ identiﬁcation with Germany over time. We will come back to this in our 
conclusion. 
In Figure 2.3, a simulation is presented that shows how the decline in Turkish migrants’ 
national identiﬁcation (not identiﬁcation itself!) with Germany would decrease (or increase) if 
they experienced similar degrees of assimilation and discrimination and showed similar 
reactions to these processes than Poles.12 Turkish migrants’ decline would be by about 30% 
smaller if their perceptions of group discrimination and value incompatibilities were as low as 
Poles’ perceptions. Their decline in identiﬁcation with Germany would be about 18% smaller 
if they were as resilient to discrimination and perceived value incompatibilities as Poles.  
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Figure 2-3. How would it affect Turkish migrants’ decline in identification with Germany if they showed 
Polish migrants’ patterns of assimilation and discrimination? (Simulation based on Table 2.2) 
Turkish migrants’ identiﬁcation with Germany would also be higher if their social 
assimilation progressed as fast as Polish migrants’ assimilation. Since Turkish migrants’ 
assimilate faster cognitively, i.e. learn German quicker, and since cognitive assimilation tends 
to enhance Turkish migrants’ identiﬁcational assimilation, the decline in their identiﬁcation with 
Germany would be even more pronounced if they learned German as slowly as Poles do. To 
put it diﬀerently: the fact that Turkish new migrants learn the language faster than Poles 
attenuates the decrease in Turkish migrants’ identiﬁcation. 
2.6 Conclusions 
Our analyses of Polish and Turkish migrants’ early patterns of identiﬁcation with the receiving 
country have revealed some interesting and signiﬁcant diﬀerences between these groups. Most 
importantly, only new migrants from Poland show an increasing identiﬁcation with Germany 
over time, whereas this is not the case for Turks. In fact, their national identiﬁcation decreases.  
Theoretically, we have argued that both groups’ identiﬁcational integration has started 
out from rather diﬀerent conditions: As non-EU immigrants, Turks arriving in Germany join an 
ethnic group that lags behind other minority groups with respect to their cognitive, structural 
and social assimilation. Since immigration from Turkey is still heavily network based, it can be 
expected that newcomers show a similar pattern of comparatively slow integration into the 
status systems and social networks of the majority. Moreover, Turks arriving in Germany join 
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an ethnic group that is in the center of a heated societal debate on integration, that is met by 
natives with comparatively high levels of social distance and that faces discrimination more 
often than other groups. 
Based on assimilation theory and the literature on ethnic boundaries, we expected that 
both groups’ identity trajectories start out from very diﬀerent conditions but there is no reason 
to assume that the basic mechanisms leading to migrants’ identiﬁcation with the majority diﬀer 
a great deal for newcomers from Poland and Turkey: On the one hand, their assimilation in 
other spheres should enhance both groups identiﬁcational integration with the receiving 
country, on the other hand, discrimination and perceived value incompatibilities – reﬂecting 
bright ethnic boundaries – should hamper it. 
Overall, our analyses conﬁrm these expectations: over time, both groups show a clear 
pattern of cognitive, i.e. language, assimilation. While Poles assimilate socially during their 
ﬁrst months in Germany this process stagnates for Turks. However, the most pronounced 
diﬀerence between the groups is that the share of individuals who feel that their group is 
discriminated against increases among Turkish immigrants. In addition, Turks comparatively 
strong perceptions of value incompatibilities between Germans and Turks stagnate over time. 
While both groups’ identity trajectories thus start out from rather diﬀerent conditions, 
they do not show fundamentally dissimilar patterns with respect to the consequences of 
assimilation and discrimination. The former increases migrants’ identiﬁcational assimilation 
and the latter hampers it even though the negative impact of discrimination is stronger for Turks 
than for Poles. 
By looking at new migrants, we have been able to study the nexus among social 
assimilation, discrimination and identiﬁcation more directly than previous studies. Most 
importantly, we could demonstrate that Turkish migrants’ comparatively low level of 
identiﬁcation with Germany does not exist from the very beginning but evolves over time and 
reﬂects rising levels of discrimination and a stagnating process of social assimilation. However, 
our results show that the indirect eﬀect of discrimination and social assimilation is quite small. 
That is, even if Turks experienced less discrimination and established more contacts with 
natives they would not show a pattern of rising national identiﬁcation as Poles do – but their 
decline in identiﬁcation with Germany would be less pronounced. 
There are several possible answers to the question of which factors could account for 
this. First of all, it is possible that our model is misspeciﬁed, i.e. other factors than the ones 
under investigation here explain this ﬁnding. While we think that no alternative theoretical 
approaches are at hand – the arguments of the proponents of the Theory of Segmented 
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Assimilation (e.g. Portes and Rumbaut, 2001) mainly refer to migrants’ stable or even reactive 
identiﬁcation with the sending context – we conducted some additional analyses not presented 
here in order to look into several alternative ideas First of all, we included a very rough indicator 
for migrants’ structural integration in our models (in the more current sense of migrants 
integration the educational system and the labour market). We have not done this in our original 
analysis since structural integration is a tricky concept for ﬁrst-generation migrants. What does 
it mean – ﬁnding a job, ﬁnding a ‘good’ job or ﬁnding a job with many German colleagues? We 
decided to go for ﬁnding a job which is an indicator for migrants’ labour market participation 
that may imply greater expos- ure to receiving society’s values, norms and practices. However, 
results show that Turks lower rates of inclusion in the labour market do not explain their 
declining levels of identiﬁcation with Germany. This is in line with previous ﬁndings that labour 
market integration inﬂuences migrants’ identiﬁcation only indirectly via an increase in 
migrants’ social assimilation (De Vroome et al., 2014). 
We also included migrants’ religiosity (religious attendance) in our analyses. Even 
though we do not see any reason to argue that being religious, especially an attachment to Islam, 
needs to hamper migrants’ identiﬁcation with the receiving society directly (and not indirectly 
by evoking discrimination), this is a popular argument. However, we found migrants’ religiosity 
to be unrelated to their identiﬁcation with the receiving country. And ﬁnally, we included 
migrants’ identiﬁcation with the country of origin in our analyses. If both identities were 
incompatible as some authors suggest (see Berry et al., 2006 for the European context), a slight 
increase in newcomers’ identiﬁcation with Poland and Turkey (compare Table 2.1) would be 
reﬂected in a slight decrease in their identiﬁcation with Germany. Unlike several other studies 
(e.g. Yagmur and Van De Vijver, 2012) we found, however, that both identity types are 
positively correlated for both groups of recent migrants. In this respect, our ﬁndings conﬁrm 
the argument by Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. (2009: 108) who state that ‘it seems that among minority 
groups negative attitudes towards the national out-group may be related to other factors than 
in-group identiﬁcation’. Last but not least, we replicated our analyses by conducting ﬁxed (with 
time measured by wave) rather than random eﬀect models (results available upon request) and 
this leads to the same conclusions. 
Despite all these checks, the picture we have outlined here is preliminary and it is quite 
possible that Turkish migrants’ identiﬁcation with Germany gains momentum later on. 
However, our analyses show that Turkish migrants’ early patterns of identiﬁcation with the 
receiving country are inﬂuenced by their early experiences in Germany. Since these are quite 
diﬀerent from the experiences of Poles, both groups’ identiﬁcational integration trajectories 
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become more dissimilar over the time period considered here. Even though the diﬀerences are 
not large, our analyses have been able to link these initial diﬀerences in migrants’ identiﬁcation 
trajectories to those factors that are described in the literature as hampering the process of 
adopting new identities, namely perceiving discrimination and value incompatibilities between 
the home- and the receiving culture and staying apart from the social cliques and networks of 
majority members. One could argue that migrants’ identiﬁcations can be considered to belong 
to the realm of private choices that may have little relevance for their eventual integration in 
the status systems of the receiving country. Things look diﬀerent, of course, when these choices 
reﬂect feelings of exclusion and salient ethnic boundaries rather than what Mary Waters once 
called ‘ethnic options’ 
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Notes 
1. We argue that for new migrants, their labour market integration is less important and 
difficult to capture empirically, for more details see the discussion in the conclusion. 
2. This following paragraph describing recent migration patterns of Poles and Turks in 
Germany is partly taken from Diehl and Koenig (2013) and their analyses of new migrants’ 
religious adaptation that is also based on SCIP data. 
3. Panel mortality was high due to the high mobility of this group not only within Germany 
but also between Germany and the sending countries. Even though large efforts were 
undertaken to re-interview migrants after 1.5 years only about 45% could be re-inter- 
viewed. Lasinskaja-Lahti et al. (2009) report similar rates; in the US New Immigrant Survey 
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panel mortality was equally high (according to an email exchange with the NIS project 
director in March 2014). 
4. Cronbach’s a for identification with the country of origin is 0.72 for both samples and for 
identification with Germany is 0.74 (Poles) and 0.71 (Turks). 
5. During fieldwork, addresses were stepwise assigned to interviewers and new addresses were 
only issued when the target persons that were issued first were either interviewed identified 
as ‘‘not-at-homes’’ or refusals or their addresses were found to be non-existent. There is thus 
little reason to assume that migrants interviewed earlier differed systematically from those 
interviewed later on (see Gresser and Schacht, 2015). 
6. Since there is little variation in the time span between the two interviews, fixed effect 
regressions only allow us to estimate the difference in national identification between the 
two waves and not as a function of time in the residence country. The estimated effects for 
social and cognitive assimilation and discrimination and value compatibility are consistent 
in the random effect model as are the group differences between the effects. 
7. The graph depicts the cross-sectional relationship between time in Germany and national 
identification based on the pooled data of respondents partaking at both waves. The plots 
have been somewhat smoothed using locally weighted regressions. 
8. This holds regardless of whether the respondent has spent time in Germany before 
migration. 
9. Results not displayed here show that personal experiences of discrimination are even lower 
for Turks than for Poles in wave 1 (with 29 versus 36% having felt discriminated against) 
but they increase significantly for Turks but decrease for Poles over time (to 32 versus 41% 
resp. in wave 2). 
10. Missing values due to item non-response were multiply imputed using chained 
equations. Results refer to the analysis of five imputed datasets using Rubin’s (1987) 
combination rules. In comparison to other missing data techniques, multiple imputation is 
more efficient, reduces potential bias in the estimation of coefficients (if missing values are 
not completely random but to some degree correlated with the vector of observed variables), 
and estimates standard errors that reflect the uncertainty of the missing information correctly 
(Allison, 2002). 
11. Total effects are calculated as sum of the direct and indirect effects. 
12. By recalculating the effects for Turks using the ‘Polish’ coefficients of the regressions 
of the relevant mediation variables on time (‘experience’) or the ‘Polish’ coefficients of the 
regressions of identification on the mediator variables of interest (‘sensitivity’). The 
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predicted change of the identification of the Turks between t0 und t1 (It1(T)-It0(T))  is the 
product of the coefficients for the mediation variables and the change in the mediation 
variables over time: It1(T)—It0(T) = B(T)(M t1(T) —Mt0(T)). The same holds ceteris 
paribus for the Poles: It1(P) —It0(P) = B(P)(M t1(P) —Mt0(P)). The simulated change for 
Turks ‘with the experiences of Poles’ is then: B(T)(M t1(P) —Mt0(P)), the simulated change 
for Turks ‘with the sensitivities of Poles’ is then: B(P)(M  t1(T) —Mt0(T)), expressed as a 
percentage of the observed change in identification of the Turks. 
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Table A 2.2. Panel regression models: Turkish and Polish migrants’ Identification with Germany 
  Random Effects  
  Poles   Turks   
Time in Germany in months/10 0.084** (0.030) -0.083+ (0.049) 
Ethnic Turk -- -- -0.210 (0.140) 
Female 0.241* (0.100) 0.101 (0.134) 
Age at immigration/10 0.176*** (0.044) 0.031 (0.094) 
Education (Ref.: Secondary)     
   Primary or less 0.250 (0.170) 0.415* (0.173) 
   Tertiary -0.269** (0.090) -0.381* (0.151) 
Employment Status (Ref.: Working)     
    In education 0.004 (0.120) 0.098 (0.169) 
    Other 0.121 (0.110) 0.207 (0.143) 
German language skills 0.029 (0.074) 0.107 (0.119) 
Time spent with Germans  0.087** (0.032) 0.112** (0.037) 
Number of German Friends 0.039 (0.038) 0.158** (0.057) 
Perceived value incompatibility -0.001 (0.046) -0.132** (0.048) 
Experiences of group discrimination -0.078 (0.050) 
-
0.188*** (0.051) 
_cons 4.833*** (0.358) 6.268*** (0.518) 
R2 overall 0.063   0.122   
R2 within 0.029  0.069  
R2 between 0.082  0.131  
Sigma (e) 0.874  1.146  
Sigma (u) 0.892  0.888  
N 977  709  
N 576   427   
Source: SCIP 2010-2013. Note: Standard errors in parentheses; unstandardized effects 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,*** p<0.001   
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Chapter 3: Does Identification with the Receiving Country 
Facilitate Political Integration? - A Longitudinal Study on the 
Impact of German Identification for new Immigrants’ Interest in 
German Politics* 
 
Abstract: 
This article discusses and empirically tests the relationship between national identification with 
Germany and interest in German politics among new Polish and Turkish migrants in Germany 
using longitudinal data from the international project on Socio-Cultural Integration Processes 
of New Immigrants in Europe (SCIP). It presents three theoretical pathways of influence 
through which national identification carries its effect on interest in national politics: (i) directly 
by social identity mechanisms of self and social identity enhancement; as well as indirectly and 
conditionally on (ii) German language proficiency; as along with (iii) involvement in interethnic 
social networks (of voluntary association). The effects of national identification are supposedly 
stronger for newly-arrived immigrants from Poland than Turkey. The panel data analyses reveal 
group-specific as well as non-group-specific patterns: the feeling of being connected to 
Germany is associated with a higher interest in German politics for both immigrant groups, but 
only among Turks is the relationship positively mediated by German language proficiency as 
well as with involvement in interethnic social networks. Moreover, national identification also 
predicts Polish migrants’ interest in national politics positively in combination with their 
involvement in any sort of voluntary associations within Germany, whereas the same 
combination hinders interest in German political affairs among recently arrived Turks. 
  
                                               
* A slightly shorter version of this article has been currently submitted to a peer-reviewed Journal. Co-author is 
Diana D. Schacht. 
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3.1 Introduction 
There are longstanding insights from political sociology suggesting there is an empirical 
association between individuals’ political alienation from public authorities, governments, and 
political systems as wholes and political protest behaviour (Farah, Barnes, and Heunks 1979) 
as well as anti-system political behaviour (Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982). Since the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 and those across Europe since the early 2000s, immigrants’ 
psychological alienation from mainstream politics and their lack of attitudinal incorporation 
into the democratic political systems of European host societies has become a major topic 
within the public as well as academia. Though a range of potential explanations have been put 
forth, it is one that has received considerable attention within the political arena as well as in 
the media. It is based on the notion that a lack of immigrants’ psychological commitment to the 
national polity leads to adverse political outcomes among ethnic minorities. The attention paid 
to migrants’ sense of belonging is relatively novel in European research and does represent a 
departure from the longstanding perspective that has downplayed subjective and psychological 
orientation towards the host society as relevant conditions for immigrant integration. 
Accordingly, there is a growing body of research that is exploring the emotional attachment 
with the host society (i.e. national identity)1 as antecedent of migrants’ social, economic, or 
cultural integration (see e.g., Leszczensky 2013; Casey and Dustmann 2010; Hochman and 
Davidov 2014). 
Even though previous European research has also indicated that identification with the 
receiving country may significantly affect migrants’ political attitudes, such as political interest 
or political trust (e.g. Diehl and Urbahn 1998; Eggert and Giugni 2010; Fleischmann, Phalet, 
and Swyngedouw 2013; Caballero 2009), the mechanisms through which migrants’ perceptions 
or feelings of attachment with the national group relates to their attitudinal integration into 
politics continue to exist as theoretical and empirical blind spots. As a consequence, a number 
of questions remain unanswered: What precisely is the effect of national identification on 
immigrants’ attitudinal integration into politics? What relevant factors account for “when” and 
“how” national identification exerts its influence on immigrants’ attitudinal integration into 
politics? And, last but not least, is the effect of national identification the same for immigrants 
of different ethnic origins? 
                                               
1 The terms “identity” and “identification” are used interchangeably within this article to refer to individual’s 
self-ascribed psychological membership in the national category/group of the receiving country. 
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To address these questions and to close the existing gaps in the literature are the main 
objectives of the present paper. We focus on “interest in national politics” as an indicator of 
immigrants’ attitudinal integration. We do so for two reasons: First, because, in contrast to 
external attitudes relating to the political system, e.g., trust in national government, institutions, 
and so forth, the interest in politics is an internal political attitude, which addresses person’s 
role and self-image as political actor, besides feelings of political self-efficacy or political 
knowledge (cf. Niedermayer 2005, 20). Put differently, political interest closely relates to an 
individual’s personal self-concept, which is generally comprised of an ‘individual’s belief about 
himself or herself, including the person’s attributes and who and what the self is’ (Baumeister 
1999, 13). In terms of national political interest this implies the self-conception as being a 
person who is interested in national politics. Thereby, political interest, secondly, provides a 
significant predictor of a variety of political activities, involving unconventional political 
activities such as signing petitions, demonstrating, and so forth, as well as conventional political 
activities such as voting, working for a political party, or contacting politicians, and so forth 
(e.g. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 353; de Rooij 2012; Ayala 2000; Coffé and 
Bolzendahl 2010; Reichert 2013). Following Verba and colleagues (1995) citizens ‘who are 
interested in politics – who follow politics, who care about what happens, who are concerned 
with who wins and loses – are more politically active’ (345). Thus, literature also supposes 
political interest as an important prerequisite of stable democracies at the macro level: ‘[A] 
properly functioning democracy needs competent and involved [interested] citizens’ (van der 
Meer and van Ingen 2009, 283). In sum, we suggest that interest in receiving country politics 
is a very valuable measure of an individual’s cognitive and motivational involvement in politics 
and thus of attitudinal integration into politics of immigrants (cf. also Reichert 2013, 11).  
To address the question on the impact of national identity on political interest as well as 
on other factors that account for the association explanatory, we will first conceptualise political 
interest by three concepts, namely political attentiveness, political importance– both well 
described in the existing literature (cf. Neller 2002, 489) – as well as what we refer to as political 
motivation, before we hypothesise how the identification with the national group affect it. We 
thereby focus on Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1986), which 
conceptualises national identity as a part of individual’s social self-concept that drives ingroup 
favouring processes and thereby also renders migrants’ self-image in national politics. We 
combine the basic social identity mechanisms with insights from the traditional Civic 
Voluntarism Model (CVM) of political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) to 
elaborate upon two distinctive indirect causal mechanisms of migrants’ host-language skills and 
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involvement in interethnic social networks (of voluntary associations) that closely relate to 
immigrants’ political interest as well as nation identification.  
Empirically, we make use of newly available data from the longitudinal SCIP- project 
(Social-Cultural Integration Proeesses) (Diehl et al. 2015), which involve recent arrivals at four 
European destinations, namely England, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands. We focus on 
the German data and new immigrants from Poland and Turkey. Both groups are quite interesting 
to study, as they currently constitute the two largest non-western immigrant groups in Germany 
(cf. Statistisches Bundesamt 2015, 7). Moreover, new Polish and Turkish migrants differ with 
respect to the group-specific conditions and cirumstances they face regarding their emotional 
and political integration processes in Germany. Thus, we will discuss how the patterns 
mechanisms for immigrant’ interest in national politics differ between Turkish and Polish 
immigrants. The SCIP data are also beneficial in analytical terms. It allows us to employ 
sophisticated empirical methods of longitudinal analysis in terms of hybrid random-effects 
models (Allison 2009) that grasp causal relationships between time varying variables, like 
national identification and political interest, while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by 
omission of time constant variables.  
Our article is organized as follows: First, the concept of national political interest is 
outlined before the impact of national identification is theoretically delineated. After the 
presentation of the general theoretical model, the situation of recent immigrants with Polish and 
Turkish background in Germany is highlighted and group-specific hypotheses are derived. 
Then, the data and the analytical strategy is outlined. The discussion of the results is followed 
by a conclusion with subsequent implications for future research. 
3.2 Conceptualising political interest 
Before we embark on theorising how national identification affect migrants’ psychological 
socialisation within the receiving country political system in terms of becoming a resident who 
is interested in national politics, we will spend some words on its meaning. Even though 
political interest is acknowledged as an important condition for an individual’s political activity 
within various strands of research (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 353; de Rooij 2012; 
Ayala 2000; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Reichert 2013), the concept itself is often less clearly 
defined and utilised with varied meanings.  
Building on the psychological literature, interest is a general concept describing a 
motivational state or processes that initiate and maintain goal-oriented (political) behaviour 
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(Mook 1996). Moreover, interest is defined within psychology by its object specificity and is 
thus also referred to as a ‘psychological state of engaging or the predisposition to reengage with 
particular classes of objects, events, or ideas over time’ (Hidi and Renninger 2006, 112; cf. also 
cf. Reichert 2013, 11).  
Following this literature, we focus in the present work on interest in politics that is 
specific to the German host society context. Furthermore, we concentrate on three concepts of 
political interest that best met the previous basic psychological definitions, namely political 
attentiveness, political importance– both well described in the existing literature (cf. Neller 
2002, 489) – as well as what we refer to as political motivation. Considering the first concept, 
researchers define political interest as the ‘degree to which politics arouses a citizen’s curiosity’ 
(van Deth 1990, 278) – or the ‘attentiveness to politics’ (Zaller 1992, 18). The defining criteria 
of “curiosity” and “attention” relate to the fundamental cognitive components of learning 
processes. Accordingly, interest in politics provides a prerequisite for learning about national 
(i.e. German) politics, which constitutes ‘a complex matter, involving a large number of 
authorities, politicians, parties, issues, movements, and groups’ (van Deth 1990, 278), and 
‘building an informed [migrant-origin] citizenry’ (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 175). In 
contemplating the second concept, political salience and relevance is another aspect of national 
political interest that addresses the absolute importance of (German) political matters to a 
migrant’s life (cf. van Deth 2000, 119). Third, the concept of political motivation refers to the 
collectivity aspect of politics, i.e. that politics refer to public goods and outcomes (e.g. 
education, public infrastructure and governmental policies in general) individuals benefit from 
regardless of their individual contribution. Thus, for ethnically self-interested migrant-origin 
individuals, it is irrational to participate in the production of national public goods. In sum, a 
migrant’s attention to national politics (political attentiveness), their concern for national 
politics in terms of their individual life (political importance), as well as their desire to 
contribute to public goods and outcomes of the host society (political motivation) is overall 
classified as migrants’ interest in German politics.  
3.3 Theoretical arguments  
National group membership and national identity, respectively, are instances of social identities 
that involve psychological memberships in social groups and categories such as gender, 
occupation, ethnicity, or nationality. Social identity is according to Social Identity Theory (SIT), 
‘that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership 
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of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership’ (Tajfel 1981, 255). More precisely, following acculturation research, national 
identification is that aspect of migrants’ social identity which addresses changes to the 
subjective sense of belonging to the national culture and group during the course of migration 
and integration (Phinney 1990). In contrast, changes in migrants’ sense of membership to their 
ethnic origin group and belonging to their homeland refers to their ethnic identification. 
Similarly, in sociological research, the emergence of feelings of “we” and connection to the 
members of the native group of the receiving country is conceived as the emotional dimension 
of migrant integration, referred to as emotional integration (Esser 2001).  
3.3.1 Migrants’ identification with the host society and interest in host-land Politics 
There are main cognitive and motivational mechanisms involved in social identification that 
may explain how specific national identity relates to interest in national politics. In general, the 
main theoretical tenet of SIT (Tajfel and Turner 1986; see also Hogg and Abrams 1988) assumes 
that individuals try to maintain and establish a positive social identity, because the self-reference 
to social groups drives main parts of individual’s positive self-feelings, self-esteem, as well as 
well-being. Thus, group and self-enhancing motives are inherent to social (i.e. national) 
identification. Because a positive social identity, and in consequence positive self-image, 
mainly bases according to SIT on positive social comparisons at the intergroup level, social 
identities drive processes of intergroup differentiation that favour the groups constituting the 
self, the ingroups (i.e. ‘we’s) and other groups, the outgroups (i.e. ‘they’s). This search for 
positive ingroup distinctiveness relates to perceptual, attitudinal, or behavioural biases. 
Accordingly, research finds that, ingroup identification is found to relate to ingroup biases to 
systematically favour the psychological membership group in terms of emotions (e.g. trust), 
stereotypical attitudes (e.g. friendly, smart, reliably) and behaviour (e.g. helping) (e.g. 
Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002; Pfeifer et al. 2007; Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2009). In 
addition, attention and memory processes are also found to be selectively biased in favour of 
ingroup-related information (Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2009, 5) 
Moreover, the search for positive distinctiveness drives cognitive self-stereotyping and 
the depersonalisation of self-conception in terms of the ingroup prototype in order to reduce 
uncertainty and accentuate intergroup dissimilarities (Taylor et al. 1978; Turner and Reynolds 
2010). Hence, individuals perceive themselves as prototypically representative of the ingroup 
in terms of norms and stereotypes in the course of social identification, which also lays the basis 
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for shared collective interests and collective actions. In short, ingroup members share a 
collective view and thus collective interests and concerns.  
We argue that because receiving-country politics involve the main collective processes 
and outcomes with respect to satisfying a positive national identification that activating 
identification with the reception context spurs the cognitive and motivational processes of SIT 
with respect to ‘politics’ of the perceived (national) ingroup. Therefore, it can be assumed that 
national identification implies that information, aspects, topics policies, actors, and other 
features of host-country politics become part of the psychological self of immigrants, thus 
relevant to individual migrants’ lives (i.e. political importance). Moreover, at the same time, 
national identification implies that national collective interests instead of personal self-interests 
of the individual migrant become relevant due to dersonalsiation. Therefore, it also 
acknowledges the motivation to contribute to the provision of public or collective goods of the 
host society (i.e. political motivation). Lastly, national identification includes according to an 
ingroup bias, selective cognitive attention processes towards the objects, actors and issues of 
national politics (political attentiveness).  
In sum, we derive that perceived national group membership (i.e. national 
identification) impacts immigrants’ political interest through affecting – (1) importanceand (2) 
attentiveness of national politics, as well as (3) motivation towards national politics within the 
individual’s self-concept (national identity hypothesis). 
3.3.2 Tackling the indirect and conditional Effects of national identification 
Evidently, the impact of migrants’ national identification on their interest in national politics 
can not only be examined in direct terms but also with respect to closely related integration 
processes of immigrants within receiving countries that also affect migrants’ political interest. 
More specifically, we explore two factors of CVM-related work that characterise migrants’ 
cultural and social integration - on the one hand, civic skills or migrants’ host-language 
proficiency and on the other, social recruitment networks in terms of migrants’ involvement in 
host society voluntary associations and social networks (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). 
According to CVM, language competencies positively affect individuals’ political involvement 
because ‘citizens who can speak or write well […]  are likely to be more effective when they 
get involved in politics’ (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 273). We assume two main 
reasons why skills in the majority language affects migrants’ interest in national politics. First, 
it increases the likelihood that the individual migrant can draw attention to information on 
national politics conveyed by media or native contacts, as well as policy makers (i.e. political 
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attentiveness). Second, proficiency in the host-society language also facilitates information on 
national politics becoming integrated within immigrants’ psychological and cognitive self-
concept, thereby increasing the relevance for individuals’ live (i.e. political importance). There 
are a number of empirical papers that have previously tested the relationship between majority 
language proficiency and political interest. Berger et al. (2004) and Jacobs et al. (2004) found 
that for immigrant groups in Berlin and Brussels that national language proficiency generates 
interest in local and national politics.  
In the literature, migrants’ command of the host national language being correlated with 
migrants’ national identification has been discussed (Esser 2006; Esser 2009; Remennick 2004; 
Vervoort 2011; Hochman and Davidov 2014; Kristen, Mühlau, and Schacht 2016). The 
acquisition of the language of the host society is closely linked to national identification as 
language is the main tool for positive social identity expression and reaffirmation. Moreover, it 
is a main boundary marker for effective inter-group differentiation between ethno-cultural 
groups for the purpose of maintaining positive national identity (Hochman and Davidov 2014). 
Therefore, host-national identification provides motivation to increase destination language 
acquisition. Though Hochman and Davidov (2014) only discovered causal influences that relate 
from language proficiency to migrants’ national identification, Esser (2009) demonstrated that 
an assimilated identity primarily involving identification with the host-society context 
positively differs from ethnic-related identity forms when predicting German language 
acquisition. Against this backdrop, regarding majority language proficiency, we propose two 
indirect hypotheses on the impact of national identification on migrants’ interest in German 
politics: 1) Identification with the German receiving society fosters immigrants’ interest in 
German politics through encouraging migrants to also become proficient in the host society’s 
language as means of social identity enhancement (Language mediation hypothesis); and 2) the 
motivational effect of migrants’ national identification to attract attention to national politics as 
well as to increase its salience for individuals’ lives positively varies with higher levels of 
German language proficiency (Language moderation hypothesis).  
In the spirit of Tocqueville (1969), a considerable body of literature stresses the 
importance of social involvement in horizontal social networks of social and cultural 
associations for migrant-origin individuals’ political attitudes towards host societies (Jacobs 
and Tillie 2004; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004; Eggert and 
Giugni 2010). The research drawing on CVM (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) and Putnam 
(1993; 2000) suggests that memberships in voluntary associations constitute a type of social 
capital for individuals’ political experience and socialisation as they ‘instill in their members 
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habits of cooperation and public spiritedness, as well as the practical skills necessary to partake 
in public life’ (Putnam 1993, 89). Within the framework of immigration, it addresses migrants’ 
memberships in voluntary associations of the host society and whether those memberships 
mainly involve native or co-ethnic members, also referred to as bridging or bonding social 
capital (Putnam 2000). Arguably, membership in cross-ethnic associations are more likely to 
foster aspects of interest in national politics. For one, interethnic associational networks provide 
social networks of inter-personal exchanges and communication, increasing the possibilities for 
migrants to encounter information on host-society politics and therefore involve means that 
facilitate attention to and learning processes for national politics (i.e. political attentiveness). 
Second, social interactions and communications permit the psychological anchoring of 
information and cues on national politics within individual migrants’ self-concept, and therefore 
increase their relevance and salience (i.e. political importance). Finally, cooperative behaviour 
in national voluntary associations promotes migrants’ interest in the provision of national 
collective goods (i.e. political motivation). Accordingly, Putnam (1993, 89) states that 
‘participation in civic organizations inculcates skills of cooperation as well as a sense of shared 
responsibility for collective endeavours’. Even though similar mechanisms can be suggested 
from immigrants’ intra-ethnic associational involvement (i.e. primarily interactions with co-
ethnics), it may rather generate interest in politics concerned with the enforcement of minority 
rights and interests of their ethnic identity group and homeland. While previous research on the 
Netherlands (Tillie 2004; Jacobs, Phalet, and Swyngedouw 2004) indicated that ethnic as along 
with cross-ethnic associational involvement matter in terms of allowing migrant attitudinal 
integration into receiving society politics, other studies have only evinced the positive role of 
cross-ethnic membership on political attitudes towards the host society, whereas the effect of 
ethnic membership seems to be detrimental (Morales and Pilati 2011; Berger, Galonska, and 
Koopmans 2004).  
Migrants’ social integration into networks with the native population closely relates to 
the social identification processes. Thus, it should also affect the relationship between German 
identification and migrants’ political interest in Germany. Social networks of voluntary 
interactions, like sport clubs, provide a very effective support structure to effectively display, 
reaffirm and experience a positive national identity. As a consequence, we propose two further 
indirect hypotheses on the moderating and mediating role of immigrants’ association 
involvement on the interaction between national identity and national political interest. The first 
is that migrants who strongly identify with German society are more interested in German 
politics because they are motivated to participate within interethnic social networks (of 
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voluntary association) (Social network mediation hypothesis). Second, the strength of the effect 
of national identification on immigrants’ interest in German politics depends on involvement in 
interethnic social networks (of voluntary association) (social network moderation hypothesis). 
3.3.3 Differences between immigrant groups in Germany 
Previous studies on the impact of national identification on migrants’ integration have been 
prone to the implicit assumption that the effect of national identification is the same across 
ethnic groups (e.g. Esser 2009; Hochman and Davidov 2014). In this article, we focus on 
differences between groups of newly-arrived migrants of Turkish and Polish origin in Germany. 
We argue that national identification should only increase political interest in line with our 
previous theoretical mechanisms when the conditions and cirumstances for national 
identification, host society language acquisition, and interethnic voluntary associational 
involvement are met. With respect to national identification, this addresses the idea that 
boundaries between immigrants and natives are rather blurred (versus bright) within the 
German host society (Alba 2005). The nature of intergroup boundaries is determined by cultural 
and social distances between the majority and the ethnic minority group as well as processes of 
discrimination. European research has overall found that perceived discrimination and rejection 
by natives may lead to stronger ethnic identification and to weaker national identification (e.g. 
Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, and Solheim 2009; Skrobanek 2009; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). 
While Poles’ Catholic background is culturally close to the historically Christian German host 
society, Turks have a primarily Muslim background, which is more culturally distant. Several 
studies in Germany reveal that Turks perceive higher levels of cultural distances, discrimination 
and rejection by the native group than other ethnic origins (e.g. Blohm and Wasmer 2008; Hans 
2010; Steinbach 2004, 146ff.) such as Poles. As a consequence, Turks may receive less social 
approval from the German host society than from identifying with their ethnic minority group. 
Therefore, research on the same data used within the present paper shows that perceptions on 
ethnic discrimination significantly increase over the first 18 months in Germany strictly for 
Turks and not for Poles despite both groups starting out with same perceptions connected to 
ethnic disadvantages (Diehl, Fischer-Neumann, and Mühlau 2016). In line with Diehl and 
colleagues (2016), the varying situation of social and psychological accommodation within 
Germany partly accounts for why national identification of newcomers from Turkey – even 
though beginning at higher levels – decreases over the first months in Germany, while it 
increases for recently arrived Poles.  
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Moreover, the literature reveals that different conditions for Turks and Poles apply for 
efficiently learning the host national language because of differences in linguistic similarities, 
or language distance, and exposure from social interaction possibilities (Chiswick and Miller 
2001; cf. also Kristen, Mühlau, and Schacht 2016, 183ff.). With respect to the German language, 
the Turkish language is more dissimilar than the original language of Poles (cf. Kristen, Mühlau, 
and Schacht 2016, 184). Moreover, it has been suggested that Turkish nationals may indeed be 
involved in dense and cohesive social networks, but that these (associational) networks mostly 
consist of co-ethnic members (e.g. Eggert and Giugni 2010; Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 
2004). Overall, the various integration patterns previously outlined contribute to the assumption 
that the conditions for positive effects of national identification conducive to developing interest 
in national politics, as defined in our paper, are less available for newcomers from Turkey than 
those from Poland. Put differently, national identification may not be sufficient to affect the 
attention, salience and collective good aspect of interest in German politics for new immigrants 
from Turkey as effectively as for new immigrants from Poland. Overall, we hypothesize that 
the effects of immigrants’ identification with the German receiving context on their interest in 
German politics should be less strong for newly arrived Turkish than Polish immigrants (Ethnic 
group-specific hypothesis). 
3.4 Data and analytical strategy 
The empirical analyses of our paper employed the German longitudinal data from the 
international SCIP project (Socio-Cultural Integration Processes among New Immigrants in 
Europe) (Diehl et al. 2015). The two-wave study in Germany involved random samples of 
Turkish and Polish immigrants based on registry data from five cities (Berlin, Bremen, Cologne, 
Hamburg and Munich). The target population was comprised of recent immigrants between the 
ages of 18 and 60 years who, at most, stayed for 18 months in Germany at the time of the first 
interview that took place in 2010 or 2011. In total, 2,644 face-to-face interviews (1,482 among 
Poles; 1,162 among Turks) were conducted in the first wave. Around 1.5 years later, as many 
as possible were re-interviewed (for a detailed description of the methodological setup of the 
project see Gresser and Schacht 2015).2 
                                               
2 Only about 45% could be re-interviewed. The response rate reflects that recent immigrants constitute a very mobile 
population within Germany but also between Germans and the source countries. The response rate however in general 
also resembles the one that was achieved within the US based New Immigrant Survey (email exchange between the 
project directors) (cf. Gresser and Schacht 2015, 31). 
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We used the question on respondents’ interest in host country politics, “How interested 
would you say you are in German politics?” to operationalise our dependent variable. The time-
variant measure is based on a self-assessment ranging from 1 ‘not at all interested’ to 4 ‘very 
interested’. Moreover, we include the corresponding measure of migrants’ interest in politics of 
the country of origin (CO) as a control variable to be able to account for ethnic political 
segregation as well as a general higher individual psychological engagement with politics (also 
ranging from 1 to 4).  
For our main independent variable of immigrants’ national identification, we generated 
an additive index of items measuring the identification with the receiving country (RC). 
Specifically, we used the answers to the following questions “How important is the following 
to your sense of who you are: your current country of residence?” and “Do you feel proud of 
your current country of residence?”. Both questions would be answered with a range of 1, being 
‘not important at all’, to 4, indicating ‘very important’. In addition, we controlled for the same 
index for the identification with the country of origin (CO) as a measure of ethnic identification.  
To capture migrants’ cultural integration, a mean index measuring the proficiency in the 
host country language is applied. The time-varying measure is based on self-assessments for 
understanding, speaking, writing and reading German, each ranging from 1 - ‘not at all’ to 4 - 
‘very well’. For social participation, respondents were asked twice about sports clubs, religious 
groups, or other groups, specifically if they were a member of this group and in the case of 
membership, how many people from the sending country participate in this group. The possible 
answers were: ‘none or almost none’, ‘some’, ‘half’, ‘a little like me’, ‘most’, ‘all’, re-coded 
with a scale 1 to 5. With this information, we computed two variables. The first was whether a 
given respondent was a member of any voluntary association. Moreover, concerning the aim to 
measure the degree of ethnic bonding and bridging social capital that migrants can access by 
associational involvement, we used that information and generated a new variable, ethnic 
bonding within associations, that for each immigrant reflects the respondent’s percentage of 
associations in which they are involved that are composed of a majority of co-ethnics (i.e. 
whether half or more are co-ethnics) (cf. for same operationalisation, see Morales and Pilati 
2011, 97 f.)3. Besides this more formal type of social integration by associational involvement, 
we also considered the frequency of contacts with members of the German native population to 
obtain an informal measure of social integration (ranging from 1 - ‘never’ to 6 - ‘every day’).  
                                               
3 Respondents who were not involved in any association were assigned a zero value for the variable that we 
included in the multivariate regression analyses. 
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Besides our main theoretical measures, we captured a number of time-independent and 
time-dependent control variables to account for the spurious relationship between national 
identification and interest in national politics. On the one hand, we had time-invariant measures 
on gender (females =1) as well on ethnic group membership (Poles= 1; Turks= ref. cat.). The 
latter included Poles and Turks with the respective country of birth and nationality. Kurds are 
included in the Turkish sample4. In addition, we involved a measure of age at migration as a 
metric variable assessed on a yearly basis. We also took into account the city the interview took 
place in during the first wave (Berlin = ref.cat; Hamburg/Bremen; Cologne or Munich). 
Whether the respondent migrated based on educational (1) or other reasons (0) was measured 
within the dummy variable, migration motive. To also control and test for the impact of the 
time-constant educational level, we involved another indicator of the years of education an 
individual has acquired prior to immigration, usually in the country of origin. We did not include 
a measure of employment status because most recent immigrants do not usually have a job.  
Further, time-variant controls and confounders encompass, for instance, respondents’ 
assessment of how often people from the country of origin are discriminated against in the 
country of reception (1 - ‘never’ to 5 - ‘very often’). As the general usage and consumption of 
national media sources may be a major source of developing a national sense of belonging as 
well as interest in national politics, we also included a mean index of the frequency of 
consuming German newspapers, music and television programs (1 - ‘never’ to 5 - ‘every day’). 
Moreover, migrants’ duration of stay in Germany was controlled, generated by subtracting the 
date of immigration from the date of the first interview (t1) and from the date of the second 
interview (t2). Based on the fact that all decisions for assimilative investments depended on the 
migrants’ intention to stay in Germany, we constructed a variable that is set equal to 0 if the 
respondents planned to stay forever in the host country; otherwise, it obtained the value 1 if the 
respondents planned to move between Germany and the country of origin or 2 if the respondents 
preferred to return to the sending country or move to another country altogether.  
Table A3.1 presents a brief overview of the descriptive statistics of the sample and the marginal 
distributions of all our model variables. All told, recent immigrants from Poland represented 
about 56% of the sample. Moreover, there are slightly less females (47%) than males. The 
immigrants in the total sample resided, on average, 13 months in Germany. To account for item 
non-responses regarding some variable values for statistical analyses, we employed multiple 
imputations on the missing responses (i.e., estimating the most likely responses, Rubin 1987). 
                                               
4 We did check our subsequent regression analyses for differences between Kurds and Turks. As we found no 
significant differences, we decided to include them in the Turkish sample. 
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In comparison to other missing data techniques, multiple imputation is more efficient, reduces 
potential bias in the estimation of coefficients (if missing values are not completely random but 
to some degree correlated with the vector of the observed variables), and estimates standard 
errors that reflect the uncertainty of the missing information correctly (Allison 2002). Using the 
Stata “mi” package5, we generated 35 additional datasets with full information and then used 
these to estimate our models. The robustness of the imputation models was confirmed by 
imputing up to 30 datasets (Bodner 2008). It should be noted that we used the strategy of 
multiple imputation, then deletion (MID) to handle missing values of the dependent variable 
(Von Hippel 2007). Hence, subsequent regressions are based on smaller samples due to the 
omission of cases with missing values on the dependent variable. 
As a consequence of our panel data providing time-variant as well as time-invariant 
variables that varied or did not vary between clusters (respondents, level 2) and occasions (time 
points, level 1), we used a regression method that estimated within effects in random-effects 
models. This was provided by the hybrid model of Allison (2009) that decomposes the time-
varying variables into a within and between cluster component by 
𝑦it = (𝑥it − 𝑥i)′𝛽 + 𝑥i𝛾 + 𝑧i′𝛿 +  𝛼i +  𝜀it 
Thus, 𝛽 yields the within or fixed-effect estimate that is unbiased by the level 2 error 𝛼i. Like 
in the fixed-effects models, 𝛽 is not biased through time-constant unobserved variables, though. 
𝛿 provides the coefficient for the time-invariant variables, for which 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛼i|𝑥it, 𝑧i)=0 still 
needs to hold. Yet, by inclusion of the cluster means, 𝑥, the model ensures that effect estimates 
of the level 2 variables are corrected for with between-cluster differences in 𝑥it. In sum, this 
hybrid model provided the most efficient and unbiased estimates for our time-variant and time-
invariant indicators of national identification, political interest and ethnicity.  
3.5 Findings 
Before presenting the results of the multivariate analysis, we will present results on the balanced 
sample (i.e. respondents who participated in both waves) for our central time-variant 
independent variables in a descriptive way.  
 
                                               
5 https://www.stata.com/manuals13/mi.pdf . 
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Table 3.1. Distribution of important independent variables by ethnicity and time 
      Panel balanced 
      Wave 1 Wave 2 
      Poles (601) Turks (476) Poles (601) Turks (476) 
      
M / 
P SD M / P SD 
M / 
P SD M / P SD 
  Identification with RC M 5,85 (1.26) 5,97 (1.58) 6,02 (1.28) 5,90 (1.58) 
  RC language proficiency M 2,44 (0.77) 2,35 (0.61) 2,69 (0.72) 2,74 (0.62) 
  Frequency of contacts with natives M 4,96 (1.51) 4,23 (1.93) 5,12 (1.37) 4,30 (1.82) 
  Involved in any organization P 0,66 (0.47) 0,45 (0.50) 0,82 (0.39) 0,61 (0.49) 
  
Ethnic bonding within 
associations M 0,50 (0.50) 0,35 (0.47) 0,61 (0.48) 0,48 (0.49) 
  Identification with CO M 6,38 (1.49) 6,72 (1.55) 6,50 (1.51) 6,78 (1.51) 
  Ethnic group discrimination M 2,73 (0.90) 2,77 (1.16) 2,71 (0.86) 2,90 (1.10) 
  National media consumption  M 2,94 (0.94) 2,78 (0.92) 3,11 (0.98) 2,82 (0.97) 
  Intention to stay in RC                   
       Forever P 0,33 (0.47) 0,41 (0.49) 0,38 (0.49) 0,31 (0.46) 
       Move between RC and CO P 0,22 (0.41) 0,25 (0.43) 0,20 (0.40) 0,28 (0.45) 
       Return/Third country P 0,45 (0.50) 0,34 (0.48) 0,42 (0.49) 0,41 (0.49) 
Source: Own calculations (SCIP). Note: descriptives on the first of 35 imputed datasets. RC= receiving country; CO= 
country of origin. t-test or Chi-quadrat test. significant difference between ethnic groups bold (p < 0.05), significant 
differences over time in italics (p < 0.05) 
As can be seen in Table 3.1, the identity levels with the receiving country (RC= Germany) are 
within the first 18 months of stay in Germany (Wave 1) higher for recently immigrated Turks 
than Poles, albeit not significantly. Yet, as expected through theory and also in line with the 
results of Diehl at al. (2016), around 1.5 years later, the picture is reversed and Turks indicated 
significantly lower senses of belonging to the German host society while Poles showed 
significantly higher senses of national attachment. Concerning both groups’ cultural integration, 
Table 3.1 shows that proficiency in German increased over time so that there is no significant 
group difference after approximately 18 months between newly immigrated Poles and Turks. 
Similarly, national media usage also rose over time despite the remaining group differences 
between the groups. As expected, indicators of both groups’ social integration showed that the 
share of individuals who were involved in voluntary organisations is much higher among 
recently arrived Poles than Turks despite the common increase in associational involvement 
over time also for Turks. In the same vein, the indicator of informal social ties to Germans 
shows that Poles are more integrated socially than Turks, which changed only moderately over 
time. Surprisingly, the degree of associational ethnic bonding varied between groups and is 
higher for Poles than for Turks. This may be due to the fact that Poles draw on a higher network 
of co-ethnic when they arrive. Moreover, associational ethnic bonding is elevated over time 
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among both groups. Therefore, 50 per cent of the associations in which Polish migrants were 
involved were formed by a majority of co-ethnics within their first months of stay (Wave 1), 
which increased further up to 61 per cent over time (Wave 2).  
Identification with the country of origin (CO) is similarly high for both groups and only 
moderately altered. Experiences of discrimination increased moderately over time and is, after 
the first months in Germany, significantly higher for Turks than Poles (Wave 2). At the same 
time, the share of immigrants who wanted to stay forever in Germany is initially significantly 
larger among newcomers from Poland but then diminished significantly, while the share 
increased among immigrants from Poland. Overall, the results demonstrate ethnic group 
differences in migrants’ national identity, language proficiency, and social ties over time. 
Starting out from these distributions, multivariate regression analysis permitted evaluation of 
how changes in national identification, language proficiency, as along with associational 
involvement related to changes in the development of interest in German politics among new 
Polish and Turkish immigrants: 
Table 3.2 outlines the estimation results of hybrid random-effects regression analyses 
where interest in German politics of recently immigrated Turks and Poles is regressed on the 
strength of national identity, German language proficiency, associational involvement, in 
addition to other characteristics. A stepwise procedure is chosen to test for the interaction as 
well as mediation effects. To also assess for ethnic group-specific effects for newly-arrived 
Turks and Poles, we also employed subsample analyses as well as interactions between our 
theoretical variables and ethnic groups for an inferential significance test of group differences6.  
  
                                               
6 For reasons of parsimony, the additional interaction analysis by interaction terms between ethnic group and 
theoretical variables is not included in the Tables, but are available upon request from the authors. 
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Model 1 refers to the control variables as well as to our theoretical effect of national 
identification. By inserting German language proficiency as along with the indicators of 
immigrants’ social capital in Model 2, we can determine whether cultural and social integration 
characteristics mediate the effect of emotional integration, net of other factors. Last but not 
least, national identification interacts with German language proficiency and indicators of 
migrants’ social inclusion in Model 3. As the between estimates of the time-variant variables 
are by specification subject to time-constant unobserved heterogeneity and confounded with 
the level 2 error, we only report the relevant within-estimates for these predictors here (see 
Table A3.2 for the entire model with between and within effects) 7.  
 Concerning our first hypothesis, the results of Model 1 reveal that a rise in feelings of 
attachment with the German RC is indeed associated with an increase in interest in German 
politics among Polish and Turkish migrants even if other important socio-demographic 
characteristics, such as education and other integration variables, are controlled for. Further in 
line with theoretical reasoning, identification with the CO, in contrast, exerts a significant 
negative influence on the development of interest in German politics. Comparing the direct 
effect of national identity in Model 1 separately across ethnic minority groups reveals that the 
positive effect of identification with Germany is only negligibly stronger among newly-arrived 
Poles versus Turks. Hence, we conclude that the positive effect of German identification on 
interest in German politics does not considerably differ between recently immigrated Poles and 
Turks in Germany as has been suggested by our ethnic group-specific hypothesis. With respect 
to control variables, estimators between the pooled and separate group models are very similar 
and point in directions that may be expected. Therefore, age at immigration, educational level, 
and intention to stay in Germany have, for instance, a significant impact on the tendency for 
respondents to become interested in German politics. While previous research often finds that 
migrant women and men differ in terms of political involvement (e.g. Berger, Galonska, and 
Koopmans 2004; Eggert and Giugni 2010), we do not find that the levels of interest in national 
politics differ for female and male Polish or Turkish respondents. We also do not find that ethnic 
discrimination exerts a relevant negative impact on interest in national politics when keeping 
all other factors constant. As to the difference between the immigrant groups, regression results 
from the full model uncover – in agreement with expectations – that newly-arrived Poles show 
significantly greater interest in German politics in comparison to Turks. 
                                               
7 Table A3.2 in the Appendix shows that the within and between estimates differ (i.e. the between effects are 
much larger), which is another test that the estimates are subject to unobserved heterogeneity and thus 
justifies the estimation of within/fixed-effects for our time-variant variables. 
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 The results in Model 2 for the pooled sample disprove mediation by migrants’ national 
language proficiency as well as social integration, as the coefficient of national identification 
does not change. Also, the analyses for Poles does not suggest mediation. Yet, for new arrivals 
from Turkey, we find that the effect of German identification (b= 0.06. p< 0.01) decreases when 
German language proficiency (b= 0.05, p< 0.05; not shown) as well as their formal and informal 
social inclusion is accounted for (b= 0.05, p< 0.10 shown). Thus, we find ethnic group-specific 
evidence for our language mediation hypothesis as well as for our social network mediation 
hypothesis, i.e. that characteristics of majority language proficiency and interethnic social and 
associational involvement mediate the effect of national identification. 
Model 2 in Table 1 also shows the direct effects of migrants’ cultural and social 
integration, independent of their emotional integration, on their interest in the politics of the 
German host country. As expected by CVM, ceteris paribus, we observe slight indications that 
a change in host language proficiency is positively associated with interest in German politics 
for the pooled sample of Turkish and Polish immigrants. Surprisingly, separate group analyses 
evince that the language effect only holds true for newcomers from Turkey with and without 
controlling for their interethnic social integration. Thus, only for Turks does destination 
language proficiency provide a crucial resource to acquiring interest in German politics.  
For all social inclusion variables, we are not able to find within the pooled model of 
Turkish and Polish respondents that changes in the frequency of contact to natives as well as 
associational involvement are significantly associated with interest development in national 
politics. Yet, it appears – as expected – that more frequent contact with Germans does have a 
slight positive effect on interest in German politics among Turks. Further in line with our theory, 
among Polish respondents, bonding social capital (i.e. involvement in organisations with a 
majority of co-ethnic members) hinders their interest in the political affairs of Germany.  
 The interaction terms are included in Model 3 of Table 2 to further test our language 
moderation and social network moderation hypotheses. The results uncover significant 
interaction effects that show the importance of the national identity effect as a function of 
language proficiency as along with being involved in any voluntary organisation. Turning to 
language proficiency, the interaction term with national identification is in agreement with our 
moderation hypothesis that a strong proficiency in German is associated with a further increase 
in interest in German politics, which, according to the separate group analyses, is only 
statistically significant for Turks. Interestingly, when reviewing the social integration 
indicators, we discover significant interaction effects from being involved in any voluntary 
organisation that are opposite for recent immigrants from Poland or Turkey. Hence, in the case 
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of new Poles in Germany, and in line with our expectations of the moderator effect, we find a 
positive effect of national identification if the Polish respondent is involved in any voluntary 
association. On the contrary, there is a significant negative association between national 
identification and interest in German politics in the case where Turks become associationally 
involved in any organisation. The additional model of interactions (not shown here) between 
ethnic group and our language and social inclusion predictors proves that the interactive 
relationship between national identification and organisational involvement significantly differs 
between Poles and Turks, whereas the model does not show significant group differences for 
German language proficiency.  
 Overall, the model statistics (within R-squared) reveal that the explanatory power of the 
last models (M3) are quite high. Thus the fixed effects of the time-variant variables, for instance, 
account for 22% of the total variance of changes in interest in Germans politics within recently 
arrived immigrants from Poland and Turkey.  
3.6 Conclusion and discussion 
In this article, we have attempted to answer three main questions that thus far have been 
insufficiently answered within the existing research on migrant attitudinal integration into 
politics within European societies. The first was does emotional integration in the form of 
identification with the host society have an effect on migrants’ interest levels in mainstream 
politics? Second, which factors account for the association between national identification and 
interest in national politics? Third, does the effect of host-national identification vary for 
different ethnic groups? 
In line with theoretical arguments by social identity theory, we found within panel 
regression analyses that the identification with the receiving society is a significant 
psychological force for recent immigrants from Poland and Turkey acquiring interest in 
receiving country politics in Germany. Moreover, we observed that the effect is in agreement 
with CVM and Putnam mediated and moderated by national language proficiency and 
involvement in social networks (of voluntary association) that are ethnic-group specific, 
though. Hence, we found that language proficiency and characteristics of social inclusion (e.g. 
contact with Germans, involvement in voluntary associations) seem to mediate the national 
identity effect among Turks. Moreover, we discerned interesting contradictory interaction 
effects of national identification and Poles’ and Turks’ involvement in any sort of association. 
Thus, whereas national identification increases interest in German politics for Poles if becoming 
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a member of any voluntary organisation, it decreases interest in national politics for Turks. We 
argue that this negative effect of organisational membership among Turkish immigrants may 
relate to the experiences of higher cultural (i.e. identity) incompatibilities they face when 
entering any associations within the German host country in contrast to Poles; also reflected in 
higher social distances on behalf of native members, as well as strong norms of ingroup loyalty 
by co-ethnics. Thus, interethnic social contexts in associations may undermine conduceive 
effects of national identification. 
We would like to mention a few limitations of this study. The results are preliminary in 
the sense that they apply to recent migrants who have not stayed longer than three years in 
Germany. Even though this may be a constraint in some respects, it is also advantageous, as the 
paper outlines, among the first studies, early political integration patterns of recently arrived 
migrants who may be indicative of long-term integration processes. Moreover, even though our 
hybrid regression models had advantages per se in testing causal effects of time-variant 
predictors, like national identification, by controlling for time-constant heterogeneity, the 
predictors may still be biased because of the omission of relevant time-variant variables that 
may account for the relationship. Nonetheless, we argue that we accounted for a variety of 
relevant time-variant confounders, indicated by the relatively high within R-squared measure. 
Moreover, our panel data does not solve the possibility of reversed causality, implying that the 
causal arrow may point away from the interest in German politics to national identification. In 
the existence of at least three time points, the employment of fixed-effects models with lagged 
independent variables, as suggested by Allison (2009), would be a promising approach. Finally, 
our measure of interest in national politics, is elusive in tow manners: Firstly, it cannot be ruled 
out that interest in national politics may imply for immigrants ethnic group/homeland-based 
and contentious politics, i.e. politics within the receiving society that target the homeland or 
ethnic community (e.g. immigrant parties) and contentious politics, including strategies of mass 
demonstrations and protest as well as political violence. Overall, the positive effects of various 
indicators of assimilation (e.g., national identification, German language proficiency, national 
media consumption) as well as the negative effect of identification with the origin country 
within our study suggest however that our measure of political interest may capture institutions, 
political personnel, policies, and topics of the the host-land political context that rely on the 
operations and rules of the dominant political system. Secondly, our measure cannot directly 
assess the different concepts of political interest implied within the present study in terms of 
political importance, attentiveness, or political motivation. Therefore, more detailed measures 
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capturing the different nuances of being interested in national politics would be a valuable 
approach of future research. 
Taken together and despite several shortcomings, we conclude that our article can make 
a number of worthwhile contributions to the current literature on national identity and political 
integration patterns of migrants within Western European nations. It longitudinally highlights 
the conditional and unconditional meaning of psychological processes that are driven by 
identifying with the receiving country for the development of interest in national politics of 
recently arrived immigrants from Poland and Turkey in Germany.  
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3.8 Appendix 
Table A 3.1. Descriptive  statistics of total sample 
      Range M / P SD Observations1  
Interest in RC politics M 1/4 2,06 (0.96) 3681 
National identification M 2/8 5,88 (1.44) 3353 
Language index M 1/4 2,44 (0.73) 3664 
Frequency of contacts with Germans M 1/6 4,64 (1.74) 3672 
Involved in any organization     0,61 (0.49) 3568 
Ethnic bonding within associations     0,44 (0.49) 3329 
Poles     0,56 (0.50) 3681 
Female P 0/1 0,48 (0.50) 3681 
Age at migration M 18/60 30,9 (9.61) 3490 
City             
  Berlin P 0/1 0,38 (0.48) 3681 
  Cologne P 0/1 0,16 (0.36) 3681 
  Hamburg / Bremen P 0/1 0,14 (0.35) 3681 
  Munich P 0/1 0,33 (0.47) 3681 
Migration motive (education vs. else) P 0/1 0,18 (0.39) 3660 
Years of education M 2/30 13,1 (3.88) 3594 
Duration of stay (in months) M 0/46 13,5 (10.61) 3506 
Ethnic identification M 2/8 6,64 (1.47) 3543 
Interest in CO politics M 1/4 2,57 (1.03) 3680 
Ethnic group discrimination M 1/5 2,77 (1.01) 3272 
Media consumption index M 1/5 2,81 (0.97) 3614 
Intention to stay in RC           
  Forever P 0/1 0,34 (0.47) 3449 
  Move between RC and CO P 0/1 0,23 (0.42) 3449 
  Return/Third country P 0/1 0,43 (0.50) 3449 
1observations are person years ; i.e. a person is counted for each year s/he responded in SCIP. 
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Chapter 4: Immigrants’ Ethnic Identification and Political 
Involvement in the Face of Discrimination: A Longitudinal Study 
of the German Case*† 
 
Abstract: 
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 1993-2006 as well as 
longitudinal modelling techniques, the present paper contributes to the growing body of 
literature on ethnic identity and its effects on immigrants’ social integration by examining the 
role of various forms of labour immigrants’ ethnic sense of belonging and cognitive 
involvement in politics. Theoretically, the paper draws on interdisciplinary integration models, 
social psychological theories of social identity as well as theoretical frameworks that delineate 
the politicisation of collective identity and especially the role of dual identification. Applying 
“hybrid” models that combine the virtues of both fixed and random effects models, the 
statistical analysis confirms that dual identification – immigrant’s identification with both the 
ethnic ingroup and the national community simultaneously – is positively related to labour 
immigrants’ political interest, conditional on the perception of discrimination on behalf of the 
ethnic origin. Secondly, the longitudinal analyses show some indication that the effect is more 
pronounced among Turkish immigrants as well as that the mechanisms behind the cognitive 
politicising process of ethnic identity types differ by ethnic group. In summary, the paper 
recognizes the value of a multiple-, instead of a one-sided inclusion in emotional terms for 
immigrants’ cognitive political involvement. 
  
                                               
*This chapter has been published as research article in the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 2014, Vol. 
40(3): 339–362. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2013.847362. 
† This work builds on the results of my (unpublished) Master’s thesis ‘Ethnic Identity and Political Participation 
- The Effect of Different Forms of Ethnic Identification on Immigrants’ Political Interest in Germany’, 
submitted to the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Mannheim in 2012. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Germany, like many Western European countries, experienced high inflows of immigrants in 
the post-war era, especially through targeted labour recruitment, leading to high plurality in 
ethnic and cultural terms. As a consequence, questions of immigrants’ incorporation into the 
receiving country arose. While first and second generation labour immigrants’ structural, social 
or cultural integration and participation in Germany has been under considerable debate and 
inquiry in public and science throughout the last decades, less attention has been devoted to the 
immigrants’ political integration in terms of development of political attitudes and behaviour. 
First of all, because of their status as guest workers, immigrants were not expected – or 
supposed – to act politically: “Migrants just had an economic role in the host society: to work 
and to produce” (Martiniello 2005, 1). Second, participation in national elections is completely 
restricted to German citizens by law. Thus, the majority of labour immigrants without German 
citizenship are still excluded from the core element of political participation within a 
democracy. One exception includes immigrants from EU-member states, who are entitled to 
participate in municipal and European elections. Notwithstanding this legal constraint, there are 
“participation rights” that are formally granted for natives and immigrants equally. For instance, 
immigrants are also allowed to state their opinion in political affairs; to take part in 
demonstrations, or to participate in a political party or in trade unions.  However, only recently 
there has been a shift in the perception of migrants from objects of politics to political subjects 
(Wüst 2006). Beyond this, it is also a normative matter to study the empirical question whether 
there is also “demobilisation of migrants beyond their mere inability to cast a ballot” (Diehl and 
Blohm 2001, 403) as the stability and legitimacy of a political system can be argued to be 
dependent on the overt as well as covert political support of its citizens and residents (Easton 
1965, 1975). On the other hand, receiving societies are sometimes confronted with political 
activism of immigrants out of legal realms, making it even more necessary to understand 
immigrants’ political engagement in threat of intergroup conflicts. 
In the present paper I move beyond standard theoretical explanations of immigrants’ 
political participation, such as resource availability (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978) or social capital 
(Putnam 1993), by drawing upon theoretical insights from social psychological research and 
literature proposing that political engagement of individuals and immigrants is not guided 
mainly by their individual motives or individual identities, but rather by their collective 
identities, i.e. their identity as a member of a certain social group or category (Simon 2011). 
Specifically, studies point to an especially conducive role of a dual identification for 
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immigrants’ politicisation, which involves immigrants’ emotional commitment to both their 
ethnic origin as well as to the society of settlement (Simon and Grabow 2010; Simon and Ruhs 
2008). 
Relying on this current empirical basis, the present study seeks a thorough analysis of 
the question whether, and how, different forms of ethnic identification held by first and second 
generation labour migrants possessing a foreign nationality in Germany affect their cognitive 
political involvement within the context of formal political exclusion. Furthermore, the study 
aims to clarify whether dual identification is thereby especially facilitating. For answering these 
questions, I build on theories explicating the concept of social identification (Tajfel and Turner 
1986) with a particular focus on approaches that delineate immigrants’ social or group 
identification as a bi-dimensional process, in which identification with the ethnic ingroup and 
identification as a member of the new society vary independently (Berry 1997; Esser 2003). 
Furthermore, I apply theories that focus on the link between social identification and political 
participation (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Miller et al. 1981; Simon and Klandermans 2001). As 
the vast majority of research results have mainly been detected cross-sectionally or with small 
panel studies (Simon and Ruhs 2008), a crucial extension and, therefore, further valuable 
contribution to existing knowledge is sought to be provided and gained by analysing the 
association between immigrants’ identification and political involvement with longitudinal 
survey data from over thirteen waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), as well 
as hybrid models as advanced longitudinal statistical method that exploits the advantages of 
random as well as fixed effects models and remedy the problem of unobserved (time-constant) 
heterogeneity. By doing so, it is aimed to achieve a more reliable and unbiased estimation of 
how changes in ethnic identification patterns (causally) effect immigrants’ political 
involvement by controlling for all time-independent covariates (e.g. gender, ethnicity or 
enduring psychological personality traits like the Big Five). And finally, with regard to scientific 
and public widespread discussions about immigrant parallel societies and reactive ethnicity 
(Diehl and Schnell 2006; Rumbaut 2008; Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004), the article 
expects to be able to formulate some valuable implications for further research and debates. In 
the following, I will discuss the theoretical and research background of my analysis, before 
deriving hypotheses that will be tested in longitudinal regression models. In the remainder of 
this article, conclusions for further research and public debate are drawn. 
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4.2 Ethnic Identity and Politicised Ethnic Identity in Theory and Research 
4.2.1 Social and Ethnic Identity 
Much of the research on ethnic identity relies on the conceptualization of social identity by the 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Tajfel 1978) and the Self-Categorization 
Theory (SCT) (Turner 1978). According to these approaches, social identity can be defined as 
“that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from [his] knowledge of [his] 
membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance 
attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1978, 63). Social identity, thus, evolves from a process of 
social categorisation which involves individuals’ categorisation of themselves and others in 
terms of memberships in social categories or groups like sex, ethnicity, religion or occupation, 
provided that the individual strives for a positive social self-concept. Concerning intergroup 
relations, this process leads to systematic intergroup biases like ingroup favoritism or 
discrimination against the outgroup. At the same time, the re-categorisation of the self from an 
“I” to a “we” leads group members to think, feel and act in accordance with the values and 
norms associated with the ingroup. In summary, Tajfel and Turners framework endorses a 
constructivist perspective of ethnicity as opposed to a primordialist position, which equals 
ethnicity with culture and perceive ethnic groups as self-evident entities (Cornell and Hartmann 
2007).  
In consequence of the fluid and contingent nature of ethnic identity, the concept has 
soon been brought to the fore in the psychological acculturation and sociological integration 
literature. According to cross-cultural psychology, ethnic identity can be thought of as an aspect 
of acculturation that focuses on the adaptation of immigrants’ subjective sense of belonging to 
a group or culture (Phinney 1990). Whereas in former theories acculturation of immigrants has 
been conceptualised as a uni-dimensional, one-directional, and irreversible process of 
abandoning their heritage culture in favour of the mainstream culture, new approaches conceive 
acculturation as a bi-dimensional, two-directional complex process, in which preservation of 
one’s heritage culture and adaptation to the host society are conceptually distinct and can vary 
independently (Berry 1997; Esser 2003). By analogy, ethnic identity and identity as a member 
of the host society (“national” identity) can also be considered as two dimensions that vary 
independently. In either case, identity can be either strong or weak, thus resulting in four 
possible ethnic identification profiles: (1) integrated/dual identity (identification with both 
groups); (2) assimilated identity (only/mainly identification with the national group); (3) 
separated identity (only/mainly identification with the ethnic group) and (4) marginalised 
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identity (low identification with both groups) (Phinney et al. 2001). At the first glance, while 
the first three identity positions can be conceived of as being partly immigrants’ individual 
choice and referring to group belonging per se, the marginalised identity position, i.e. the 
exclusion from both groups or, put differently, the presence of two negative group relations, 
seems an exception and contradiction to that. Research on immigrants’ self-definitions can 
demonstrate that, in general, respondents are actually the least likely to opt for a marginalised 
or assimilated self-definition (Verkuyten 2005). However, if they choose marginalisation it 
might not be due to the perception of marginalisation in terms of group belonging or cultural 
distress per se, but rather due to an individualistic notion of self-concept that does not strongly 
rely on group belongings. In this light, the four ethnic identification types could be 
differentiated along a collectivist-individualist continuum. One extreme of continuum refers to 
the two-sided group reliance as most “collectivistic”, followed by the one-sided inclusion forms 
that fall in-between and the marginalised identity form as most “individualist” on the other end 
of the continuum.  
The four different identity or acculturation profiles have been found to be substantially 
related to all important types of adaptation (psychological, sociocultural, and economic), 
whereby studies tend to converge on the finding that integration is the most adaptive and 
marginalisation the least adaptive acculturation strategy, while assimilation or separation 
strategies are intermediate (for a meta study see Nguyen and Benet-Martinez 2012). In contrast 
to the positive findings of the dual identification type in the psychological literature, a 
longitudinal study of (Esser 2009) evinced that this type is not beneficial to the other dimensions 
of integration, but rather exerts a negative influence compared to an assimilated type of 
identification, by impinging on immigrants’ linguistic assimilation or their ability to establish 
interethnic contacts. 
4.2.2 Ethnic Identity and Political Involvement 
One of the most cited Theories of Individual Political Participation was laid forward by the 
research group around Sidney Verba and colleagues (Verba, Lehman, and Brady 1995; Verba, 
Nie, and Kim 1978); an approach which also holds expectations for explaining immigrants’ 
participation. Specifically, the theory focusses on political participation defined as “legal acts 
by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of 
governmental personnel and/or the actions that they take” and, thus, clearly distinguishes 
political activity from psychological involvement in politics, like political interest (Verba, Nie, 
and Kim 1978). Both, however, are expected to be highly related, implying that “the 
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generalization about the socioeconomic basis of political activity should also apply to the basis 
of psychological involvement in politics as well” (71).  
The theoretical framework holds that the association between social stratification and 
political activity can be traced back to two independent processes of mobilisation: an 
‘individual-based’ and a ‘group-based’ process. In the former case, the political participation is 
the result of individual motivations (e.g. beliefs of political efficacy or political interest, called 
“civic attitudes”) and resources (e.g. money, prestige or political skills) that do not rely on any 
group affiliations; whereas in the latter case, political mobilisation particularly relies on group-
based motivations and resources. Here, the motivations emanate from a consciousness of 
membership in a particular social category. Thereby, group-based political mobilisation can rely 
on characteristics like economic position, ethnicity, religion or sex. The process implies that if 
members of disadvantaged social groups can be politicised to a higher degree than the actual 
possession of relevant social resources would actually predict, higher equality may arise across 
different socioeconomic levels but at the same time higher inequality along, for instance, ethnic 
lines.  
Empirical results on higher political participation rates of African Americans compared 
to White Americans in the 1970s were highly inconclusive, however. Whereas, Verba and Nie 
(1972) or Olsen (1970) could find that African Americans, who display a kind of group 
consciousness when discussing political issues, were more likely to participate politically than 
non-conscious Blacks and Whites of similar social status, subsequent studies (Leighley and 
Vedlitz 1999; Verba, Lehman, and Brady 1995) rebutted the positive influence of group 
consciousness on African American participation rates.  
Subsequently, there has been the attempt by Miller et al. (1981) to account for the 
inconsistent findings concerning the relationship between group identification and political 
involvement by proposing a general Model of Group Consciousness which differentiates 
between group identification per se and a politicised form of group identification: group 
consciousness. Whereas the former notion indicates a perceived self-location in terms of a 
social hierarchy together with a psychological feeling of belonging to that location, the latter 
additionally involves an attentiveness of the relative position of the group in society: 
“Participation is not simply a reflection of the social conditions that people experience. How 
people perceive and evaluate their position is an important link between the experience of 
certain social situations and political participation” (Miller et al. 1981, 503). Their ‘interactive’ 
model of group consciousness and political participation, thus, conceives group consciousness 
as a multidimensional construct consisting of four components: (1) identification with the 
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ingroup; (2) ingroup-favouritism; (3) dissatisfaction with the relative status of one’s own group 
and (4) attribution of blame to the political system.  
In the National Election Study (1972 to 1976), the models’ assumptions proved useful, 
especially with regard to the conjunction of these components (Miller et al. 1981). Thus, group 
identification alone has been largely insufficient to promote political participation; but in 
interaction with feelings of group deprivation it yielded a significant impact on electoral 
turnout, even after accounting for the possible confounding effects of socioeconomic variables. 
This effect could be established for Blacks but also for several other social groups, which 
occupy subordinate positions in American society (e.g. women or the poor) but did not apply 
to superordinate groups like Whites. By delineating the necessity of group identification to be 
politicised for affecting immigrants’ political participation, the model approaches Marxist 
terminology, that the social group needs to turn from ‘a group of itself’ (‘Klasse an sich’) into 
‘a group of and for itself’ (‘Klasse an und für sich’) (cf. Miller et al. 1981, 495).  
Social Identity Theory also suggests a trajectory of mobilisation on behalf of the group 
identity under certain conditions. Tajfel and Turner (1986) propose three strategies by which 
individuals can deal with a threatened identity as result of being a member of a devalued and 
subordinate low status group, depending on the legitimacy and permanence of the intergroup-
boundaries: Besides leaving the group – psychologically or physically – if boundaries are seen 
as legitimate and permeable, or changing the basis of intergroup comparison if boundaries are 
seen as legitimate and impermeable, individuals invest in action that seeks to improve the inter-
group status if boundaries are seen as illegitimate and impermeable. The last strategy is the one 
which most closely refers to politicisation and political action on behalf of the group.  
Among the main groups of labour migrants in Germany (e.g. ex-Yugoslavian, Turks, 
Italian, Greek, Spanish and Portuguese), the members of the Turkish minority group that 
currently composes the largest single immigrant group in Germany are known to be especially 
likely to define themselves in ethnic terms (Verkuyten 2005) as well as to be in comparison to 
the other labour migrant groups more socially disadvantaged (Kalter 2006; Kalter, Granato, and 
Kristen 2007) and to be more discriminated against by the majority group. For instance, Wasmer 
and Koch (2003) could show that Germans are more often inclined to deny equal rights form 
Turkish nationals than nationals from other origin countries. In addition, due to Turkish 
immigrants’ cultural background, primarily Muslim, scholars propose that Islam forms a “bright 
boundary” separating the immigrant and the native group (Alba 2005). In this light, it can be 
argued that Turkish immigrants are faced with high identity threat and lack of positive 
distinctiveness with regard to their ethnic group membership (Verkuyten 2007), facilitating 
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Turks’ perception of intergroup boundaries to be rather stable and highly illegitimate as well as 
impermeable (Verkuyten and Reijerse 2008) and, hence, to opt for social competition as an 
identity managing strategy. 
Relying on the outlined research lines, mainly elaborated in the US context, European 
scholarship supplemented the American group consciousness approach in important respects. 
In the theoretical framework of Politicized Collective Identity (PCI) by Simon and 
Klandermans (2001), the politicisation of group identities is viewed as a process in which group 
members “intentionally engage, as mindful and self-conscious collective (or as representatives 
thereof), in […] a power struggle knowing that it is the wider, more inclusive context in which 
this struggle takes place and needs to be orchestrated accordingly” (Simon and Klandermans 
2001, 323). The authors contribute to the literature because in contrast to previous work (Miller 
et al. 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1986), which mainly focuses on single identification and bipolar 
intergroup relations, they acknowledge the wider society as prerequisite. Hence, besides a first 
step, in which the members of a particular group have to perceive their group as relatively 
aggrieved  and a second stage, that the aggrieved group members have to blame an external 
group for the experienced injustice, the group members also need to “acknowledge or even 
stress their identity as a member of [the] society because only by virtue of their membership in 
this more inclusive group or community are they entitled to societal support for their claims” 
(Simon and Klandermans 2001, 326). Thus, the Simon and Klandermans approach underlines 
that politicised collective identity or group consciousness, in the terms of Miller and colleagues 
(1981), includes the identification with a more inclusive group and, therefore, implies a nested 
or dual identity.  
Yet, the precise underlying mechanism, explaining how and why dual identity effects 
political involvement, remains quite vague in the PCI framework and current theoretical 
discussions. Thus, I would like to propose three mechanisms that might be at work here. The 
first I call the “self-esteem” argument. Relying on notion by SIT that group identity is 
fundamental to the promotion of individual well-being and positive self-esteem, a newer line 
of research proposes that immigrants with a bicultural orientation or integration strategy evince 
the highest scores on psychological adjustment (e.g. life satisfaction or self-esteem)  and  
behavioural competence  as sociocultural adjustment,  including academic achievement or 
career success, compared to those who are marginalised; immigrants preferring assimilation 
and separation fall in-between (Berry and Sabatier 2010; Nguyen and Benet-Martinez 2012). 
Thus, it seems reasonable to assume, providing that political consciousness and behaviour 
requires some sort of self-esteem and feelings of competence, that dual identity orientation may 
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foster political involvement to a higher degree within the context of ethnic discrimination than 
the other identification types. The second argument I call “resource argument”. In sociological 
integration literature there is the notion that resources are in general country and society-speciﬁc 
(e.g. educational credentials), i.e. they are more productive in some societal contexts than in 
others (Kalter 2006). Through migration experience, immigrants often lack host country-
speciﬁc capital, which, in consequence, may impede integration. In the same line, social 
integration theory like the intergenerational theory of integration developed by Esser (Esser 
2003) argues that all individuals strive for physical and social well-being, that can be reached 
through society specific cultural recognized lower and higher order goals and means/resources. 
Thus, within an investment perspective it is possible to argue that both group identities fulfil 
two different functions. Dual identification includes both an ethnic specific orientation and 
resource that mainly provides a psychological function but also includes a host country specific 
orientation/resource providing an instrumental function involving the frames, means and 
resources necessary for political participation, conceived as a lower order goal to produce social 
well-being. Last I want to address that the effect of dual identity might reflect an “additive 
identity threat” argument: Arguably, it could be that having a bicultural identity causes by the 
maltreatment of one membership group by the other, a higher identity threat and, hence, 
politicisation than if only one group identity is threatened.  
Subsequent studies, one among Turkish (Simon and Ruhs 2008) and the other among 
Russian minority members in Germany (Simon and Grabow 2010), could reveal empirical 
support for the hypothesised politicisation effect of dual identity. Moreover, Klandermans, 
Toorn, and Stekelenburg (2008), who simultaneously tested for an array of socioeconomic 
characteristics (gender, age, education) as well as different explanations for immigrants’ 
participation in collective actions like petitions or demonstrations among Turkish respondents 
in the Netherlands and New York found that “[w]hen respondents who felt treated unfairly 
displayed a dual identity, they were more likely to engage in collective action than were people 
who felt treated unfairly but did not display a dual identity. [There are] no such effects for 
national or ethnic identity” (1007).  
As opposed to studies, which explored established forms of political participation, like 
turnout, as well as for less established forms like collective actions, there are only a few studies 
that examined immigrants’ (dual) identification in relation to psychological involvement 
measures in politics. For instance, Diehl and Urbahn (1999) studied the political interest among 
guest worker immigrants in Germany and demonstrated in a cross sectional analysis of the  1996 
survey wave of the GSOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel) that labour immigrants who feel 
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German in only some respects demonstrate a higher political interest than those who do not feel 
German at all, taking different indicators of assimilation, like language proficiency in German 
or the amount of interethnic contacts into account. 
Although revealing, the findings presented above are confined in their interpretation 
towards causal inference, as they are mainly cross-sectional in structure. More narrowly, they 
rely on between-person estimates that are subject to the main problem inherent of non-
experimental research, unobserved heterogeneity, a bias that is caused by self-selection or 
variables that are not observed/measured but correlate with the observed independent variables. 
In the method part I outline how the usage of longitudinal data with repeated measures within 
persons as well as appropriate statistical methods can help to alleviate the problem of biases 
caused by variable omission. 
4.2.3 Hypotheses on German Immigrants’ political involvement 
In the foregoing I have explored the theoretical background as well as the current state of 
research. These considerations lead to two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: It can be expected that a dual identification leads to higher political 
involvement than separated or assimilated identification. However, the positive 
effect of ethnic dual identification should only be expected if it is politicised by 
perceptions of group deprivation and disadvantages.  
Hypothesis 2: Arguably, due to arguments of Turkish immigrants most 
disadvantaged and aggrieved social position in intergroup contexts as well as high 
perceived levels of group discrimination and resentments, a higher politicising due 
to ethnic ingroup belonging can be supposed. Thus, and with reference to the 
reasoning of the PCI framework, I secondly suggest that the joint effect of dual 
identification and discrimination differs across the minority groups, but is more 
pronounced among Turks. 
4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Data and Measures 
In order to investigate the theories and hypotheses outlined in the previous section, data from 
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is used. GSOEP is a household-based nationally 
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representative panel survey collected annually by the German Institute for Economic Research 
(DIW) since 1984 (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007). In the first wave, about 4500 households 
with a German born head of household were interviewed, as well as about 1500 households 
with a foreign born head of household. The GSOEP is quite unique and valuable for studies on 
the German immigrant population as it contains an especially high representation of the guest 
worker immigrant population, which has been oversampled in the foreigner sample (sample B), 
also drawn in the initial year 1984.  
In several steps I constructed a longitudinal data set for my statistical analysis. 
Following GSOEP studies by Hochman (2010) as well as Esser (2009), I only included those 
labour immigrants who do not hold a German citizenship. One the one hand, this limitation to 
foreign nationals has methodological reasons, as some of the relevant indictors on immigrants’ 
integration have only been asked in the GSOEP to those respondents whose nationality is not 
German (e.g. questions on ethnic and national identification, interethnic contact or language 
proficiency). On the other hand, it is the particular interest of the present paper to study the 
effect of symbolic instead of formal group membership on political involvement for the 
majority of the labour immigrants in Germany who are legally constrained in partaking in 
politics. Consequently, I restricted my sample to foreign nationals from the classic guest worker 
nations and classified them into three groups: Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia and South European 
(foreign nationals from Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal). To determine the ethnic background, 
I decided to choose respondent’s country of birth as indicator as opposed to nationality that may 
change over life course. For the second generation immigrants born in Germany, I drew on the 
country of birth of the parents. Hereby, I only considered those respondents whose parents were 
both foreign born, in order to preclude dual identification due to two different ethnic 
backgrounds of the parents. Among those, I opted for the mother’s country of birth to determine 
their ethnic background, because this information is more often included in the GSEOP (cf. 
Hochman 2010).  On the basis of the indicators (described in detail below), which are not 
consistently included in every survey year, I further restricted the sample by choosing the years 
between 1993 and 2006 (including 13 waves) as period of analysis. Furthermore, only those 
respondents were kept who participated in at least two survey waves. For the purpose of 
following descriptive and multivariate analyses, cases with missing data on key variables were 
omitted, resulting in a total sample of analysis of 2209 respondents comprising 1021 
respondents with a Turkish background, 917 migrants from South European states and 217 
foreign nationals from the former Yugoslavia. 
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Political Involvement 
The dependent variable of interest is ‘immigrants’ political involvement’. Because the GSOEP 
contains only limited information on the socio-political participation habits of immigrants in 
Germany, I selected the item on respondents’ general political interest (coded 1-4, with 
4=highest interest). Furthermore, in theory and research, psychological involvement is expected 
to be closely associated with political activity, implying “the intervening step to the latter” 
(Verba et al. 1978, 71) and to be less susceptible to intervening effects of institutional constraints 
like participation rights.  
Ethnic Identification Types 
In accordance with the conceptualization of social identification, ethnic identity is conceived as 
a multidimensional construct that can be measured in several ways (Ashmore, Deaux, and 
McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). In general, to avoid confounding ethnicity (objective membership by 
parents’ heritage) and ethnic identity, researchers commonly use respondents’ self-labels as an 
indicator for the latter. The GSOEP only assesses immigrants’ identification with their ethnic 
origin or with the receiving group by two items that capture some kind of affective dimension 
of group identity. For their ethnic minority identification, respondents are asked “to what extent 
do you feel connected with your country of origin”, and for their identification with Germany 
they are supposed to state “to what extent do you feel German” (coded 1-5, with 5=highest level 
of identification). In the presence of two independent identification scales in the data, scholars 
either use the median, the mean or the mid-point as cut point to construct the 
acculturation/integration typology by Berry (1997) or Esser (2003). According to Berry and 
Sabatier (2010, 196) “[t]here appears to be no ideal way of splitting the scales, since all three 
make an arbitrary cut near the middle of the scale where (in a normal distribution of scores) 
most respondents are likely to fall”. For the present study I decided to apply the median split 
method. Hence, I crossed the ethnic identification and national identification measure at the 
median point of each scale and coded a variable with four identity categories: dual identity (=1), 
marginalised identity (=2), assimilated (=3) and separated identity (=0).  
Perceived/Experienced Discrimination 
In the GSOEP, immigrant respondents can indicate on a three-point scale how often they have 
experienced disadvantages and discrimination due to their ethnic origin in the previous two 
years. The categories “often” and “seldom” were to 1 and “never” to 0. 
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Control Variables 
In accordance with the concept of ‘participation resources’, I considered further predictors that 
were found to be relevant determinants for immigrants’ host country-oriented political 
involvement as well as to indicate immigrants’ assimilation in terms of different dimensions of 
social integration (Diehl and Urbahn 1999). To measure respondents’ cultural integration, I 
incorporated the information on respondents’ German self-reported reading and speaking skills 
into one single variable of ‘German language proficiency’ (coded 1-5, with 5=very well). To 
attain a measure for social assimilation, I computed a dummy ‘interethnic contact’ out of the 
information on whether the respondents had German visitors or have visited Germans over the 
last twelve months (=1). For structural integration, respondents’ ‘education attainment’ is 
measured on the CASMIN scale, which differentiates between ”general” and ”vocationally-
oriented” education and is designed for international comparisons. I computed a four-category 
version that classifies general primary or lower education as low educational level (CASMIN 
1a, 1b=1), secondary and intermediate general education as well as vocational qualifications 
indicate a medium educational level (CASMIN 1c, 2a and 2b=2) and maturity certiﬁcate with 
and without vocational qualiﬁcation as well as tertiary education represent a high educational 
level (CASMIN 2c, 3a and 3b=1). Besides education, respondents’ labour market status is 
estimated by a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is ‘employed’ (=1), as well 
as through the logarithm ‘household income’.  
Further controls are also considered: gender (female=1) as well as ‘number of years 
passed since immigration’, implying the respondents’ increasing exposure to the German 
society. For German-born respondents their age as proxy is used. The respondents’ generational 
status was coded into three categories: first, 1.5 (those who arrived at a young age between six 
and twelve), and the second generation.  
In order to reduce the number of missing values in my model variables, due to waves in 
which they were not included, I imputed the values from the closest waves in which they were 
included. Hence, according to my selected period of analysis (1993-2006), the values were 
imputed as a maximum three years backwards (for the case of discrimination), and three years 
forward (for the case of ethnic identification) (cf. Hochman 2010, 102).   
4.3.2 Analytical strategy 
As emphasised in the introduction, one of the main contributions of the current study to the 
growing body of literature on ethnic identity and political involvement is the application of 
longitudinal methods of analysis on longitudinal data like the GSOEP with repeated measures 
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on the individual level. Specifically, I use hybrid models to predict the political interest as a 
function of several explanatory variables (Allison 2005). The advantage of this method is the 
combination of the fixed effects as well as random effects method, i.e. it allows an estimation 
of both time constant (e.g. ethnicity, gender) and time varied covariates (e.g. language 
proficiency, identification). The model is an extended version of a random effect model and 
decomposes each time-dependent predictor into its ‘within’ (𝑥it − 𝑥i) and ‘between’ ( 𝑥i𝛾 ) 
differences, thus allowing to separate the within from the between effects 
𝑦it = (𝑥it − 𝑥i)′𝛽 + 𝑥i𝛾 + 𝑧i′𝛿 +  𝛼i +  𝜀it 
where αi presents the person-specific error or person-specific time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity and εi the idiosyncratic error or time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. The 
estimators of the within-component (β) are identical with the within-estimators of fixed effects 
regressions, i.e. the effects of the time-varying predictors are no longer biased due to time-
independent unobserved heterogeneity because the between variation is controlled for (𝛾). At 
the same time, the hybrid method helps to get better estimates of time-constant covariates (δ) 
in contrast to the random effect model, because even though the estimates are still subject to 
person-specific unobserved heterogeneity, it now also accounts for time-varying heterogeneity. 
The utilization of the hybrid method for my study is also supported by the calculation of the 
Hausman specification test (H0: ?̂?re = ?̂?fe) which displays that the implicit assumption of the 
re-model (β= 𝛾) does not hold and, thus, that random effects estimates would be biased and 
overestimated by unobserved heterogeneity.    
4.4 Findings 
4.4.1 Descriptive Evidence 
Before examining how ethnic identification types are associated with political interest, in this 
section I present a descriptive picture of the distribution of the model variables.  According to 
Table 4.1, the mean level of political interest is in general rather low (M=1.76), Ex-Yugoslavs 
demonstrating the highest mean political interest (M=1.82). In terms of participation and 
assimilation resources, the Turkish immigrants are the most disadvantaged group. For instance, 
regarding cultural assimilation, Turkish immigrants significantly evince the lowest German 
skills (M=3.18). Likewise, the Turkish nationals also report the lowest average gross income 
(M=10.09). 
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Table 4.1. Means and percentages of model variables 
 
Ex-
Yugoslavs 
(n= 272) 
(1) Turks         
(n= 1022) 
(2) South 
Europeans  
(n= 919) 
Total           
(n= 2213) 
Means (SD)  
 
 
 
  
General political interest 1.82 * 1.76  1.75 1.76 
 (0.81)  (0.79)  (0.76) (0.78) 
 Household income (log) 10.17 * 10.09 * 10.24 10.16 
 (0.57)  (0.53)  (0.50) (0.53) 
Years passed since 
immigration 22.96 * 21.57 * 27.14 24.18 
 (8.28)  (8.33)  (8.29) (8.72) 
German language 
proficiency 3.44 * 3.19 * 3.49 3.34 
 (1.11)  (1.17)  (1.15) (1.17) 
Percentages       
Ethnic identification types:       
Assimilated identity  39.1 * 27.7 * 31.4 30.5 
Separated identity  36.3 * 48.1 * 39.9 43.3 
Integrated (dual) identity 18.2  17.8 * 25.7 21.3 
Marginalised identity  6.4  6.4 * 2.9 4.9 
Discrimination 51.4 * 57.0 * 39.1 48.6 
Interethnic contact 80.2  79.4 * 86.9 82.8 
Employed 64.1 * 49.1 * 63.5 57.0 
Educational degree 
(CASMIN):       
General elementary school 
or less (CASMIN 1a, 1b) 50.1 * 58.2 * 53.7 55.4 
Secondary/intermediate 
general and vocational 
qualifications (CASMIN 
1c, 2a, 2b) 43.5 * 35.5  36.7 36.8 
General/vocational 
maturity certificate or 
tertiary education 
(CASMIN 2c, 3a and 3b) 6.3  6.3 * 9.7 7.8 
Generational status:       
First generation  72.6  61.2  59.0 61.4 
1.5 generation 5.7  13.1  10.0 11.0 
Second generation 21.7  25.7  31.0 27.6 
Female 46.6  47.4  45.3 46.4 
(1)*= two-sided significance test between Turks and ex-Yugoslavians at the 0.05 level 
(2)*= two-sided significance test between Turks and South Europeans at the 0.05 level 
 
What does the table tell about the distribution of the theoretical variables? The lowest 
proportion of respondents with an assimilated identity is found in the Turkish minority (27.7%), 
whereas they constitute the highest proportion of respondents demonstrating a separate identity 
(48.1%). In terms of an integrated or dual identity, respondents with Turkish or ex-Yugoslavian 
ethnic background are less likely to hold a dual identity (17.8 and 18.2%) than nationals from 
South Europe (25.7%). In this respect, it is, however, worth noting that the South Europeans 
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not at the same time show the highest political interest. As already found in literature (Verkuyten 
2005) marginalised group identification was the less chosen by immigrant respondents. In 
regard to discrimination, about half of them have felt discriminated against due to their ethnic 
background in the last two years, however, Turkish immigrants reporting it significantly more 
often than South Europeans or Ex-Yugoslavs.  
4.4.2 Multivariate Evidence 
In order to assess and answer the research question of how ethnic identification causally relates 
to political interest, Table 4.2 displays the results from a series of the hybrid regression models 
conducted on the overall immigrant sample as well as separately for the three immigrant 
subgroups under investigation. The independent variables are added to the model in four steps. 
 Model 1 introduces base model factors, like the individual-based participatory or 
assimilation resources and other control variables. The model uncovers significant effects for 
immigrants’ individual participatory resources consistent with previous research findings. For 
instance, ceteris paribus, German language skills in terms of cultural assimilation or interethnic 
contact with Germans in terms of social assimilation exert a positive influence on the level of 
political interest (b=0.05, p<0.001 and b=0.03, p<0.05). Of the two structural assimilation 
indicators, the coefficients of the logarithm income as well as of the educational degree signal 
a positive and significant impact on the dependent variable (b=0.03, p<0.05; b=0.16, p<0.01). 
Moreover, the number of years passed since immigration, implying growing exposure to the 
host society, leads to a slight increase in the interest in politics (b=0.01, p<0.01). 
Turning to the respondents’ ethnic background the first model indicates pronounced 
interethnic differences. Although respondents from former Yugoslavia and Turkey are 
completely barred from national and local voting, they demonstrate significantly higher 
political involvement compared with South European respondents (b=0.10, p<0.05; b=0.15, 
p<0.001). Contrary to expectations, respondents affiliated with the 1.5 and second generation, 
arguably, show a significant lower political interest than the first immigrant generation (b=-
0.17, p<0.001 and b=-0.27, p<0.001). First generation labour immigrants might be more 
politicised than their descendants due to their direct migration experience and because of their 
more threatened residence and social status at the beginning of their stay in Germany. 
Model 2 additionally includes the explanatory variables for the group-based 
politicisation process and the theories previously delineated. A chi-square statistic of a Wald 
test can provide evidence that the theoretical predictors significantly add to the explanation of 
political interest and improve the fit of the model (Wald Chi2(4)=10.87, p<0.05).   
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Nonetheless, the model only conveys a significant parameter estimate for perceived 
discrimination. Although the direction of the coefficient of dual identification indicates that a 
dual identity has a positive effect, while a marginalised and assimilated identity has a negative 
effect compared to a separate identity, it is of no significance. By contrast, respondents who 
have experienced discrimination due to their ethnic background show higher levels of political 
interest than if they do not report such worries; independent from their education, generational 
status or employment status (b=0.04, p<0.01).  
To test whether the influence of the ethnic identification types is contingent on a kind of 
politicisation through perceived discrimination, Model 3 adds the interaction terms between the 
respondents’ ethnic identification profiles and discrimination experiences. In accordance with 
theory and hypothesis 1, the only significant interaction term in Model 3 (b=0.06, p<0.05) 
indicates that discrimination has a positive effect on respondents’ political interest if 
respondents’ hold a dual instead of a separated identity (b=0.08 and b=0.02 respectively). It 
also implies that dual identification significantly contributes to respondents’ political interest 
only if they perceive discrimination. Hence, it is rejected by the data that there is an independent 
effect of immigrants’ two-sided ethnic identification from the perception of devaluation on 
behalf of the ethnic group membership. No similar integration pattern is observed for 
marginalised or assimilated identification. To illustrate the complexities involved, Figure 4.1 
depicts the varying impact of identification profiles depending on the perception of 
discrimination.  
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Source: GSOEP 1993-2006 (own analysis); Note: Adjusted predictions based on Model 3
Figure 4-1. The predicted values of ethnic identification profiles depending on the perception of 
discrimination 
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In addition, changing the reference category to assimilated identification yielded the same 
encouraging result for dual identification. Conversely, by setting dual identity as a reference 
category all other identity types evince negative estimates, with significant estimates for 
assimilated and separated identification (not shown).  
In the theoretical section I also suggest that the effects of group identity and shared 
grievances might differ across labour immigrant groups. In line with my second hypothesis the 
subsample analyses indicate that the joint effect of the ethnic identification types and 
discrimination appears to differ by ethnic group. Specifically, as demonstrated in Model 
“Turks”, the interaction between dual identification and perceived discrimination is significant 
and positive (b=0.11, p<0.05). Thus, the negative effect of dual identification (b=-0.07, p<0.10) 
is moderated and reversed among Turkish respondents who feel discriminated against. At the 
same time, discriminated Turks demonstrate higher political interest if they feel that they belong 
not only to the Turkish group but also to the German native population. Concerning respondents 
who belong to the ex-Yugoslavian ethnic minority, the model does not display any significant 
interaction term. However, it is noteworthy that the relatively small sample size may have 
caused most of the parameter estimates in the model to fail any significance. Turning to the 
parameter estimates in the model for the South European immigrants, I find that it is not the 
interaction term between dual identification and discrimination, but between marginalised 
identification and discrimination that shows a pronounced significant impact on political 
interest (b=0.26, p<0.01).  
Nevertheless, there is a caveat to these findings. In general, the evidence for possible 
group differences in parameter estimates, offered in the subsample models, must be interpreted 
cautiously, as it is simply based on the comparison of the significance of variables instead of 
precise estimators for significant parameter differences. To provide such statistical estimates to 
detect significant differences across groups requires estimating another overall model including 
all subsamples, the three-way interaction terms between each type of ethnic identification, 
experienced discrimination and each ethnic group. Thus, another combined model (Model 4) 
takes additional interaction terms into account. Due to the considerable number of interactions 
terms in the model and for reasons of parsimony, I do not discuss the model in detail here. In 
general, the results of the subsample models can be retrieved. Hence, the three-way interaction 
between dual identity, discrimination and Turkish ethnic background as well as for marginalised 
identity, discrimination and South Europeans is significant. Yet, there is only sufficient 
statistical support that the effect of marginalised identity and discrimination differs by ethnic 
group (Wald Chi2(2)=5.64, p<0.10), whereas the other three-way interaction is not significant 
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(Wald Chi2(2)=3.61, p=0.1643). Thus, concerning my second research hypothesis, the analysis 
displays evidence that the effect is more pronounced among Turks, though not with sufficient 
statistical confidence. Moreover, the last findings suggest that it is not only a dual identity that 
can be a politicised identity. Indeed, for South European immigrants it appears to be a 
marginalised, thus, more individualistic form of ethnic identification in conjunction with 
discrimination that acts psychologically politicising. At the same time, however, some word of 
caution in interpreting the result is in order here, because marginalised identity is actually a 
really rare identity type among South Europeans (2.9%; cf. Table 4.1). Nevertheless, in sum, 
the findings suggest that the mobilising mechanism of ethnic identification types according the 
two-dimensional conceptualisation may differ by ethnic group membership. Taken together, 
these remarkable analysis results indicate that in the face of persistent discrimination, 
immigrants’ dual identification, instead of an assimilated or separated identity, may 
counterbalance their lack of common participation resources and provide a unique politicisation 
factor. This result is quite encouraging, in the face of perceived ethnic discrimination on half of 
the respondents (cf. Table 4.1).  
4.5 Summary and Discussion 
The purpose of the current study was to investigate the role of immigrants’ identification with 
their ethnic origin and with the German society on their political involvement. Even today, first 
and second generation immigrants are still largely conceived and legally treated by the receiving 
society as politically silent residents. Notwithstanding, as many of the labour migrants and their 
German-born children have already lived in Germany for several decades, it is necessary and 
valuable to consider and to understand their political involvement in the receiving society in 
wider terms than merely with regard to voting.  
Following social psychological approaches on ethnic identity and the theoretical 
frameworks of politicised group identity the current longitudinal study of thirteen waves of the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) revealed conclusively that dual identification leads 
to a higher political interest, though only in the attentiveness of discrimination. By the same 
token, the estimations indicate that perceived discrimination leads to higher political interest if 
respondents feel they belong to both the origin- and the host country than if they hold an 
assimilated or separated ethnic identification. However, what exact mechanism, alluded to in 
the theory section, is at stake in this process can only be suggested and could not be completely 
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disentangled on basis of the present data. Thus, further conceptual and methodological rigour 
is needed.  
To give further insight to the political mobilisation process among immigrants I also 
conducted separate regression analyses for the traditional labour immigrant groups in Germany. 
For Turkish immigrants the subsample as well as overall analyses indicated as theoretically 
predicted that the joint politicising effect of dual identification and discrimination is more 
pronounced among Turkish nationals, although this effect could not be estimated with final 
sufficient certainty. In general, the intergroup differences found seem mainly driven by the 
exceptional political involvement pattern of south European nationals due to a maginalised form 
of ethnic identification. Referring to the previous discussion in the paper on the meaning of 
marginalised identity, it is, thus, called into question whether it is actually a politicisation on 
collective basis and accordingly because of feelings of marginalisation from group attachments 
or rather a politicisation due to an individualistic identity position, thus, rather constituting a 
“politicized individualistic identity”. However, it preliminarily remains in the dark and research 
is needed to shed light on this issue of collectivistic versus individualistic politicization.  
It is also notable that with regard to interethnic differences in political interest my 
regression analysis uncovers remaining, pronounced ethnic disparities despite accounting for 
the theoretical indicators and an array of other control variables. Remarkably, although Turkish 
and ex-Yugoslavian nationals are more constrained in political participation rights than 
nationals from the EU member states, they evince higher political interest. However, as studies 
could show this higher interest of Turkish immigrants might be more addressed to issues related 
to country of origin and the defence of religious/Muslim rights than German politics (Berger, 
Galonska, and Koopmans 2004; Diehl and Blohm 2001), a special focus should also be placed 
on providing more encompassing data sets containing several measures that differentiate 
between immigrants’ political behaviour and attitudes that are directed to the homeland or the 
host country. It has clearly been beyond the scope of this paper to resolve this issue or to provide 
results for political behaviour instead of behavioural precursors. However, the positive findings 
in my models with regard to immigrants’ assimilation in different dimensions like cultural 
knowledge or social contact may also provide a sign that the dependent variable captures 
interest in German politics. A similar conclusion has also been drawn by the study of Diehl and 
Urbahn (1999). Some additional support is provided by the study of Simon and Grabow (2010) 
that conveyed that dual identification of Russian migrants in Germany was associated to 
peaceful and normative forms of politicisation within the given statutory framework, but was 
completely unrelated to radicalised forms like supporting political violence.  
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As a further limitation, I could also not adequately address the debate in research literature 
about the appropriate measurement of dual identification. Various researchers propose that the 
combination of high ethnic and high national identification does not adequately capture the 
direct psychological experience of dual identity (Simon and Ruhs 2008; Verkuyten and 
Martinovic 2012). Thus, a direct single measure of dual identification in the inquiry of Simon 
and Ruhs (2008) could yield significant impact on immigrants’ politicisation as opposed to an 
interaction term of ethnic and national identity. Finally, a note should be made regarding the 
method of analysis used. Notwithstanding the intriguing evidence on the effects of time-varying 
predictors that could be gained by my method of analysis, it is important to keep in mind that 
even though hybrid regression models account for unobserved time-constant heterogeneity, the 
fixed-effects estimations can still be biased due to time-varying unobserved heterogeneity, 
which is caused by the omission of time-dependent variables and individual characteristics that 
may correlate with ethnic identification and political interest, e.g. further psychological 
adjustment processes or other cultural, social or structural indicators of integration not been 
addressed in the present paper. 
Nonetheless, this caveats do not mitigate studies’ two-fold advancement of not even 
attaining more reliable and unbiased estimates of ethnic identifications’ impact on political 
interest, but also to obtain less biased estimates for time-constant indicators as well. Therefore, 
I argue that even though longitudinal analyses are still in their infancy, they seem to provide a 
productive path for future research on immigrants’ integration processes. Besides the statistical 
contribution, the paper also crucially advances current research on ethnic identification and 
political involvement theoretically. With respect to a consistent and vivid scientific and public 
debate between a pluralist vs. assimilationist position of foreign nationals’ integration (cf. Esser 
2009), the study finds support that for an emotional inclusion there does not necessarily have 
to be a trade-off between immigrants’ devotion to the group of origin and devotion to the 
dominant group (cf. Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012) but that an attachment including both 
groups may be valuable to be encouraged. But, first and foremost, it seems evident that future 
scientific controversies in this line should increasingly and thoroughly been tackled with 
questions of social context and situational dependency. For instance, learning how immigrants 
respond to perceived disadvantages or ethnic discrimination as one indicator for the social 
context in which the integration of immigrants in Germany occurs, merits further investigation. 
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Chapter 5: An Alternative View of Religion and Immigrants’ 
Commitment to Democracy: The Impact of Religious Affiliation 
and Attendance on Immigrants’ Satisfaction with Democracy in 
Germany* 
 
Abstract: 
This article examines the role of religion in predicting Turkish and non-Turkish immigrants’ 
psychological commitment to the democratic regime in Germany. Since the terrorist attacks in 
2001, the impact of religion on immigrants’ political attitudes towards European receiving 
societies has gained major attention within public and scholarly debates. From the angle of a 
social identity and subjective evaluation perspective as well as arguments of well-being and 
perceived discrimination, I discuss how two components of migrants’ religious identity, 
religious belonging and social religious behaviour, affect the satisfaction with current 
democratic governance differently. Moreover, I address the moderating influence of immigrant 
generation, ethnic origin, as well as national group membership. The employment of panel 
models on data measured in two waves (2005 and 2010) from the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (GSOEP) reveals that religion is indeed linked to the democracy satisfaction of 
immigrants, yet in complex ways: while religious attendance generally contributes to migrant 
democracy satisfaction, belonging to a certain denomination has no independent effect 
regardless of migrants’ specific ethnic background. Compared to self-identified Muslims with 
a Turkish ancestry, non-Turkish Muslims from Western/Eastern European as well as other non-
European countries are more satisfied with the democratic regime. Moreover, I find that 
German-born Muslim-Turks, compared to foreign-born, are less satisfied with democracy. 
Finally, the analyses show that the experiences of discrimination and general well-being are 
driving mechanisms for immigrants’ psychological commitment to democracy.  
  
                                               
*This chapter is currently under review in the journal Social Science Research. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Migrants’ political integration in Western democracies has become increasingly intertwined 
with controversial and heated debates concerning their religion, particularly regarding Islam 
(Connor and Koenig 2013; Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Fleischmann, Phalet, and Klein 2011; 
Foner and Alba 2008; Voas and Fleischmann 2012;). As a consequence of the increasing 
international migration flows from non-Western countries, Muslims have become the largest 
religious group besides Christians among immigrants in Europe1. Pluralism, minority rights, 
non-discrimination and equality are key aspects of European democracy (EUR-LEX 2008). Yet, 
within Western European nations, where Christian identities (albeit secularised) are still a main 
aspect of individuals’ self-conception, immigrants’ Muslim religious identity is perceived as 
disruptive to democracy due to irreconcilable values (Fish 2002; Fukuyama 2006; Huntington 
1996a; Karatnycky 2002; Lewis 1996). According to Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis, 
‘the most dangerous cultural conflicts are those along the fault lines between civilizations. […] 
It is now the line separating people of Western Christianity, on the one hand, from Muslim and 
Orthodox peoples on the other’ (1996a, 28). Since 9/11 and in the courses of political Islam and 
Islamism, public and political discourses have become particularly intense and conceptualise 
Islam as threat to both democratic values and the stability of Western democracies (Richardson 
2004; Strabac and Listhaug 2008).  
As a consequence, the attentiveness and commitment to shared fundamental democratic 
values, such as human rights, freedom and equality as well as the psychological commitment 
to democracy involving political attitudes such as political trust, confidence and political 
satisfaction, have increasingly become the main subjects of study in immigrant political 
integration (e.g. Anduiza and San Martín 2011; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Maxwell 2010a; 
Maxwell 2010b; Maxwell 2013). Trust in the government or regime satisfaction measure the 
degree to which individuals regard democratic governance as legitimate and responsive to their 
needs (Ginsberg 1982). These political attitudes are central to the key normative principles of a 
democratic political system (cf. Anduiza and San Martín 2011, 199) and accordingly provide 
important indicators not only of migrant attachment to mainstream politics but also of the 
legitimacy of democratic political systems within European receiving societies. Moreover, 
according to Kelleher and Wolak (2007, 707) trust or confidence in the government is highly 
consequential because ‘people are more likely to comply with laws when they have confidence’. 
                                               
1 According to the Pew Research Center, the Muslim population in Europe (excluding Turkey) will increase from 
6% (44 million) in 2010 to more than 10% (71 million) in 2050 (Pew Research Center 2015, 147). 
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In contrast, a lack of political trust and regime dissatisfaction call the democratic political 
system into question and may generate resentment and individuals' interest in political change 
as well as protests or even antisystem behaviour (Farah, Barnes, and Heunks 1979; Muller, 
Jukam, and Seligson 1982). Accordingly, research argues among Muslims in Amsterdam that a 
lack of political trust may provide a pathway to alienation and radicalisation (Tillie, Slootman, 
and Fennema 2007). Maxwell (2010b) has a similar perspective on Muslims’ trust in the 
government: ‘Trust in government (or the lack thereof) is not the only measure of alienation but 
it is an important indicator of Muslim attachment to mainstream politics because it measures 
the degree to which individuals feel government authority is legitimate and responsive to their 
needs’ (90).  
Although religion among immigrants as well as political engagement have become 
highly politicised as well as a main focus of growing scholarly literature in recent years (see 
e.g. Eggert and Giugni 2011; Just, Sandovici, and Listhaug 2014; Phalet, Baysu, and Verkuyten 
2010; van Tubergen 2007), both the theoretical accounts and the empirical evidence on how 
religion is associated with immigrants’ commitment to democratic governance in Europe is still 
less systematic. Put differently, there are still very few studies analysing this relationship. In 
general, existing research on political confidence or political trust either tackles the impact of 
religious denomination (Jackson and Doerschler 2012, 82ff.; Maxwell 2010b) or immigrant 
status (André 2014; Maxwell 2010a; Maxwell 2013; Röder and Mühlau 2012; Voicu and Tufiş 
2015) but rarely both systematically2. As a consequence, certain questions remain that I seek to 
obtain answers to within the present study: What precisely is the effect of religion on 
immigrants’ democratic commitment, and what other relevant factors should be considered? Is 
there a difference between migrants’ religious affiliation (e.g. Islam vs. Christianity) in the 
psychological engagement with democracy for different ethnic groups? And, above all, how 
can these differences be explained? 
To account for the impact of religious belonging and behaviour on migrants’ 
psychological commitment to democracy, I go beyond standard theoretical approaches of 
political behaviour that discuss the impact of migrants’ religion that stem from differences in 
the access to certain resources, social cleavages or networks (e.g. Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 
1995; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). I also attempt to transcend the prevailing cultural 
                                               
2 Maxwell (2010b) is such an exception as he shows within his study on British Muslims that Muslims are more 
likely to have positive political attitudes because of their immigrant status, which relates to more optimistic 
evaluations of British society. However, the study does not consider immigrants systematically or with 
respect to different ethnic origins. 
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perspective on religion’s role on democratic values and its main focus on incompatible values 
and cultural traits (e.g. Huntington 1996a; Lewis 1996), which gained only inconclusive 
empirical confirmation (e.g. Gundelach 2010; Tessler 2002; Jackson and Doerschler 2012, 
82ff.). Instead, my theoretical account focuses on a micro-level perspective and builds on a 
subjective evaluation and social identity perspective (Inglehart 1999; Newton 2008; Tajfel and 
Turner 1986). I derive hypotheses on the different effects of immigrants’ religious affiliation 
and religious social behaviour3 on the satisfaction with democracy due to the different social 
identity experiences they provide that are known to shape individuals’ social and psychological 
well-being. These religious identity effects are further discussed with respect to social identity 
experiences due to migrants’ multiple memberships in three other socially meaningful 
categories: their immigrant generation (e.g. first or second generation), their ethnic origin (e.g. 
Turkey) and the native majority (e.g. German).   
In order to test my theoretical hypotheses empirically, in contrast to previous research, 
I apply a longitudinal empirical approach. More specifically, I use longitudinal and individual-
level data that have been collected as part of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) from 
2005 and 2010 (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007). The data from GSOEP are of high quality 
and are commonly used to study various aspects of immigrant integration (see, among others: 
Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann 2009; Esser 2009; Diehl and Liebau 2015; Fischer-
Neumann 2014). It is also unique as immigrants from former guest worker nations have been 
over-sampled to provide sufficient numbers for a detailed analysis. In my regression analysis, I 
distinguish self-identified Muslims, Christians and non-denominational immigrants from four 
European and non-European ethnic origins: from Western and Eastern Europe, Turkey and other 
non-European countries (e.g. those coming from the Middle East, North Africa or Indonesia). 
To exploit the clustered data structure analytically, I apply correlated random effect regression 
models that estimate the effects for time-constant (e.g. ethnicity) as well as time-varying 
variables (e.g. religious affiliation or religious social behaviour) (see e.g. Mundlak 1978; 
Schunck 2013).  
The article is divided into five parts. I will begin by outlining the theoretical framework. 
Then, I will provide an overview of the data and method. Afterwards, the bivariate and 
                                               
3 I use religious service attendance, church attendance and related terms such as religious participation and 
religious social behaviour interchangeably. All terms imply the social practice of religion, involving 
participation in religious communities as well as worship attendance. In a similar vein, religious affiliation is 
also used interchangeably with comparable terms like religious belonging and religious denomination to 
indicate identity categories an immigrant can consider himself or herself to be a member of – be it 
Christianity or Islam. 
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multivariate results are outlined and discussed. The final section offers a summary and 
addresses further implications of my research findings. 
5.2 Theoretical considerations on the effects of religion on commitment to democracy 
5.2.1 Previous literature 
Political scientists have a long-standing interest in the connection between religion and political 
culture, involving democratic attitudes and values. A number of scientists have argued that 
Islam and democracy are mutually exclusive due to incompatible values (see, among others: 
Huntington 1996a; Huntington 1996b; Modood 2003; Pauly 2013). Put differently, proponents 
of this essentialist claim conceptualise Islam ‘as problem’ and ‘threat’ through its cultural traits. 
Huntington (1996a) identifies an inherent ‘clash of civilizations’ between Islam and the West. 
He writes, ‘Muslims agree that a basic difference exists between their culture and Western 
culture.’ For instance, in contrast to Western Christianity, Islam still supports the idea that the 
church and state are one; in essence, ‘God is Caesar’ (i.e. that the ultimate source of political 
authority is God) (Huntington 1996b, 31; cf. also Hofmann 2004, 654). Yet, the essentialist 
perspective has been applied to suggest differences in attitudes between Western and non-
Western countries and between the Muslim immigrant and non-Muslim native population 
within European receiving societies (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2009).  
Despite the substantial coverage of the essentialist position in academic literature as 
well as in public debates, empirical results on the alleged negative relationship between Islam 
and democracy are far from conclusive. Empirical research thus reveals that Muslims do show 
positive attitudes towards democracy (Gundelach 2010; Tessler 2002). Moreover, Grundel and 
Maliepaard (2012) demonstrate that Muslim and Christian adolescents in the Netherlands do 
not differ in their levels of democratic skills, such as the expression of their own opinion, the 
respect of the opinions of others, as well as the reflection on democratic matters such as issues 
of power and equal rights. Both Muslim and Christian adolescents have proven to be more 
democratically competent than non-religious adolescents (ibid.: 2089). Also cross-country 
multivariate analyses on data such as the European Social Survey (ESS) indicate that Muslims 
evince nearly the same levels of trust in the government and show even higher levels of 
democracy satisfaction than non-Muslims in the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom 
or France (cf. Jackson and Doerschler 2012, 93). Similarly, Maxwell (2010b) highlights that 
British Muslims are more trusting of political institutions compared to Christians. He argues 
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that that British Muslims are more likely than Christians to be migrants, and migrants are more 
likely than natives to have more positive evaluations about host society institutions (Gille and 
Krüger 2000; see also Kao and Tienda 1995; Maxwell 2010a; Röder and Mühlau 2012). 
Altogether, previous empirical studies call into question the simplistic notion of Islam as 
peculiarly hostile to democracy per se. 
Literature acknowledges that previous mixed findings on the impact of religion on 
democracy relate to the multidimensional structure of religion. Accordingly, religion is 
suggested to involve at least three dimensions – belief, behaviour and belonging (cf. Ben-Nun 
Bloom 2014, 5482). While the former exclusively refers to the individual, the latter two – 
behaviour and belonging – connect the individual to a social group and/or social context. In this 
line, literature shows that religion – be it Islam or Christianity –  in terms of the personal belief 
component involving religious beliefs such as the belief in God, heaven and life after death is 
generally associated with conservative-traditional values that undermine democratic values 
such as freedom, tolerance, equality and universalism. In contrast, religion at the group level in 
terms of social religious activities, such as church attendance and participation in religious 
organisations, can be suggested to support democratic values, since religious activity fosters 
political-efficacy (a measure of whether individuals feel that they can influence the political 
system), civic norms and knowledge (Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2013; Putnam 2000; see also, 
for an overview on the different effects, Ben-Nun Bloom 2014).  
In this article on the impact of religion on migrants’ psychological commitment to 
democracy (e.g. trust in or satisfaction with democracy), I rely on the multidimensional 
structure of religion and add to previous research by concentrating on the group level dimension 
of social religious behaviour and religious belonging. Within previous literature on migrant 
integration, the effect of religious affiliation and attendance has also been differentiated. Thus, 
Connor and Koenig (2013) show that through different mechanisms viewing religion as a 
religious marker as access to resources, religious belonging and religious attendance have 
different impacts on immigrants’ occupational attainment. In the present study, I build on the 
general literature on social identification to propose why immigrants with a Muslim affiliation 
or Christian affiliation may differ in levels of democratic governance satisfaction.  
5.2.2 Explanatory approaches to migrants’ psychological commitment to democracy 
The psychological commitment to democracy can be understood as a consequence of subjective 
perceptions and evaluations of the performance of the national democratic government. More 
specifically, I examine satisfaction with democracy as an outcome of whether individuals 
 An Alternative View of Religion and Immigrants’ Commitment to Democracy 
153 
perceive the democratic political system to be legitimate and responsive to their needs. 
Accordingly, previous research finds that citizens’ judgment of the state of the economy, of 
health care, and of education has a considerable impact on individuals’ view of democracy 
(Schäfer 2013). At the same time, subjective variables including job satisfaction, life 
satisfaction and happiness are discussed as predictors of regime satisfaction (Newton 2008, 
250; see also Zmerli, Newton, and Montero 2007). From this perspective, people commit to 
democratic governance because they personally benefit or do well. Satisfaction with one’s own 
situation and life can be expected to lead individuals to attribute legitimacy and responsiveness 
to the political system, which increases feelings of satisfaction with it. Thus, individual 
resources such as higher household income and education are also found to lead to higher rates 
of democracy satisfaction, while personal hardships such as unemployment drive discontent 
(Schäfer 2013). Inglehart (1999), who also employs a cross-county comparison, evinces that 
life satisfaction is a strong predictor for a stable democracy. He argues that ‘[..] if one’s life as 
a whole has been going well under democratic institutions, it gives rise to a relatively deep, 
diffuse, enduring basis of support for those institutions’ (Inglehart 1999, 170).  
There is a well-established body of literature on social identity that highlights that 
individual well-being and life satisfaction are mainly determined by individuals’ perceived 
membership in socially meaningful categories such as gender, ethnicity, denomination or social 
class, which are referred to as social identities (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Tajfel 1981; Turner et 
al. 1987). In general, social identity is defined by Tajfel (1981) as ‘that part of an individual’s 
self-concept which derives from [his] knowledge of [his] membership of a social group (or 
groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership’ (255). 
Individual social identities are determined by both internal and external ascriptions. Indeed, 
Nagel (1995, 21) refers to ethnic identity as ‘a dialectic between internal identification and 
external ascription’ such as by the members of the native majority group within receiving 
countries. It is suggested by social identity theory (SIT) that social identities are the main 
components of individual’s self-image and are sources of psychological well-being. Thus, 
incorporated memberships shape self-perceptions as well as the social experiences with other 
groups in ways to achieve a positive social identity, and in conceuquence a positive self (cf. 
Tajfel and Turner 1986, 16).  
Aside from emotional attachment and cognitive knowledge of the membership, social 
identities involve several other dimensions that capture, for instance, the importance of the 
membership, attitudes towards the social identity group as well as expressive components such 
as ethnic or religious practices regarding language usage, eating food, listening to music and 
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attending religious services (Phinney and Ong 2007; Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 
2004). Consequently, immigrants’ religious identities can be perceived as consisting of religious 
belonging (i.e. self-identification/categorisation as member of a particular denomination), as 
well as religious social behaviour. Religious identity, as suggested in literature, is particularly 
relevant for individuals’ subjective well-being because it offers a complete worldview, a robust 
social support and value system and unique form of a psychological basis (cf. Ysseldyk, 
Matheson, and Anisman 2010, 670). In the following, I discuss how both religious identity 
dimensions shape migrant psychosocial functioning and experience and affect individuals' level 
of democracy satisfaction. 
Social religious activities are a means to actively reinforce immigrants’ social identity 
and thus well-being through social identity engagement. Literature acknowledges that religious 
identity performance includes group behaviour that primarily serves to bolster religious group 
identity (i.e. identity consolidation) (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2010; Klein, Spears, and Reicher 
2007). Additionally, the general high value of church attendance for individuals’ health and 
well-being is discussed in literature (see e.g. Ellison 1991; Headey, Hoehne, and Wagner 2014). 
Accordingly, Lechner (2015) argues that church attendance buffers the impact of various life 
stressors on one’s well-being, such as unemployment, due to the social support that religious 
communities provide. Moreover, they reinforce psychological resources such as self-efficacy. 
In addition to the well-being function, existing research shows that participation in organised 
religious communities provides opportunities to develop civic skills, norms, trust and the 
political knowledge necessary to practise democratic citizenship (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
1995; Putnam 2000). Due to its functions of social identity consolidation and democratic 
socialisation, social religious behaviour may lead migrants to attribute legitimacy and 
responsiveness to the democratic political system. Thus, I derive the hypothesis that 
immigrants’ attendance of religious services contributes to their satisfaction with the democratic 
regime in Germany (Hypothesis 1). 
While the social activity component of religious identity can be expected to increase 
migrants’ satisfaction with democracy, the effect of the social belonging component may be 
detrimental. Even though both religious identity components relate to immigrants’ self-esteem 
and well-being, they differ in the social experiences they provide. While social experience 
through church attendance is mainly limited to the acceptance by and support from fellow 
religious ingroup members, the self-identification as a member of a certain social or religious 
group is seen by the proponents of the social identity framework to be tied to an ingroup-
outgroup context as well as to respective social relations fostering the construction of ingroup-
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outgroup boundaries (Turner et al. 1987). Thus, Muslim self-identification is not only affected 
by ingroup mechanisms but also by the way in which Muslims are externally defined, 
acknowledged and treated by the host society outgroup (Phalet, Baysu, and Verkuyten 2010). 
While wearing the headscarf may be seen among Muslim affiliated persons as way to publicly 
and positively affirm their identity, the headscarf is often publicly disapproved by historically 
Christian receiving societies in Europe. Accordingly, Zolberg and Woon (1999) argue that 
‘European identity, despite national variations, remains deeply embedded in Christian tradition, 
in relation to which ‘Muslim’ immigrants constitute the visible ‘other’’(Zolberg and Woon 
1999, 7). Since the attacks in the early 2000s in New York, Washington, Madrid and London, 
as well as the recent attacks in France and Belgium, Muslim migrants seem to be more 
vulnerable to experiencing discrimination than non-Muslims. According to Modood (2003, 
100), there has been an ‘anti-Muslim wind blowing across the European continent’. Moreover, 
as Pauly (cf. 2013, 162) notes, unemployment levels among Muslims are up to five times the 
national average in France and Great Britain and are double in Germany (cf. also Khattab 2009; 
Model and Lin 2002). As other researchers have considered the ‘otherness’ status and lack of 
economic and social accommodation of Islam in Western democracies, I hypothesise that 
immigrants with a Muslim affiliation may feel more alienated from the politics of their host 
societies and therefore are less satisfied with democratic practice than immigrants with a 
Christian affiliation or no religious affiliation (secular) (Hypothesis 2). Further, and with respect 
to the considerations of the social religious behaviour component of religious identity, I suggest 
for religious service attendance to reduce the negative effect or increase the positive effect that 
belonging to Islam or Christianity may have on immigrants’ democracy satisfaction (Hypothesis 
3).  
Most social identity researchers agree that people have multiple group identities that can 
intersect differently (see e.g. Roccas and Brewer 2002; Tajfel 1978; Verkuyten and Martinovic 
2012b). Hence, an individual’s social self-concept and social experience involve multiple 
categorisations of internal and external ascriptions, as in the case of immigrants in terms of their 
ethnic origin (i.e. country of birth and kinship), their generational belonging (i.e. foreign-born 
or receiving-country-born) or the majority group of the receiving country (i.e. German).  
In regard to migrants’ generational status, being born either abroad or in the host country 
can be expected to involve different perceptions and social experiences in the Western European 
countries that shape different perceptions and evaluations of regime responsiveness and 
legitimacy. Actually, through their socialisation within the host country, second-generation 
immigrants, compared to those of first generation, can be expected to be more familiar with the 
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rules and regulations governing a receiving country’s politics as well as its norms and values 
(Grundel and Maliepaard 2012; Maxwell 2010a). Accordingly, research shows that second-
generation immigrants display more similar democratic values to autochthonous individuals 
than their foreign-born counterparts (Maxwell 2010a). However, with regard to generational 
differences in religious belonging, studies often refer to an inter-generational stability or special 
religious vitality and religious reaffirmation among second-generation immigrants as a means 
to uphold challenged religious values and practices in the context of socio-economic 
difficulties, discrimination and stigmatisation (Diehl and Koenig 2009; Fleischmann, Phalet, 
and Klein 2011; Jacob and Kalter 2013).  
Thus, social experiences with respect to preserving well-being as well as perceptions of 
responsiveness of the democratic governance due to religious belonging may differ between 
first- and second-generation immigrants. More specifically, while first-generation immigrants’ 
Muslim identity has been socialised within the country of origin as a majority religion among 
fellow religious ingroup members, second-generation immigrants’ Muslim identity develops in 
Western receiving societies within a conflictive intergroup context of boundary drawing, 
between a minority Muslim and majority Christian population. Further, receiving society-born 
immigrants have higher expectations and standards of equality with natives than first-
generation immigrants, who have migrated voluntarily from lower-status countries to industrial 
societies such as Germany (cf. Maxwell 2013, 273). These expectations of second-generation 
immigrants are, however, often not met, because they still lag behind in relative positions to 
children with native-born parents within the educational system and the labour market ((for 
overviews, see Heath and Cheung 2007; Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008). As a consequence, 
second-generation immigrants, who actually feel entitled to the same treatment as the majority 
population through their native status, may have stronger personal feelings of frustration due to 
their Muslim identity compared to first-generation immigrants, which in turn may estrange 
them more from host countries’ democratic politics, which are sought to uphold equality and 
pluralism (EUR-LEX 2008). I therefore hypothesise that the expected negative effect of being 
a Muslim on satisfaction with democracy should be stronger in the case of being a second-
generation immigrant than in the case of being a first-generation immigrant (Hypothesis 4). 
In Western countries, it is often thought that Muslim group identification implies low 
identification or even disidentification with the host society as a Muslim identity relates to 
incompatible values and beliefs. Yet, the literature on multiple identities indicates varying 
degrees of migrants’ identification with both the religious minority group and the national 
community simultaneously (Berry et al. 2006; Phinney 1990; Verkuyten 2007). Thus, 
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Verkuyten and Martinovic (2012a, 92) posit that ‘no clear evidence that an emphasis on a ‘pure’ 
Islam […] implies psychological separation and opposition to the nation of settlement’. 
National identity can be expected to positively relate to democracy satisfaction due to two 
processes. First, it fosters positive social experiences and thus personal well-being. For 
immigrant minority members, it opens the access to the national majority group, its social and 
structural system and, in consequence, to valuable resources and improved social status. 
Second, research shows that besides ethnic aspects such as the majority language, the national 
identity consists of civic and political components involving shared sets of laws and institutions, 
political practices, norms and values (Kunovich 2009). Thus, if immigrants self-identify as 
members of a democratic national community such as Germany, they are psychologically 
motived to adapt to the respective democratic norms and practices. In sum, national identity 
processes can also be expected to be a driving force behind immigrants’ perception of higher 
democratic government responsiveness and legitimacy. As a consequence, I hypothesise that 
immigrants’ identification with Germany moderates the negative relationship between a 
Muslim self-identification and satisfaction with democracy (Hypothesis 5). 
Finally, within integration research, it is well known that the main influences of 
immigrants’ generational status, religious denomination or national identification on labour 
market positions, educational attainment or political activities vary according to each 
immigrant’s ethnic background (i.e. ethnic origin). For instance, British research on the 
question of ethnic or religious penalties directed towards the labour market shows that the 
Muslim ‘effect’ on unemployment varies considerably among different ethnic groups, being 
much higher for Muslim men from Pakistan than for Muslim men from other origin countries 
(Lindley 2002). Additionally, for Muslims in Germany, a representative study reveals that 
Muslims with a Turkish background are more structurally disadvantaged than Muslims from 
other non-European countries such as North Africa or the Middle East (Haug, Müssig, and 
Stichs 2009). Furthermore, European research highlights that second-generation immigrants of 
Turkish ancestry are far more likely to become early school leavers across different countries 
(Crul et al. 2012) and to be unemployed (Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008). Studies evince that 
most of the ethnic penalties in education can be explained by general factors associated with 
the socio-economic background (Kristen and Granato 2007; Phalet, Deboosere, and 
Bastiaenssen 2007). Kalter (2006), on the other hand, concludes that Turkish ethnic penalties 
in the labour market are largely explained by ethnic-specific characteristics such as the ethnic 
composition of friendship networks and German language proficiency.  
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Apart from integration disadvantages, immigrants of Turkish origin seem to perceive 
higher levels of cultural distances, discrimination and rejection by the native majority compared 
to other ethnic groups (Blohm and Wasmer 2008; Hans 2010; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2012; 
Steinbach 2004, 146ff.). Thus, native Germans feel less social distance towards Italians and 
Greeks than they do towards Turks (Ganter 2003; Steinbach 2004). As such, researchers also 
suggest that Turks are less likely to hold a strong national identification as they are not able to 
combine their ethnic and host-national identities due to external discrimination and also because 
of the strong ingroup norms of exclusive loyalty (Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012a; see also on 
national identification Diehl, Fischer-Neumann, and Mühlau 2016). Moreover, Diehl and 
Schnell (2006) found that while Turks’ German national identification is relatively low, their 
ethnic identity is particularly strong. Taken together, ethnic origin is associated with certain 
social identity experiences shared by members of the ethnic group. Based on the previous 
literature that suggests Muslims with a Turkish background seem to be more disadvantaged 
than Muslims of other ethnic origins, I hypothesise that the negative effect of Muslim self-
identification on immigrants’ democracy satisfaction should be stronger or even limited to 
immigrants of Turkish ancestry (Hypothesis 6).  
5.3 Data and analytical strategy 
The individual level data employed in my empirical analysis derive from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP), which provides a representative dataset collected annually since 
1984 (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007). A main feature of the GSOEP is that it contains a 
sufficient number of respondents with a migration background because it oversampled 
households whose head was either from Italy, Greece, Spain, former Yugoslavia or Turkey when 
the original sample was taken in 1984. Hence, individuals from the so-called former ‘guest 
worker countries’ are overrepresented. Moreover, GSOEP also contains additional samples with 
foreign individuals drawn between 1994 and 1995 (as part of sample D) and in 1998 and 2000 
(samples E and F). All samples are considered for the analytic sample of my study.  
I proceeded in three steps to find my longitudinal analytic sample. Firstly, I restricted 
the sample to respondents observed in 2005 and 2010, as it was only in these waves that 
respondents had been asked about their satisfaction with democracy. Distinctions between first 
and second generations of immigrants are based on the country of birth. By definition, 
individuals who are not born in Germany belong to the first generation regardless of the age at 
which they immigrated to Germany. Thus, I define individuals who were born in Germany and 
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whose mother and/or father is not German born or has non-German nationality to belong to the 
second generation. Many of the questions from the GSOEP 2005 and 2010 that measured 
integration processes such as national identification or discrimination were asked because of 
the existence of immigrants who did not possess German nationality since birth. Consequently, 
my sample is restricted to second-generation immigrants who may or may not possess German 
citizenship, though not since birth. As the main interest of this study lies in assessing the impact 
of religious and Muslim membership, I consider first- and second-generation immigrants of 
three main religious groups: Muslims, Christians (involving Catholics, Protestants and other 
Christians), as well as non-denominational immigrants. Further, immigrants are distinguished 
by their ethnicity, which corresponds with their country of origin. More precisely, I look at 
immigrants coming from one of the four sending countries/regions (for an overview of which 
countries are included, see Table A5.1): immigrants from Western Europe, here defined as EU-
15 plus Norway and Switzerland, or Eastern Europe, involving the ten states of the EU 
enlargement towards the East in 2004, plus Rumania and Bulgaria. Moreover, I also involve 
third-country immigrants from Turkey, as well as sending regions that are known to build the 
second, third and fourth largest populations of the four million foreign Muslims in Germany 
(besides Turkey), i.e. Southeast Europe, Near/Middle East, North Africa, and South/Central 
Asia (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2009). To define the ethnic background, the emphasis is placed 
on the country of birth rather than on nationality as it may change over time. For second-
generation immigrants, who are by definition German born in GSOEP, their ethnic background 
is identified by the country of birth of the father or mother. In the case of both parents not being 
born in the same country of origin or not having the same citizenship, the country of origin of 
the mother outweighs the country of origin of the father. When there is no information available 
about the country of birth or citizenship of the parents, non-German nationality is used as a 
criterion to determine immigrants’ ethnicity. Immigrants’ ethnicity is treated within the 
descriptive and statistical analyses as a time-constant variable.  
Finally, I restricted my empirical analysis to immigrants over 17 years of age, because 
most of my data is missing for people aged 17, as they received specific youth questionnaires. 
In total, I have an unbalanced sample of 2,620 persons with a migrant background, either 
personally or induced by their parents, and 3,696 observations (person-years). Complete panels 
with information for both years comprise 1,076 immigrants.  
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Dependent variable 
The evaluative dimension of subjective regime satisfaction is assessed with the following 
survey question: ‘How satisfied are you with democracy as it exists in Germany?’ Answers 
were given on an 11-point scale (0 = totally unhappy; 10 = totally happy). The measure closely 
coincides with the indicator often used within political support literature (e.g. Linde and Ekman 
2003): ‘On the whole are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all 
satisfied with the way democracy works (in your country)?’ 
Main explanatory variables 
The main independent variables that allow for the testing of my theoretical hypotheses are 
religious affiliation and religious social behaviour. Religious affiliation is based on a thrice 
repeated self-categorisation question between 2003 and 2011 asking respondents to indicate if 
they consider themselves to be a member of a church or religious community and, if so, to 
include the name of the church or religious community of which they are a member. Based on 
this information, I created dichotomous variables for ‘Christian’ affiliation (involving 
Catholics, Protestants, or other Christians), ‘Muslim’ affiliation and ‘no religious affiliation’. I 
took the annually or bi-annually repeated measure of religious attendance in the GSOEP to 
measure religious social behaviour, which is based on a survey question that asked respondents 
to indicate how frequently they attended religious services and events. Depending on the year 
of survey, the variable had four to five response categories, ranging from ‘never’ to ‘daily’. To 
define a consistent measure across panel waves, I recoded the variable into three dummy 
variables and captured attendance at least once a week (‘weekly’), at least once a month 
(‘monthly’) or less than once a month (‘less than monthly’). The reference dummy involves 
respondents who ‘never’ attend religious services. Both denominational affiliation and religious 
social behaviour are treated as time-varying. 
 Ethnic group membership also involves multiple dummies measuring immigrants’ 
ethnic origin, which is time-invariant: Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Turkey. As singe 
case numbers of third-country immigrants other than those from Turkey are quite small, and 
studies show that Turks constantly differ in their integration from other non-European 
immigrants (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2009), I created a collapsed category of ‘other non-EU 
countries’ for immigrants from countries in Southeast Europe, Near/Middle East, North Africa 
and South/Central Asia.  
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 The key indication of national identification is gained by relying on the only indicator 
available in the GSOEP that captures immigrants’ sense of social belonging to Germany. On a 
five-point scale that ranges from ‘not at all’ to ‘completely’, respondents had to indicate to what 
extent they view themselves as a German.   
 To take into account the main theoretical mechanisms of social identities’ effects on 
migrants’ subjective evaluation of democracy, I further rely on one measure of perceived 
discrimination indicating if the respondents have perceived disadvantages due to their ethnic 
background within the last 12 months (often/seldom; reference: never) and general life 
satisfaction (0 = completely dissatisfied; 10 = completely satisfied). 
 
Controls 
I control for several possible confounders of the relationship between social identity aspects 
and democracy satisfaction. Time-varying dummies capture the effects of changes in migrants’ 
age, citizenship (German; reference: else), marital status (married; reference: else: single, 
divorced, widowed), or occupational status (retired, jobless, all other non-working; reference: 
working). Additional time-varying factors of structural characteristics are considered if the 
migrant respondent has more than basic education (=CASMIN 2a, 2c, 3a and 3b) as well as the 
height of the household net income (logarithm). Furthermore, I included a time-varying 
measure to represent the years since the immigration of first-generation immigrants, which I 
calculated from their year of birth and their year of immigration. Moreover, migrants’ cultural 
integration was measured if respondents read mostly/only German newspapers (reference: no, 
mostly/only from country of origin, or equally from Germany and country of origin). Moreover, 
a cognitive-political indicator of political interest is included (very much/much interest versus 
not so much/no interest) in addition to a measure of social integration, capturing if the 
respondent visits Germans or receives visits from Germans. As a time-constant, control 
migrants’ gender (female; reference: male) is considered. Finally, to account for period effects, 
I include a dummy for the year of measurement (2010; reference: 2005). 
Sample statistics 
Table A5.2 presents the summary statistics of my sample as well as the information about the 
distribution and range of the included variables. The majority of the immigrants observed, 
namely 29.2%, have their ethnic background in Western Europe followed by Turkey (27.7%), 
immigrants from the other non-European countries (28.2) and East Europe (14.8%). Moreover, 
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about 37% hold a German citizenship. There are slightly more women (51.7%) among my 
sampled immigrants, and the age of the respondents varies between 18 and 96, with the average 
age being around 45 years. About one-third of the immigrants in my sample self-identify as 
Muslim, and about two-thirds identify as Christian. Immigrant respondents who do not consider 
themselves to be a member of a faith are the minority of the sample (~13% of the sample). The 
restrictions in information that the GSOEP contains with respect to immigrants older than 17 
years of age as well as with non-German citizenship since birth leaves 17% of the immigrants 
in my sample who are by definition affiliated with the second generation. This percentage is 
lower than that presented in the official statistics of the German Statistical Office (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2015), which indicates that one-third of immigrants in Germany belong to the group 
of persons without indirect migration experience (i.e. the second or later immigrant generation).  
Treatment of missing data 
There are two notable missing data driving mechanisms in my GSOEP-data, either due to 
‘refusal’ by the participant or by ‘design’ due non-annually measurement of some variables. 
The proportion of missing values for the variables considered in the analysis is presented in 
Table A5.2.  In the case that there was no information available for 2005 and 2010 due to non-
collection, I replaced the missing values with information from the most recent year (up to 3+/- 
years) in line with other studies (see e.g. Diehl and Liebau 2015; Fischer-Neumann 2014;  
Kalter 2006). To further reduce missingness due to non-collection of the main indicator of 
religious belonging, for 10% of the cases, I used information on the religious belonging of the 
mother (primarily) or the father, because religious belonging is found be stably transferred 
between generations within families (Jacob and Kalter 2013). The remaining missing cases due 
to non-collection (not more than 3.73% for religious belonging) were dropped for the regression 
analysis. Even though the missing rate due to ‘refusal’ was less than 5% for most of my 
variables, the listwise deletion of all observations that have a missing value in at least one 
variable would have substantially reduced my sample size for the separate group analysis. Since 
the share of missing values due to refusal is not high for most of my measures, I apply the 
simple imputation approach of ‘dummy variable adjustment’ (Cohen and Cohen 1985). Even 
though the method is liable to produce biased estimates for the indicators that have missing 
values and to underestimate the respective standard errors (Allison 2002), I consider the bias 
negligible in my case as in fact only for one out of 27 variables, 5% of the data are missing. 
Readers should also be aware that I do not substitute missing data for the dependent variable 
‘democracy satisfaction’; instead, cases that exhibit missing values (refusal) are dropped. 
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Regression method 
In order to exploit the within-person as well as the between-person variation available in my 
two-wave panel data, fixed-effects models would actually outweigh random-effects models 
because they control for all time-constant (level 2) characteristics (e.g. ethnic group 
membership), i.e. ‘partial them out’, – whether observed or unobserved (see e.g. Wooldridge 
2010; Schunck 2013). As a consequence, fixed-effects models account for one part of 
unobserved heterogeneity that generally biases causal inferences in survey-based and non-
experimental research. Yet, there are two disadvantages involved in the fixed effects method. 
First, the method, by default, does not assess the effects of time-invariant characteristics such 
as ethnicity. Second, the coefficients are less efficient due to larger standard errors because of 
the loss of the between-person information within fixed-effects logic. To circumvent both 
disadvantages, I apply the correlated random-effects models first proposed by (Mundlak 1978), 
which measure within effects in random-effects models by including a cluster means of level 1 
(time-variant) variables. Yet, I include cluster means only for variables, where the within and 
between effects are significantly different at 5% (cf. Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, 121). 
5.4 Findings 
Table 5.1 presents the mean distribution of key theoretical variables and measurements of 
integration by ethnicity, religion and generational status. The descriptive statistics of my 
dependent variable already addresses some theoretical expectations with respect to immigrants’ 
ethnic and religious group membership. The mean value of democracy satisfaction is 5.617 for 
Muslims, thus only slightly lower than for Christians (5.688) and secular immigrants (5.709). 
Yet, the mean scores mask interesting differences among the ethnic groups. As Figure 5.1 
reveals, democracy satisfaction is lower among Turkish Muslim immigrants compared to non-
Turkish Muslims with origins in West/East Europe or other non-EU countries: the respective 
values are 5.446 vs. 6.615 and 6.195.  In contrast, there are no considerable differences in 
democracy satisfaction between non-Muslim immigrants from Turkey and other countries, 
subsuming secular as well as Christian immigrants: the mean value for Turks is 5.866 in 
comparison to 5.607 for Western and Eastern Europeans and 5.819 for immigrants from other 
non-European countries. 
  
 
Chapter 5 
164 
Table 5.1. Distribution of main (intergration) indicators by religion, ethnicity, and immigrant generation 
  
Democracy 
satisfaction 
(0-10) 
German 
identifi-
cation        
(1-5) 
House-
hold 
income 
(log) 
Religious 
attendance   
"weekly" 
Work More  
than  
basic 
educ. 
Reading 
mostly 
German 
newspaper 
High   
pol.  
interest 
Discrimi-
nated 
against 
Visits 
from/ 
visiting  
Germa
ns 
Religious affiliation  % % % % % % % 
Christian         
mean 5.688 3.490 10.308 0.146 0.593 0.401 0.677 0.232 0.312 0.864 
sd 2.221 1.255 0.627 0.353 0.491 0.490 0.468 0.422 0.464 0.343 
Muslim         
mean 5.617 2.653 10.224 0.194 0.482 0.214 0.344 0.161 0.550 0.663 
sd 2.133 1.068 0.574 0.395 0.500 0.410 0.475 0.367 0.498 0.473 
No         
mean 5.709 3.354 10.326 0.022 0.632 0.531 0.687 0.292 0.405 0.854 
sd 2.293 1.205 0.727 0.147 0.483 0.500 0.464 0.455 0.491 0.354 
Ethnic background         
Turkey        
mean 5.544 2.683 10.225 0.208 0.480 0.188 0.318 0.151 0.566 0.648 
sd 2.161 1.110 0.548 0.406 0.500 0.391 0.466 0.359 0.496 0.478 
Western Europe        
mean 5.641 3.041 10.407 0.095 0.605 0.378 0.648 0.264 0.246 0.865 
sd 2.220 1.238 0.676 0.293 0.489 0.485 0.478 0.441 0.431 0.341 
Eastern Europe        
mean 5.600 4.109 10.323 0.177 0.630 0.591 0.837 0.246 0.359 0.909 
sd 2.236 1.074 0.592 0.382 0.483 0.492 0.370 0.431 0.480 0.287 
Other non-EU countries       
mean 5.884 3.456 10.188 0.106 0.565 0.386 0.615 0.213 0.421 0.826 
sd 2.191 1.172 0.634 0.308 0.496 0.487 0.487 0.410 0.494 0.379 
Generational status       
First generation        
mean 5.659 3.203 10.269 0.148 0.548 0.345 0.549 0.219 0.412 0.792 
sd 2.206 1.267 0.637 0.355 0.498 0.476 0.498 0.413 0.492 0.406 
Second generation        
mean 5.770 3.315 10.348 0.109 0.635 0.447 0.707 0.201 0.344 0.839 
sd 2.176 1.174 0.559 0.312 0.482 0.498 0.456 0.401 0.475 0.368 
Source: GSOEP 2005,  2010 (own calculations) 
   
 
5.866
5.446 5.607
6.615
5.819
6.195
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
de
m
oc
ra
cy
 sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n
Turkey West/East Europe Other non-European countries
Source: GSOEP 2005, 2010; own calculations
Mean democracy satisfaction by Muslim affiliation and ethnic background
Non-Muslim Muslim
Figure 5-1. Mean satisfaction with democracy in Germany by religious affiliation and ethnic 
background 
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Table 5.1 also indicates that Muslims’ integration patterns are as ‘low’ as that of the Turks, 
while Christians demonstrate higher levels of integration similar to the non-Turkish ethnic 
groups. Hence, for instance, Muslims in my sample demonstrate the lowest mean levels of 
German identification as Turks do (2.653 and 2.683 vs. 3.490 and 3.041 for Christians and 
Western Europeans). Moreover, Muslim persons and Turks are less likely to be employed as 
and are less likely to have more than basic education compared to other religious and ethnic 
groups (for education: 21.4% and 18.8% vs. 40.1% and 37.8% for Christians and Western 
Europeans). Also Muslim and Turkish immigrants show the strongest senses of discrimination 
(55% and 56%). Because many Turks are Muslims and many Western and Eastern Europeans 
are Christians, the question which is relevant here (and which will be answered in my further 
statistical analyses) is whether it is the ethnic origin of immigrants or their religion that 
determines democracy satisfaction4.  
In sum, my bivariate analyses provide a partial and preliminary indication that there is 
a difference in democracy satisfaction on the basis of a Muslim/non-Muslim affiliation as well 
as a Turkish or non-Turkish affiliation among immigrants. Yet, to scrutinise the links among 
religion, immigrant generation and ethnic group as well their ‘pure’ effects more precisely, I 
proceed with a multivariate analysis. 
I employ multivariate correlated random-effects models to assess the effects of social 
identity aspects and immigrants’ democracy satisfaction in Germany. As a first step, I estimate 
models (see Table 5.2) on the total immigrant sample to assess the partial effects of the religious 
identity aspects of religious belonging and social behaviour as well as that of other indicators. 
Thereby, Model 1 includes the social identity variables as well as the controls that may account 
for spurious correlations. Model 2 adds interactions between ethnicity and religious affiliation 
to test for possible group-specific effects of religious belonging. In Model 3, life satisfaction is 
included to account for the SIT argument that the religious identity aspects are linked to 
migrants’ democracy satisfaction through affecting personal well-being. In a second step, the 
relationship of interest is studied in separate analyses for Turkish as well as non-Turkish 
immigrants (see Table 5.3). 
  
                                               
4 While Western and Eastern Europeans are predominantly Christian (84%), about 85% of the Turks in my 
sample are Muslims and about 4% are Christians; about 21% of the immigrants from ex-Yugoslavia and other 
non-EU countries are Muslims and about 64% are Christians. 
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Table 5.2. Democracy Satisfaction of immigrants in Germany: correlated random-effects regression models 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Main theoretical variables       
Religious affiliation (ref. No affiliation)       
   Christian -0.160 (0.135) -0.030 (0.383) 0.038 (0.410) 
   Muslim 0.028 (0.163) -0.364 (0.266) -0.441+ (0.249) 
Religious service attendance (ref. Never)       
   less than monthly 0.291** (0.094) 0.318*** (0.094) 0.329*** (0.092) 
   monthly 0.502*** (0.121) 0.529*** (0.121) 0.510*** (0.117) 
   weekly 0.581*** (0.124) 0.576*** (0.123) 0.489*** (0.119) 
Second Generation 0.156 (0.138) 0.195 (0.136) 0.164 (0.133) 
German identification 0.103* (0.041) 0.090* (0.041) 0.047 (0.039) 
Ethnic background (ref. Turkey)       
   Western Europe 0.162 (0.180)     
   Eastern Europe -0.287 (0.199)     
   Other Non-EU countries 0.335* (0.156)     
Interactions       
Ethnic background (ref. Turkey)       
   West/East EU   -0.311 (0.323) -0.470 (0.306) 
     x Christian belonging   -0.094 (0.428) -0.120 (0.450) 
     x Muslim belonging   1.345** (0.452) 1.271** (0.426) 
   Other non-EU countries   0.017 (0.329) -0.128 (0.313) 
     x Christian belonging   -0.084 (0.437) -0.170 (0.459) 
     x Muslim belonging   0.741* (0.375) 0.849* (0.360) 
Mechanisms       
Has been discriminated -0.386*** (0.083) -0.403*** (0.083) -0.282*** (0.080) 
Life satisfaction     0.306*** (0.025) 
Controls       
Year of measurement 2010 0.076 (0.069) 0.062 (0.069) 0.003 (0.068) 
Female -0.055 (0.085) -0.063 (0.085) -0.104 (0.081) 
Age -0.053** (0.019) -0.051** (0.019) -0.023 (0.018) 
Age squared 0.001** (0.000) 0.001** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Married 0.113 (0.105) 0.094 (0.104) -0.023 (0.102) 
German nationality 0.002 (0.108) -0.106 (0.101) -0.088 (0.097) 
Years since arrival (First generation) -0.023*** (0.005) -0.020*** (0.005) -0.018*** (0.005) 
More than basic education 0.281** (0.097) 0.268** (0.097) 0.240** (0.093) 
Household income (log) 0.271*** (0.071) 0.299*** (0.072) 0.203** (0.068) 
Occupational status (ref. working)       
   non-working -0.065 (0.100) -0.071 (0.100) 0.035 (0.096) 
   retired -0.090 (0.211) -0.068 (0.212) 0.039 (0.203) 
   jobless -0.456** (0.150) -0.456** (0.150) -0.116 (0.146) 
Reading mostly/only German newspaper -0.171+ (0.089) -0.194* (0.089) -0.247** (0.086) 
Political interest (high) 0.102 (0.103) 0.118 (0.103) 0.059 (0.099) 
Identifies with country of origin -0.005 (0.044) 0.003 (0.044) -0.043 (0.043) 
Visits from/visiting Germans 0.179+ (0.105) 0.178+ (0.105) 0.087 (0.101) 
Constant 3.974*** (0.885) 3.906*** (0.903) 2.607** (0.867) 
Number of persons’ years 3294   3294   3294   
Number of persons 2344  2344  2344  
Within R2 0.010  0.009  0.050  
Between R2 0.079  0.087  0.143  
Overall R2 0.070  0.077  0.137  
Source: GSOEP 2005, 2010. Notes: Results are random-effects regression estimates (using STATA’s xtreg, re command) 
with cluster means as controls for covariates where within and between effects are significantly different at 5% level. 
Controlled for missing dummies for refusals. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors.   + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01,*** p<0.001  (two-tailed). 
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Model 1 in Table 5.2 reveals some interesting preliminary patterns in the control characteristics. 
As can be expected from theory, grievances in integration such as being unemployed and 
perceiving discrimination have a negative effect on migrants’ satisfaction with democracy in 
Germany. By contrast, integration indicators such as contacts with natives, higher educational 
levels and income are associated with positive regime evaluations. The length of residence in 
the receiving country negatively relates to first-generation immigrants’ satisfaction with the 
democratic regime, which might reflect the frustrated expectations of immigrants who moved 
voluntarily to another country with high expectations to do better (economically) in the 
destination country. 
In the following, the issues with respect to the main theoretical social and religious 
identity variables are highlighted. Model 1 shows an independent positive effect of migrants’ 
identification with the German receiving country. Hence, everything else equal, an increase in 
the sense of belonging to Germany can be found to increase immigrants’ satisfaction with 
democracy by 0.103 scale points (p<0.05).  There is some indication, though no final statistical 
proof, that second-generation immigrants are more satisfied than first-generation immigrants. 
Moving on to the influence of the ethnic group membership, interestingly, the coefficients 
reveal that being a migrant from other non-European countries (versus being a migrant with 
Turkish ancestry) is significantly related to democracy satisfaction. Thus, when keeping other 
variables in the model constant, immigrants from other non-European countries seem to be 
significantly more satisfied with democracy in Germany than their Turkish counterparts. 
In regard to the religious identity aspects, Model 1 confirms the theoretical expectations 
of a somewhat mixed picture for religious behaviour and religious affiliation: It shows that the 
frequency of religious service attendance, independent of other characteristics as well as 
immigrants’ religious affiliation, systematically increases immigrants’ democracy satisfaction. 
Put differently, all else being equal, immigrants who attend religious services more frequently 
evaluate the democratic regime more positively. In contrast, the results for the religious 
affiliations show that there are no significant differences across religion in terms of immigrants’ 
democracy satisfaction. Yet, in Model 1, the influence of religious belonging on support for 
democracy is constrained to be the same for Turks and immigrants from other origin countries. 
In theory, I hypothesised that religious affiliations’ impact on shaping personal experiences and 
democracy satisfaction can be expected to be a function of immigrants’ ethnic group 
membership. Moreover, previous descriptive patterns have already effectively indicated that 
there is an ethnic group dependent pattern of migrants’ satisfaction with democracy. 
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Thus, Model 2 adds interaction terms between immigrants’ country of origin as well as 
their Muslim and Christian religious affiliations. Because a cross-tabulation of ethnicity and 
religious affiliation (see Table A5.3) reveals that the number of cases in the cell for Muslim 
belonging and an Eastern or Western background is rather low, I combined these immigrant 
sources to provide more robust estimates in Model 2. The inclusion of the interactions does not 
change the findings for the effects of immigrant generation, national identification or religious 
social behaviour. Yet, there are two significant positive interaction terms for immigrants’ ethnic 
background in Western/Eastern Europe and other non-EU countries with a Muslim self-
identification (b=1.345, p<0.01; b=0.741, p<0.01). These results demonstrate that self-
identification as a Muslim among non-Turkish immigrants is associated with significantly 
higher levels of democracy satisfaction, while being a Muslim is negatively yet insignificantly 
related to democratic commitment among Turks (b=-0.364, p>0.10). In contrast to being 
Muslim, there are no significant ethnic-group differences for immigrants’ self-identification as 
Christian or as not being affiliated with any religious denomination. These results provide 
support that there are no commonly shared effects of Muslim belonging for immigrants across 
ethnic origins and show that they are unique to specific ethno-religious combinations.  
To account for the previous identity effects, Model 3 further includes an indicator for 
the potential mechanism of immigrants’ well-being. General life satisfaction, consistent with 
previous studies and theoretical considerations, has a considerable direct effect on migrants’ 
satisfaction with democracy (b=0.306, p<0.001) and also shows substantial mediation effects 
as a mediator and a suppressor through diminishing or increasing other effects. For instance, 
the inclusion of life satisfaction diminishes the effect of discrimination and completely erases 
the effects of age, unemployment, contacts with natives and national identification. The results 
in Table 5.3 thus suggest that national identification is not directly related to democracy 
satisfaction but through general happiness. Moreover, life satisfaction also accounts for the 
negative effect of Muslim-being for Turks in terms of a suppressor effect as its inclusion 
strengthens the interaction coefficient between Muslim belonging and Turkish group 
membership slightly to significance (b=-0.441, p<0.010). Such a mediation (suppression) effect 
appears when the direct effect of a variable as well as the indirect effect through the mediator 
have opposite signs. Accordingly, the correlation matrix in Table A5.4 reveals that being a 
Muslim-Turk is the only ethnic-religious combination that significantly and negatively relates 
to democracy satisfaction, while at the same time it positively correlates with life satisfaction, 
which itself is systematically associated with higher democracy satisfaction. In sum, general 
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well-being is an important factor to account for the impact of social identity aspects as would 
be suggested by SIT.  
To further the understanding of the interactions between religious and ethnic group 
membership among immigrants, Figure 5.2 illustrates the regression-based average predicted 
values of democracy satisfaction (Model 3). Figure 5.2 shows that while a Christian or non- 
religious affiliation predicts nearly the same average levels of democracy satisfaction among 
immigrants, a Muslim identification is associated either with lower or higher average values 
depending on migrants’ ethnic origin. While a Muslim affiliation is associated with higher and 
similar average values of democracy satisfaction for immigrants of non-Turkish ancestry, it is 
associated in the case of a Turkish origin with lower average values compared to a Christian 
affiliation or to no religious affiliation. At the same time, it applies that while there are no 
considerable differences in the predicted values in the case of a Christian affiliation or no 
religious affiliation between different ethnic origins, group differences between Turkish and 
non-Turkish immigrants appear for a Muslim affiliation. 
These findings suggest two main preliminary conclusions. First, the effect of religious 
belonging seems not to matter in terms of a primarily cultural difference between a Muslim and 
Christian affiliation but as a difference between a Muslim and non-Muslim affiliation (involving 
secular as well as Christian immigrants). Second, it seems that while the religious identity 
aspect of social behaviour has an independent positive effect on migrants’ positive evaluation 
of the democratic regime in Germany, religious belonging does not have any effect but varies 
according to immigrants’ Turkish or non-Turkish ethnic group membership. 
To give credit to the previous empirical findings, the difference in democracy 
satisfaction between a Muslim and non-Muslim affiliation as well as the other social identity 
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Figure 5-2. Predicted values of satisfaction with democracy in Germany by religious affiliation and ethnic 
background 
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aspects is analysed separately for Turkish and non-Turkish immigrants in Table 5.3. By 
breaking the immigrant populations down, I am able to assess different influences of different 
social identity variables on democracy satisfaction depending on migrants’ ethnic origin. Model 
1 provides the basic and additive model for each ethnic category, while Model 2 involves the 
interaction terms between Muslim affiliation as well as the other social identity variables of 
religious attendance, generational status and national identity for testing Hypotheses 3-5. 
Table 5.3. Democracy Satisfaction of Turkish and non-Turkish immigrants in Germany: Correlated 
random-effects regression models 
  Turkish (T)   Non-Turkish (NT) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Main theoretical 
variables         
Muslim affiliation (ref. 
Non-Muslim) -0.588** (0.203) 0.453 (0.619) 0.533** (0.169) -0.235 (0.479) 
Religious service 
attendance (ref. 
Never)         
   less than monthly 0.391* (0.168) 0.330 (0.484) 0.324** (0.104) 0.280** (0.108) 
   monthly 0.570** (0.213) 0.910 (0.835) 0.517*** (0.139) 0.472*** (0.143) 
   weekly 0.570** (0.194) 1.509** (0.471) 0.562*** (0.145) 0.539*** (0.149) 
Ethnic background 
(ref. Western Europe)         
Eastern Europe     -0.268 (0.169) -0.267 (0.170) 
Other non-EU 
countries     0.151 (0.138) 0.151 (0.139) 
Sec. generation 0.548* (0.267) 1.480*** (0.445) 0.109 (0.164) 0.075 (0.173) 
German identification 0.127 (0.079) 0.310+ (0.175) 0.051 (0.045) 0.038 (0.046) 
Mechanisms         
Has been 
discriminated -0.507*** (0.141) -0.510*** (0.142) -0.194* (0.098) -0.192+ (0.098) 
Life satisfaction 0.391*** (0.046) 0.385*** (0.045) 0.281*** (0.029) 0.281*** (0.029) 
Interactions         
Muslim x sec. 
generation   -1.135* (0.446)   0.346 (0.403) 
Muslim x attendance: 
less than monthly   0.055 (0.509)   0.637 (0.398) 
Muslim x attendance: 
monthly   -0.360 (0.867)   0.693 (0.491) 
Muslim x attendance: 
weekly   -1.008* (0.492)   0.199 (0.497) 
Muslim x German 
identification   -0.195 (0.181)   0.178 (0.148) 
Controls5   (…)    (…)  
Number of persons’ 
years 902   902   2392   2392   
Number of persons 646  646  1698  1698  
Within R2 0.146  0.137  0.067  0.076  
Between R2 0.252  0.268  0.145  0.145  
Overall R2 0.229  0.239  0.142  0.144  
                                               
5 Controls are the same as in Table 5.2. For reasons of parsimony, they are excluded here but can be found in 
Table A5.5. 
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Source: GSOEP 2005, 2010. Notes: Results are random effects regression estimates (using STATA’s xtreg, re command) with 
cluster means as controls for covariates where within and between effects are significantly different at 5% level. Controlled for 
missing dummies for refusals. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors.   + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,*** p<0.001  
(two-tailed). 
 
In line with previous findings, the base line models (M1-T and M1-NT) for both samples 
of immigrants yield nearly the same strong and consistent positive impact of religious service 
attendance on democracy satisfaction regardless of Muslim affiliation and other characteristics. 
Thus, Hypothesis 1 on the general positive effect of religious identity behaviour finds support. 
It may now seem unsurprising that, in line with the interaction effects in Table 5.2, M1-T and 
M1-NT confirm that a Muslim self-identification (versus a Christian affiliation or no affiliation) 
is positively associated with democracy satisfaction among non-Turkish immigrants while it 
negatively relates to democratic engagement among Turkish immigrants. In sum, the previous 
findings lend support to Hypothesis 6 on the ethnic group-specific effect of being a Muslim in 
Germany, while they disconfirm a general effect of religious affiliation as has been formulated 
in Hypothesis 2.  
In a subsequent step, I assess how the group-specific Muslim identity effects are 
moderated by further social identity experiences relating to immigrants’ religious identity 
behaviour, their ascribed generational belonging and their identification with German (cf. 
Hypotheses 3-5). First of all, Table 5.3 only reveals significant interaction terms among Turkish 
immigrants. Hence, ceteris paribus, the positive effects of Muslim belonging and religious 
social behaviour are the same for non-Turkish immigrants who are foreign- or native-born as 
well as for all levels of psychological attachment to the receiving society. I also cannot find any 
positive interaction effect when including the interaction terms stepwise (not presented here). 
An additional test for variation of the impact of Muslim affiliation between non-European and 
European origins also shows that the positive effect of Muslim affiliation does not differ within 
the non-Turkish sample (interaction coef. b= -0.505; p= 0.150 (not shown in Table 5.3)). Model 
2 (NT) also cannot find evidence that immigrant generation as well as national identification 
play a significant role for non-Turkish immigrants’ psychological commitment to the 
democratic system in Germany. 
 In contrast to the non-Turkish sample, Model 2 (T) suggests that the negative difference 
between a Muslim and non-Muslim self-identification on Turkish immigrants’ regime 
evaluation is dependent on different intensities of their religious social behaviour as well as 
generational belonging (expect for national belonging). By including the interaction effects in 
Model 2 (T), the main effect of Muslim affiliation becomes insignificant. Thus, the effect of 
Muslim self-identification for Turks seems due to the specific combinations with levels of 
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generational affiliation and social religious practice. More specifically, I hypothesised that the 
effect of religious belonging is positively moderated by social religious behaviour in the way 
that the negative Muslim difference should be lower for higher levels of positive religious 
identity expression within the social environment of worship or religious events (cf. Hypothesis 
3). An illustration of the significant interaction in Model 2 (T) is given in Figure 5.3 and Figure 
5.4.   
 
Contrary to theoretical expectations, it turns out that all levels of religious attendance in 
reference to no attendance increase instead of decrease the negative difference between a 
Muslim and a non-Muslim affiliation. Yet, Figure 5.3 illustrates that the negative difference is 
only significant larger for a ‘weekly’ attendance of mosques and religious services. The large 
confidence intervals among Turkish immigrants who attend worship ‘at least monthly’ may be 
a result of a small number of observations in this category. Along the same lines, Figure 5.4 
shows that the positive returns on democracy satisfaction due to differences between 
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Figure 5-4. Average marginal effects of Muslim affiliation at different values of religious service attendance 
Figure 5-3. Predicted values of satisfaction with democracy in Germany by Muslim affiliation and 
frequency of religious service attendance 
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frequencies of church attendance from ‘less than monthly’ to ‘weekly’ are lower or even absent 
in the case of a Muslim identity6. A separate analysis of the interactions between Muslim 
belonging and generational status as well as church attendance reveals that the interaction with 
the latter is actually dependent on the inclusion of the former interaction (not presented here). 
Hence, the significant difference between Muslim and non-Muslim affiliation in the case of a 
weekly attendance is a matter of taking the difference between generations into account.  
For generational belonging, the negative interaction coefficient in Model 2 (T) between 
immigrant second generation and Muslim affiliation (b=-1.135, p<0.05) proves to be in line 
with Hypothesis 4, which assesses that the negative difference between Muslim and non-
Muslim belonging on democracy satisfaction is larger for German-born (with at least one 
foreign-born parent) than for foreign-born (first-generation) immigrants of Turkish ancestry. 
As the main effect of Muslim affiliation (for first-generation Turks) is not significant, even if 
the other interactions are not included (not presented here), the negative influence of being 
Muslim compared to being a Christian or not religious seems to be limited to second-generation 
Turks. This finding is also depicted in Figure 5.5 (based on M2-T) as both regression lines 
indicate a negative difference between a Muslim and non-Muslim affiliation, yet the line of 
first-generation Turks is much flatter.  
 
                                               
6 I recalculated the interaction model by recoding the factor variable of church attendance as a quasi continuous 
variable, as the frequency of attendance could be recalculated in days. These results yield a significant 
negative interaction term (-0.317, P<0.10) (not shown in Model 2 (T)) and also suggest a steady increase of 
the negative gap between a Muslim and non-Muslim affiliation on democracy satisfaction due to increasing 
levels of religious practice. 
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Figure 5-5. Predicted values of satisfaction with democracy in Germany by Muslim affiliation and 
generational status 
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At the same time, the significant main effect of generational status (b= 1.480, p<0.05) 
in Model 2 (T) suggests that second-generation Turks do have significantly higher levels of 
democracy satisfaction than first-generation Turks if they identify as Christian or are not 
religious compared to if they identify as Muslim (the difference is b=-1.135, p<0.05).  
 Finally, I do not find confirmation within the analysis for Turkish immigrants that the 
impact of a Muslim affiliation on democracy satisfaction is moderated by national identification 
(cf. Hypothesis 5). Yet, the inclusion of variation between Muslim and non-Muslim affiliation 
due to generational belonging and different intensities of religious social behaviour uncovers a 
slight significant independent effect of German identification on democratic commitment in 
Model 2 (T), holding other factors constant. Put differently, an increase in Turks’ perception of 
membership in the national group by one scale point is associated with an increase of 0.3 scale 
points  (p<0.10) in satisfaction with democracy in Germany7.  
For the last step, in reference to SIT’s theoretical mechanisms indicated by perceived 
discrimination and life satisfaction, Table 5.3 on ethnic group-specific analyses depicts, similar 
to Table 5.2, significant negative and positive effects, respectively, on Turkish as well as non-
Turkish immigrants’ satisfaction with the democratic regime. Yet, the negative effect of 
discrimination is considerably stronger for Turkish immigrants than it is for non-Turkish 
immigrants as might be expected from the literature review within the theoretical part.  
 In sum, the random effects regression models in Table 5.3 reveal interesting and 
complex influences of religious identity aspects on immigrants’ psychological support for the 
democratic regime in Germany. The longitudinal analyses support the empirical distinction 
between religious belonging and religious social behaviour as different parts of immigrants’ 
religious identity, which may affect the subjective evaluation of democratic governance 
differently. While religious social behaviour independently fosters immigrants’ satisfaction 
with the democratic regime in Germany, the variation between a Muslim and a non-Muslim 
affiliation is dependent on migrants’ ethnic group affiliation. In addition, the effect is positive 
for immigrants with a non-Turkish European background as well as those from non-European 
countries, but the effect is negative for immigrants with a background in Turkey. Within the 
group of immigrants of Turkish ancestry, my analyses highlight that the negative Muslim effect 
is dependent on and specific to certain levels of other social identities. Hence, the negative 
                                               
7 For a robustness check, Model 2 (T) has been recalculated by including German identification as categorical 
variable with ‘not at all’ as reference category. The results concerning the interaction do not change. With 
respect to the independent effect of national identification, only the midpoint category ‘mostly’ of the identity 
scale does not significantly increase democracy satisfaction. However, this might be due to larger confidence 
intervals and small case numbers. 
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effect is found to be specific to an affiliation with the second generation (i.e. being German 
born) as well as to be associated with higher intensities of religious social behaviour (i.e. 
‘weekly’ church attendance).  
5.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to shed light on the relationship between immigrants’ religious 
identity and support for democracy in Western receiving countries, which is currently contested 
in public and scientific debates. There are serious doubts that the religious beliefs of the 
increasing Muslim immigrant population are compatible with the key principles of democratic 
governance in Western Europe. To respond to these debates, I attempted to achieve a more 
nuanced understanding about the impact of immigrants’ religion on satisfaction with 
democracy, which is an important yet understudied indicator for immigrants’ psychological 
affiliation to the political system of European receiving societies.  
Building on theoretical arguments of the social identity literature, I sought to go beyond 
primarily cultural and essentialist perspectives and defined the impact of religious affiliation. 
Firstly, I differentiated between belonging and social behaviour aspects of migrants’ religious 
identity. Secondly, I defined the impact of religious identity in interaction with other social 
group belongings with respect to immigrant generation, ethnic origin and the receiving society. 
Within this framework, I stressed that immigrants’ social identities provide different social 
experiences that are crucially linked with their personal experiences, benefits, well-being and 
their evaluation of the democratic national government as responsiveness and legitimate to their 
needs. Hypotheses were formulated and subsequently tested with panel models that allowed for 
the testing of time-variant effects such as religious or national identity as well as time-invariant 
variables such as ethnic origin and generational status. The hypotheses were tested on a sample 
of more than 2,500 immigrants from the German Socio-Economic Panel from 2005 and 2010. 
Three major conclusions can be drawn from this study.  
First, while religious social behaviour (e.g. going to a mosque) has a general positive 
effect on immigrants’ psychological regime commitment, the effect of (self-described) 
belonging to a religion (e.g. Islam) varies among different ethnic origins. Consistent with the 
theoretical expectations, a key finding of my paper is that it is neither religious belonging per 
se, nor the sole difference between a Muslim and Christian affiliation but an ethnic group-
specific effect of being Muslim that drives immigrants’ levels of democracy satisfaction. Being 
Muslim in Germany has a positive effect among non-Turkish immigrants from Western and 
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Eastern Europe as well as from other non-European countries. These countries, involving 
nations in Southeast Europe, Near/Middle East, North Africa, and South/Central Asia North, 
are known to provide the main sources of the foreign Muslim population in Germany besides 
Turkey (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2009). In contrast, a Muslim affiliation (versus a Christian 
affiliation or no religious affiliation) has a negative impact among respondents with a Turkish 
migration background. Hence, immigrant religion is not per se a burden as suggested by 
literature (Foner and Alba 2008) that needs to be left behind by all immigrants in the process of 
intergenerational integration regardless of immigrants’ specific ethnic origin. In other words, 
being Muslim – as an identity category – is not disruptive to the support of democratic 
governance. Rather, the effect of Muslim belonging may be driven by mechanisms that relate 
to specific social experiences of this category membership by immigrants’ immutable, ascribed 
categorisation in terms of their ethnic origin.  
Second, in Germany there are pronounced ethnic group differences in terms of 
economic success, social distances and experiences of discrimination, often in particular to the 
detriment of Turkish immigrants. Thus, my analyses demonstrate that the negative Muslim 
identity effect for Turks seems to be specific to social identity experiences that relate to a high 
religious identity performance (i.e. the attendance of religious meetings more often on a weekly 
basis) as well as to the belonging to the second immigrant generation (i.e. to be born in the 
receiving country). Turkish immigrants’ self-perception and social self-concept are shaped by 
their experience of belonging to a minority religion that is distinct and less accepted by the 
Christian majority as well as associated with larger integration disadvantages. Existing research 
indeed shows that second-generation Muslim immigrants in Europe report higher levels of 
perceived discrimination than foreign-born Muslims do (cf. Voas and Fleischmann 2012, 536). 
An intensified (‘weekly’) form of social experiences within mosques or other religious events 
that involve the sharing of common grievances due to their religion as well as (alternative) foci 
due to religion such as the prioritisation of godly matters above world affairs may strengthen 
the negative impact of Turks’ Muslim identity on estrangement processes from the democratic 
political system of European receiving societies. My research otherwise reveals that the second 
generation (versus first generation) as well as the weekly attendance of religious services 
(versus never) are associated with higher democracy satisfaction among Turks in the case of 
being a member of the majority religion and in the case of having no religious affiliation.   
Third, my longitudinal analysis reveals that subjective perceptions of well-being (life 
satisfactions) as well as discrimination, which relate to social identity experiences, are driving 
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or hampering forces, respectively, for Turkish and non-Turkish immigrants’ satisfaction with 
democracy. 
Even though the current study has effectively provided new information on the 
relationship between immigrants’ religious belonging and political regime support, it is not 
without limitations that, in turn, could pose as ideas for further research. First of all, by focusing 
on democracy satisfaction, my study captures only one aspect of immigrants’ psychological 
commitment towards the democratic regime in Germany. There are reasons to expect that theory 
as well as results may differ for migrants’ support of specific regime values and principles. 
Consequently, it would require more encompassing datasets with different indicators of 
psychological democracy support to assess this assumption. Second, as already mentioned, 
testing theoretical hypotheses about the ethnic group specificity of the religious identity effect 
may require datasets with much larger subsamples of ethnic groups than those applied in the 
present study (e.g. concerning the immigrant groups in the broad category of ‘other non-
European ethnicities’). Third, even though personal well-being as well as perceived 
discrimination are found to be decisive mechanisms that may link religious identity and 
immigrants’ democracy satisfaction, there might be other mediating mechanisms at work that 
could not be observed within my study. Thus, it would be interesting to assess the impact of 
content-related aspects of religious group memberships such as orthodox religious viewpoints 
(e.g. to implement Islamic law or to defend Islam) on democracy satisfaction in contrast to non-
essentialist mechanisms. In a similar vein, social identity research highlights that a social 
identity involves multiple dimensions of importance, regard, emotional attachment and, 
eventually, meaning (Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). Accordingly, a recent 
study on Sunni and Alevi Muslims from Turkey living in German could show that even though 
both groups present low levels of political tolerance, individual higher levels of emotional 
attachment to Islam foster higher political tolerance (Verkuyten et al. 2014). Concerning the 
effect of second-generational belonging on Turks’ democracy satisfaction, it must be noted that 
my analysis only involves that part of the actual population that is older than 17 and does not 
hold German citizenship since birth. Finally, the panel models applied for the empirical analysis 
may be advantageous for causal inferences in comparison to cross-sectional studies, but they 
do not rule out reverse causality. Yet, in the case of my study, I propose that it is more difficult 
to imagine that immigrants with high democracy satisfaction become more religiously active in 
Germany or should identify less with their religious group. Moreover, in the case of ethnicity 
and generational status, the question of reverse causality is also less of a problem.  
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Thus, in sum and despite certain limitations, my study places emphasis on two main 
issues when studying the relation of religion to immigrants’ psychological commitment with 
democracy in European receiving societies. First, immigrants’ commitment to democracy can 
theoretically be understood from another non-essentialist social identity perspective. Second, 
our knowledge needs to extend beyond religious belonging to understand the effect of religion 
on migrants’ subjective evaluation of democracy satisfaction. More specifically, we may need 
to consider immigrants’ religious social behaviour as well as their ethnic background and 
generational belonging.   
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5.7 Appendix 
Table A 5.1. Sample characteristics: Country-of-origin groupings from GSOEP Data 2005, 2010 
Country Grouping Label 
Countries Countries Included in Group Number of Cases 
West Europe 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,  Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and United 
Kingdom 1,086 
East Europe 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, Romania 553 
Turkey Turkey 1,033 
Other non-EU countries 
Iran, Israel, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Algeria, Ghana, 
Bangladesh, Tunisia, Nigeria, Iraq, Morocco, 
Kazakhstan, Albania, Kyrgyzstan, Mozambique, Egypt, 
Tajikistan, Somalia, Pakistan, South Africa, Eritrea, 
Jordan, Uzbekistan, Namibia, Croatia, Bosnia, 
Macedonia, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Albania, Georgia, 
Yemen, Palestine, Turkmenistan, Serbia, Former 
Yugoslavia, Russia, Ukraine, Lebanon 
1,052 
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Table A 5.2. Descriptive sample statistics 
Variables mean sd 
observa-
tions min max 
%Missing 
due 
to"refusal" 
%Missing 
due to "non-
collection" 
Satisfaction with democracy 5.678 2.201 3570 0 10 3.41  
Years since immigration 26.170 11.417 3583 0 80 3.06  
Second-generation immigrant 0.170 0.375 3696 0 1   
Turkey 0.277 0.448 3696 0 1   
Western Europe 0.292 0.455 3696 0 1   
Eastern Europe 0.148 0.355 3696 0 1   
Other non-EU countries 0.283 0.451 3696 0 1   
Christian affiliation 0.575 0.494 3558 0 1  3.73 
Muslim affiliation 0.297 0.457 3558 0 1  3.73 
No religious affiliation 0.128 0.334 3558 0 1  3.73 
Female 0.515 0.500 3696 0 1   
German nationality 0.367 0.482 3696 0 1   
Age 44.766 15.608 3696 18 96   
Married 0.695 0.460 3696 0 1   
Church attendance: never 0.440 0.497 3671 0 1 0.68  
Church attendance: less than 
monthly 0.291 0.454 3671 0 1 0.68  
Church attendance: monthly 0.127 0.333 3671 0 1 0.68  
Church attendance: weekly 0.141 0.348 3671 0 1 0.68  
German Identification 3.221 1.253 3555 1 5 0.70 3.11 
Country of origin Identification 3.354 1.104 3561 1 5 0.54 3.11 
Household income (log) 10.282 0.625 3693 4 15 0.08  
Other non-working 0.241 0.428 3696 0 1   
Retired 0.105 0.307 3696 0 1   
Jobless 0.091 0.288 3696 0 1   
Working 0.563 0.496 3696 0 1   
More than basic education 0.362 0.481 3469 0 1 6.14   
Reading mostly German newspaper 0.576 0.494 3652 0 1 1.16 0.03 
High political interest 0.216 0.411 3659 0 1 1.00  
Has been discriminated 0.400 0.490 3665 0 1 0.84  
Visits from/visiting Germans 0.800 0.400 3581 0 1 0.60 2.52 
Happiness 6.858 1.859 3680 0 10 0.43   
Source: GSOEP 2005,  2010 (own calculations) 
 
Table A 5.3. Crosstabulation of religious affiliation by ethnic background 
  Ethnic background   
Religious belonging Turkey West Europe East Europe Other non-EU Total 
Christian 38 873 426 613 1,95 
Muslim 810 19 8 203 1,04 
No religion 94 135 70 137 436 
Total 942 1,027 504 953 3,426 
Source: GSOEP 2005,  2010 (own calculations) 
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Table A 5.4. Bivariate correlations between main theoretical variables 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 
Democracy 
satisfaction 1       
2 Life satisfaction 0.303*** 1      
3 Muslim-Turk -0.0653*** 0.0472** 1     
4 Muslim-West EU 0.0322 0.0134 -0.00522 1    
5 Muslim-East EU 0.0298 0.0758*** 0.107***  0.133*** 1   
6 Muslim-non-EU 0.00656 0.0510** -0.268***  -0.144*** 0.128*** 1  
7 
German 
identification 0.0670*** 0.119*** 0.0657*** 0.329*** 0.0694*** 0.113*** 1 
Source: GSOEP 2005, 2010 (own calculations). Note: * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
    
Table A 5.5. Table 5.3 continued 
  Turkish (T)   Non-Turkish (NT) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Controls        
Year of measurement 
2010 -0.444** (0.136) -0.457*** (0.136) 0.127 (0.079) 0.136+ (0.079) 
Female 0.103 (0.154) 0.124 (0.154) -0.131 (0.097) -0.132 (0.097) 
Age -0.036 (0.046) -0.038 (0.046) -0.012 (0.020) -0.011 (0.020) 
Age squared 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Married -2.027*** (0.492) -2.083*** (0.519) 0.040 (0.117) 0.046 (0.117) 
German nationality 0.306+ (0.169) 0.252 (0.168) 0.956** (0.361) 0.945** (0.364) 
Years since arrival (First 
generation) -0.020+ (0.011) -0.018 (0.011) -0.025*** (0.006) -0.025*** (0.006) 
More than basic 
education 0.065 (0.193) 0.100 (0.195) 0.307** (0.106) 0.308** (0.106) 
Household income (log) 0.179 (0.137) 0.173 (0.138) 0.195* (0.078) 0.192* (0.078) 
Occupational status (ref. 
working)         
   Non-working -0.087 (0.166) -0.120 (0.167) 0.040 (0.116) 0.045 (0.116) 
   retired -0.606 (0.433) -0.613 (0.430) 0.149 (0.220) 0.146 (0.220) 
   jobless 0.208 (0.251) 0.195 (0.250) -0.326+ (0.182) -0.331+ (0.182) 
Reading mostly/only 
German newspaper 0.155 (0.171) 0.167 (0.173) -0.298** (0.099) -0.306** (0.099) 
Political interest (high) -0.589** (0.223) -0.613** (0.224) 0.201+ (0.108) 0.196+ (0.108) 
Identifies with country of 
origin -0.092 (0.083) -0.075 (0.082) -0.054 (0.051) -0.058 (0.051) 
Visits from/visiting 
Germans 0.244 (0.156) 0.266+ (0.157) 0.057 (0.134) 0.030 (0.133) 
Constant 2.038 (1.761) 1.204 (1.847) 2.379* (0.969) 2.508** (0.971) 
Number of persons’ 
years 902   902   2392   2392   
Number of persons 646  646  1698  1698  
Within R2 0.146  0.137  0.067  0.076  
Between R2 0.252  0.268  0.145  0.145  
Overall R2 0.229  0.239  0.142  0.144  
Source: GSOEP 2005, 2010. Notes: Results are random-effects regression estimates (using STATA’s xtreg, re command) with 
cluster means as controls for covariates where within and between effects are significantly different at 5% level. Controlled for 
missing dummies for refusals. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors.   + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,*** p<0.001  
(two-tailed) 
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Chapter 6: Summary, Discussion, and Outlook 
6.1 Introduction 
Social identity, which reflects membership in various social groups and categories such as 
gender, nationality, and ethnicity, builds besides the personal identity as a unique person a 
central part of an individual’s self-concept and his/her positive self-feelings (Tajfel and Turner 
1986). Put differently, social identities such as in the form of ethnicity or religion provide 
meaningful self-references through which (migrant) individuals perceive themselves as well as 
the environment and others around them. Social identities are thus perceived as guiding 
principles of an individual’s cognitions, emotions, and behaviour, specifically in intergroup 
situations such as in the context of multiculturalism and immigration within current Western 
European societies. Against this background, the purpose of the present doctoral thesis has been 
to scrutinise the role of immigrants’ senses of belonging to the ethnic or religious minority 
group and/or the (ethnic) national majority group of the receiving country for their attitudinal 
integration into politics in Germany, which is a current focus of heated public and scientific 
discussions. Psychological group loyalties to the origin country or the religious minority group 
(i.e. Islam) are commonly perceived as barriers to migrants’ psychological integration into the 
democratic political systems of historically Christian European countries. In contrast, loyalty 
to the national majority group is conceived as a psychological bridge that includes immigrants 
as psychologically involved (e.g. interested, competent, and knowledgeable) political actors in 
the host-society political systems as well as instilling in them positive attitudes towards (i.e. 
trust in and satisfaction with) the democratic institutions, governance, regime, and so forth. 
Within four empirical chapters, the present thesis tries to shed light on the relationship between 
the subdimensions of migrants’ social identity (i.e. national, religious, and ethnic identity) and 
political integration at the attitudinal level in terms of internal political interest and external 
satisfaction with the democratic regime. A special focus has been on the role of national identity, 
on the one hand as its own explanandum and political attitude towards the national political 
community, and on the other hand as a source in addition and combination with ethnic and 
religious identity for migrants’ interest in national (i.e. German) politics as well as satisfaction 
with democracy in Germany. In this final chapter, I summarise the important conclusions of my 
doctoral research and discuss their implications. Moreover, I also indicate current limitations of 
my work and formulate suggestions for future research. 
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6.2 Conclusions 
6.2.1 National identification 
Chapter 2 of this doctoral thesis focussed on the trajectories of migrants’ identificational 
assimilation, identification with the national political community, and its determinants. To make 
a fundamental contribution to the literature, it examined the classic assimilation theory (Gordon 
1964) and approaches on the nature of ethnic boundaries (e.g. Alba 2005) in the context of 
recent immigrants from Poland and Turkey in Germany. More specifically, it has discussed the 
effect of command of the majority language (i.e. cultural assimilation), bridging social contacts 
and networks (i.e. social assimilation), as well as salient ethnic boundaries—reflected in 
perceived discrimination and value incompatibilities between the home and the receiving 
culture—on the development of migrants’ sense of belonging to the German host society over 
the first three years. 
The longitudinal regression results on the two-wave-panel study SCIP seem to support 
both the classic assimilation theory (Gordon 1964) and approaches on the nature of ethnic 
boundaries (e.g. Alba 2005). The random-effects regression models showed that while effects 
of social assimilation and discrimination on national identity are not considerably dissimilar for 
newcomers from Poland or Turkey (even though the negative impact of discrimination is 
stronger for Turks), the identity trajectories indeed start out from very different conditions: 
while both groups show similar patterns of language assimilation, only Poles seem to assimilate 
socially, while the process stagnates for recently arrived Turks. Moreover, the groups differ in 
their perceptions of discrimination. Thus, only new Turks experience a pronounced increase in 
discrimination against their ethnic group. These differences in the conditions with respect to 
social assimilation and discrimination were shown partly to explain the emergent dissimilar 
identity trajectories of recently immigrated Turks and Poles: While for Turks it is indicated by 
an initial increase, and subsequent decline, for Poles national identity is characterised only by 
a steady increase of German identification, even though they first start out with lower levels of 
national attachment right after immigration than Turks do. 
Even though the study can only draw a preliminary picture of identificational 
assimilation trajectories of recently arrived immigrants in Germany, it underlines the 
importance of social assimilation and discriminatory processes for migrants to become 
emotionally committed to the German majority group similar to that shown in studies by de 
Vroome et al. (2014) or Schulz and Leszczensky (2016). However, in addition to this and 
previous research, the present study of this doctoral thesis puts emphasis on the relevance to 
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decompose (identificational) assimilation processes of immigrants not only in the study of 
effects of the conditions under which migrants become emotionally committed to the 
mainstream society but also in the study of the conditions themselves and respective differences 
between various immigrant groups to adopt the conditions. 
6.2.2 Interest in politics in Germany 
In Chapters 3 and 4 of this doctoral thesis, I focused on the relationship between migrants’ 
national and ethnic identity and their inclination to become interested in German politics. To 
provide clear and well-founded explanations, the relationship was scrutinised from different 
theoretical perspectives, involving the classic social identity theory (SIT) (e.g. Tajfel and Turner 
1986), as well as grievance-based social movement approaches (e.g. Simon and Klandermans 
2001), or the classic civic voluntarism model (CVM) of political participation (e.g. Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995). I came to the view that the frameworks have intersections, so 
they should not be treated as entirely separate (see theory in Chapter 1). The basic idea is that 
national and ethnic identity may affect interest in national politics because politics provides 
means and processes to satisfy the basic need driven by social identification to establish and 
reinforce a positive social identity within an intergroup context, and in consequence to achieve 
a positive self-image. Both frameworks suggest that national and ethnic identity may therefore 
affect interest in national politics among immigrants through two independent but related social 
identity processes, conditional on if intergroup comparisons are favourable or unfavourable. 
Thus, in the case of national identity, which involves favourable comparisons with other groups 
within the receiving societies on various dimensions such as status and power, the motive to 
preserve a positive social identity relates to depersonalisation, assimilation, as well as in-group 
biasing mechanisms that affect three concepts of migrants’ political interest: migrants’ attention 
to national politics, involving national authorities, politicians, parties, issues, movements, and 
groups, and so forth, (i.e. political attentiveness), their concern about national politics (i.e. 
political importance), as well as their motivation to contribute to national public outcomes (i.e. 
political motivation). I widened the focus by proposing that processes of language and social 
assimilation that positively relate to the motive of reinforcing a positive national identity, as 
well as at the same time according to CVM to political attentiveness, saliency, and motivation, 
mediate the national identity effect on migrant’s interest in mainstream politics. 
In contrast, in the case of ethnic identity, social comparisons are inclined to be 
unfavourable in the reception context with respect to status and power, which leads to the 
existence of salient intergroup boundaries to seek the reestablishment of a positive ethnic 
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identity through collective actions that may change the relative position of the ethnic in-group 
in the status hierarchy. The basic idea is then that minority group members’ ethnic identity may 
relate to interest in politics within the reception country to the extent to which they are subject 
to discrimination and salient ethnic boundaries. However, the link to politics may rather imply 
ethnic group/homeland-based and contentious politics, involving ethnic group/homeland-based 
authorities, politicians, parties, issues, movements, and groups, and so forth. Further 
considering the empirical reality and bi-dimensional models of acculturation (e.g. Berry 1997), 
in which self-definitions are characterised by varying levels of both ethnic and national 
identification, I further posited in line with the politicised collective identity model (PCI) (e.g. 
Simon and Klandermans 2001) that in the case of a devalued ethnic identity, an additional 
identification with the national majority group makes cognitive engagement even more likely 
because it increases the likelihood of success for ethnic group claims. 
Accordingly, the hybrid random-effects analyses of two empirical longitudinal data 
sources in Germany (SCIP and GSOEP) in Chapters 2 and 3 showed that while by analysing 
interest that is specific to German politics, ethnic identification negatively relates to political 
interest among recent immigrants from Poland and Turkey (SCIP), it positively relates under 
the condition of perceived discrimination and the form of dual identity to general political 
interest in Germany of long-term labour immigrants (GSOEP; 1993–2006). National 
identification, instead, provides in both cases (interest that relates specifically to German 
politics, as well as general political interest) a single measure or in the form of dual identity, 
respectively, a significant determinant. Those findings lend support to previous results in the 
literature that national identity positively predicts political interest among immigrants in 
European countries (Diehl and Urbahn 1998; Eggert and Giugni 2010). Further, my study 
validates the usefulness of dual identity not only for the prediction of collective action 
(intentions) (e.g. Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008; Simon and Grabow 
2010; Simon and Ruhs 2008) but also for more conventional political attitudes such as general 
political interest. Moreover, the analyses in Chapter 3 depicted that the effect of national identity 
on interest in national politics may be indeed mediated for newcomers from Turkey in Germany 
by host-country language proficiency, as well as gaining informal and formal (i.e. 
organisational) contacts to Germans. However, according to the regression results, there seems 
also to be a drawback related to organisational membership among Turkish immigrants: thus, 
interethnic social contacts in associations may lead to experiences of discrimination, which 
undermine the positive effect of national identification. 
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All of this leads me to conclude that national identification may act as a psychological 
bridge to involve migrants in the political system of European receiving countries in terms of 
internal political attitudes that address the self-image s/he develops about her/his place and role 
in the political system. This not only applies in terms of a single national identity but also in 
terms of a combined dual identity, which additionally involves the minority ethnic identity. 
However, at the same time it applies that also an ethnic identity may not per se indicate a barrier 
to migrants’ interest in politics within receiving countries, but may also act as a bridge in the 
case of dual identity. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the effects are simple and 
the same for different immigrant groups. Thus, my research reveals that the positive effect of 
German identity on German politics is moderated and mediated group-specifically. Moreover, 
the impact of dual identity on general political interest is dependent on perceived discrimination 
and seems to be stronger for Turkish immigrants. 
6.2.3 Satisfaction with democracy in Germany 
In Chapter 5 of this doctoral thesis, I focused on the relationship between migrants’ religious 
(i.e. Muslim versus Christian) identity and their political attitude towards the political system 
of Germany in terms of satisfaction with the democratic regime. I contributed to the literature 
by moving beyond primarily essentialist positions on alleged conflictive cultural values of Islam 
(e.g. Huntington 1996) by explaining the impact of religious identity by a social psychological 
identity perspective (e.g. Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2007; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner 
et al. 1987; Verkuyten 2007). Accordingly, I have argued that the religious identity effect relates 
to the social and thereby personal (well-being) experience that the membership in a religious 
community provides for the individual immigrant within the receiving society context, which 
has an impact on how responsively s/he perceived a democratic regime. I therefore further 
perceived religious identity as a multidimensional concept, involving religious self-
categorisation as well as religious social behaviour. This differentiation yielded different 
predictions concerning the effect of religious identity. On the one hand, through positive in-
group references as well as democratic socialisation mechanisms following from social capital 
literature (e.g. Putnam 2000), I suggested positive effects of religious service attendance on 
migrants’ democracy satisfaction regardless of denominational belonging. On the other hand, I 
argued that immigrants’ self-categorisation as a member of a religious category relates to 
intergroup experiences (e.g. of discrimination) that alienate immigrant Muslim self-identifiers 
more strongly from the political regime than Christian self-identifiers. Within the social identity 
perspective of multiple group memberships that individuals possess, I further proposed that the 
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negative Muslim membership effect may be dependent on immigrants’ belonging to the second 
generation, as well as ethnically belonging to the Turkish group. 
The longitudinal analyses (i.e. correlated random-effects models) on data of two waves 
of GSOEP (2005, 2010) confirmed as anticipated that the expressive component of religious 
identity (i.e. religious service attendance) indeed relates positively to EU- as well as non-EU-
migrants’ satisfaction with the democratic regime in Germany regardless of denomination, 
ethnic origin, immigrant generation or other factors. In contrast, the effect of religious self-
categorisation as Muslim is more complex and is conditional on migrants’ ethnic origin. Thus, 
only for immigrants of Turkish origin does Muslim self-identification significantly predict 
democracy satisfaction negatively, while there is a positive effect for all non-Turkish 
immigrants, independently of whether they have their ethnic origin within an EU or non-EU 
country. The analyses further revealed that the Turkish-Muslim effect seems to be specific to 
the second generation as well as weekly mosque goers. Moreover, my results further fit the 
arguments derived by the social identity literature proposing that personal life satisfaction (i.e. 
well-being), as well as perceived discrimination may be significant determinants of immigrants’ 
satisfaction with democracy. Last but not least, my regression analyses also indicated a positive 
impact of migrants’ national identity on democracy satisfaction, which may flow through higher 
personal well-being (i.e. life satisfaction). 
Taken as a whole, the findings of my longitudinal study on German data contradict 
prevalent assumptions of a per se destructive (i.e. barrier) effect of religious (i.e. Muslim) 
identity on the affect that immigrants manifest towards the political regime of European 
democracies. In terms of being satisfied with the democratic regime in Germany, the effect 
seems to be specific to the experiences of second-generation (i.e. German-born) Turkish 
immigrants who attend religious services at least once a week. Those experiences may involve 
higher discrimination experiences as well as experiences of lower social positions within the 
status hierarchy of German society. My findings with respect to denominational belonging thus 
rather confirm results that have also shown previously that Muslim belonging does not self-
evidently relate to lower external political attitudes such as trust in government or democracy 
satisfaction (e.g. Jackson and Doerschler 2012, 82ff.; Maxwell 2010b). I further conclude from 
my findings that national identity may be a bridge to migrants’ attitudinal inclusion into 
mainstream politics in Germany in terms of positive external evaluations of the political regime 
through increasing well-being. 
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6.3 Implications 
Even though there should be some words of caution with respect to my doctoral research (see 
section 6.4), I argue that the empirical studies within Chapters 2 to 5 of this thesis can put some 
emphasis on the notion that migrants’ social identities in terms of ethnic, religious, and/or 
national identity make a difference for their attitudinal integration into politics of Western 
European countries, involving attitudes towards the self in mainstream politics as well as 
attitudes towards the dominant political regime. 
Which elements then should be taken into account when assessing the impact of national 
identity on immigrants’ attitudinal integration for policy implications? First, my analyses 
suggest that national identity is affected by and itself predicts bridging social contacts and 
(associational) networks, German-language proficiency, as well as levels of perceived 
discrimination, which have been found also by previous research to matter for immigrants’ 
political attitudes such as political interest or political trust (e.g. Berger, Galonska, and 
Koopmans 2004; Eggert and Giugni 2010; Morales and Pilati 2011; van Craen 2012). Thus, the 
support of migrants’ social as well as language inclusion by means of language classes, civic 
integration courses, or civil integration projects in Germany (already at the beginning of their 
stay) may provide pathways to promote their identification with the national political 
community, as well as at the same time their interest in national politics as well as satisfaction 
with the democratic regime. Moreover, stimulating migrants’ social and language assimilation 
may decrease perceptions of ethnic discrimination and cultural incompatibilities – reflecting 
bright ethnic boundaries – which seem to hamper, according to my analysis, national identity 
as well as democracy satisfaction. 
Is it important that minority group members also identify (in addition) with their ethnic 
and religious in-group for their attitudinal integration into politics of the receiving country? 
There are indeed reasons to believe that ethnic and religious identities are important. Thus, 
nonetheless of the meaning of national identification, this dissertation also dwells on the 
importance of dual identity on political interest defined as immigrants’ identification with their 
ethnic in-group as well as the national community in their country of reception, specifically for 
immigrant groups that are known on the one hand to strongly identify with their ethnic in-group 
as well as on the other hand experience that their ethnic identity is devalued within the reception 
context and intergroup boundaries are impermeable. This is, for instance, the case for Turkish 
immigrants in Germany due to lower status positions and social distances by the majority group. 
Thus, an ethnic identity may provide an important part of immigrants’ self-concept that gets 
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them cognitively involved in receiving-country politics. Most importantly, there is also no 
indication from previous research so far that dual identity relates to any form of violent or non-
normative political actions (Simon and Grabow 2010). Hence, the acceptance of migrants’ 
ethnic minority besides the support of a shared national identity might also be a promising 
pathway to migrants’ attitudinal integration into politics in host societies. This also gains weight 
especially under the consideration that it is unlikely that immigrants abandon their 
psychological membership with their ethnic origin and group when entering new intergroup 
contexts such as in the case of multicultural receiving countries. Rather, they provide according 
to social identity approach important parts of migrants’ self-references that are involved with 
subjective self-esteem and well-being, that may buffer negative experiences of discrimination 
(e.g. Branscombe et al. 1999). Thus, it can be expected that ethnic idenity may also positively 
affect evaluations of responsiveness and legitimacy of the democratic political system if they 
perceive that their identity is not threatened and devealued due to low social status or cultural 
non-recognition. Moreover, empirical reality and research show that immigrants prefer and are 
more likely to identify in dual terms (e.g. Verkuyten 2007), and dual identity is related to higher 
self-esteem and well-being (e.g. Berry 1997). 
In a similar vein, my argument also concerns the meaning of migrants’ religious 
minority identity for their attitudinal integration into politics in European receiving countries. 
Thus, my research shows that belonging to Islam has a substantial positive impact on regime 
satisfaction in Germany for all non-Turkish EU- as well as non-EU-immigrant groups. Only for 
Turkish immigrants with an emphasis on the second generation as well as weekly mosque 
attendance Muslim belonging relates to significantly lower levels of satisfaction with the 
German democratic regime than for religiously non-affiliated or Christian-affiliated persons. 
Even though time-constant omitted variables as well as perceptions of discrimination or 
differences in well-being and other integration factors such as structural integration cannot 
completely account for the differences found between Turkish and non-Turkish immigrant 
groups within my longitudinal analysis, they yield to being important determinants of 
immigrants’ current satisfaction with the democratic regime in Germany. Hence, discrimination 
and joblessness are obstacles for migrants’ regime satisfaction. However, further research is 
needed to disentangle the different meanings Muslim-being has for Turkish or non-Turkish 
immigrant’s satisfaction with democracy. 
In sum, my doctoral research, together with earlier studies, underlines that national 
identity has a bridging potential to generate interest in German politics as well as democracy 
satisfaction among immigrants and thus to foster migrant attitudinal integration into receiving-
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country politics. Moreover, it highlights a more complex view on the bridging versus hampering 
functions of migrants’ ethnic and religious minority identity, refuting a simplistic assumption 
of barriers to migrants’ psychological inclusion in receiving-country politics. 
6.4 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
For the empirical analysis, this doctoral thesis used unique longitudinal data from two important 
panel projects that allow assessment of the integration of immigrants in Germany (SCIP and 
GSOEP). While the former project tackles within two waves the integration of recently 
immigrated Polish and Turkish immigrants who have not stayed longer than three years in 
Germany, the latter provide information over more waves on the integration of first- and second-
generation immigrants, who have lived for a longer time in Germany. By employing 
longitudinal data and hybrid regression methods, the research in this doctoral thesis is superior 
to previous cross-sectional research on the same topic. Most of all, it more convincingly allows 
tackling the question of causality with respect to time-variant variables as identification because 
the hybrid regression models employed control for unobserved heterogeneity due to the 
omission of any time-constant variables. Moreover, those models allow assessment of the 
effects of time-variant (e.g. social identification) as well as time-invariant variables (e.g. 
ethnicity) at the same time. 
Despite the general advantages and contributions of my doctoral research to shed light 
on the relationship between migrants’ social identities and political attitudes, as with many other 
researchers, also I am confronted with some limitations that I use as starting point to propose 
suggestions for future research. 
The models presented in this dissertation can be expanded in several ways. One of them 
involves tackling at another time more thoroughly about the question of causality. Despite the 
advantage of controlling for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity and my effort to control 
for time-variant confounding factors, the hybrid models used within this dissertation do not 
completely rule out unobserved heterogeneity due to the omission of time-variant variables as 
well as reverse causality (cf. Brüderl 2010, 992). Even though it is harder to argue in the case 
of religious identity and democracy satisfaction that democracy satisfaction impacts on 
religious belonging and church attendance, in the case of the relationship between nation (dual) 
identity and political interest, the influence may also flow the other way around from interest 
in German politics to identification with Germany. Accordingly, I propose to interpret my 
conclusions on these data in very cautious causal terms. A supplementing approach in the case 
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of at least three waves of empirical data might be the employment of fixed-effects models with 
lagged independent variables, as suggested by Allison (2009) to tackle reverse causality more 
profoundly. 
Second, an extension can include the use of scales to measure immigrants’ political 
interest or satisfaction with the democratic regime. In the present thesis, political interest was 
generally conceptualised as involving three concepts (i.e. political attentiveness, saliency, and 
motivation), yet in the end it was only operationalized by using a single item. Although this 
single-item procedure was determined by the information available in my data and is also 
commonly used in other research (e.g. Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004; Diehl and 
Urbahn 1998; Eggert and Giugni 2010; Fennema and Tillie 1999), it would be worthwhile to 
expand the operationalisation of the concept using more items, which may also increase 
reliability as well as validity. Similarly, with respect to migrants’ external political attitudes, the 
focus can be broadened with respect to political satisfaction to other objects of the political 
system, involving the democratic government, institutions, authorities, and so forth. 
Specifically, with respect to trust, previous research on ethnic minorities already includes more 
items (e.g. Fennema and Tillie 1999; Fleischmann, Phalet, and Swyngedouw 2013; Maxwell 
2010a). 
Relatedly, a third extension can address further indicators of migrants’ social identities. 
In this doctoral thesis, I was constrained to single-item or two-item measures of migrants’ 
national or ethnic and religious identity. However, research proposes that identification is 
multidimensional, involving further aspects than attachment, pride, or importance, such as 
sense of interdependence, content and meaning, or social embeddedness (see for items and 
measures Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). Moreover, within US research 
several ethnic identity scales, such as the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM) by 
Phinney (1992) or the Ethnic Identity Scale (EIS) by Umaña-Taylor et al. (2004) have been 
developed, which measure different dimensions of ethnic identity, involving exploration, 
affirmation, or commitment. However, those scales are less employed thus far within immigrant 
surveys in Germany, even though multi-item measures are more regularly used within Dutch 
social psychological research (e.g. Verkuyten 2007). Thus, I am aware that this dissertation does 
not cover all subdimensions of migrants’ social identities and specifically religious identity, for 
which I could only rely on a type of self-categorisation measure as well as the measures of 
religious social behaviour in Chapter 5. Nonetheless, the single-item approach is also in line 
with other current studies on the impact of social identity and migrants’ political attitudes (e.g. 
Eggert and Giugni 2010; Fleischmann, Phalet, and Swyngedouw 2013; Maxwell 2010b). 
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Concerning political interest, there is a general lack of appropriate measures that capture 
its different aspects (i.e. attentiveness, importance, motivation) or address what “politics” or 
“political” may imply for the respondent. Rather, political interest is measured only by one 
single question such as in SOEP: “Generally speaking, how much are you interested in 
politics?”. This measurement strategy is flawed in terms of reliability and validity. Even more 
problematic with respect to content validity in integration research is that this question in SOEP 
does not address the immigrant situation of different contexts of inclusion and thus whether it 
addresses political issues of the origin country or the host society. The problem is not 
completely solved with the item involved in the SCIP-data as “interest in receiving country 
politics” still leaves open what politics might refer to and what content is implied for the 
migrant. Thus, political interest in receiving country politics may also relate to ethnic group-
specific interests (e.g. assertion of religious rights) or may involve anti-democratic or radical 
democratic views. These measurement problems can conceptually and statistically partly be 
solved by the thesis ex-ante and well as ex-post empirical analysis. First, the thesis conceptually 
differentiates and measures with political interest and democracy satisfaction both an example 
of migrants’ internal political attitudes as well as migrants’ external political attitudes. Even 
though political interest may still involve ethnic or religious group-specific content in terms of 
collective interests, the thesis argues that it may provide an indicator of migrants’ attitudinal 
inclusion as long as it evokes political activity within realms and means of the political system 
of the receiving country. Thus, possible activities may involve wide range of conventional as 
well as unconventional forms, e.g. voting as well as protesting. Moreover, ex post empirical 
analysis, the thesis argues that political interest may rather refer to interest in political issue of 
the receiving country as opposed to the origin country political system because the inclusion 
indicators with respect to the host society (e.g. majority language proficiency and native 
contacts) proves to predict political interest positively, while the reverse is true for ethnic group-
related indicators (e.g. ethnic identification) (cf. results in Chapter 3 and 4). 
Last but not least, a fourth research expansion can include sampling larger sizes of 
immigrant groups coming from predominantly Muslim countries to assess more profoundly the 
meaning of Muslim identity for migrants’ political integration in Germany. Within my studies 
on the SCIP and GSOEP data, I was mainly constrained to Muslim immigrants from Turkey 
and needed to subsume other countries in GSOEP within a broad ethnically diverse category. 
Further SOEP does not allows to detect issues of their legal status with respect to the question 
of asylum seekers.  This research expansion especially gains momentum in the context of 
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current increasing influxes of refugees from Muslim countries other than Turkey, such as from 
countries in the Middle East or North Africa. 
In sum, I conclude that this doctoral thesis yields a number of important (longitudinal) 
insights that contribute in several ways to the current scientific and research literature on 
migrants’ social identities and attitudinal integration into politics within Western European 
countries. Nonetheless, more work still needs to be done to untangle the relationship between 
migrants’ emotional integration on the one hand and their (attitudinal) integration into politics 
on the other hand. 
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